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“[E]veryone	will	 always	 have	 the	 liberty	 to	 speak,	as	he	pleases,	and	to	apply	what	articulate	sounds	to	 what	 ideas	 he	 thinks	 fit,	 and	 change	 them	 as	often	as	he	pleases.	But	yet	when	we	will	 inquire,	what	 makes	 the	 same	 spirit,	 man,	 or	 person,	 we	must	 fix	 the	 ideas	 of	 spirit,	man,	 or	person,	 in	 our	minds;	 and	 having	 resolved	 with	 ourselves	 what	we	mean	by	them,	it	will	not	be	hard	to	determine,	in	 either	of	 them,	or	 the	 like,	when	 it	 is	 the	 same,	and	when	not.”	 John	Locke,	An	Essay	
Concerning	Human	Understanding		 	
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Introduction		Imagine	 that	 this	morning,	 I	 picked	up	my	umbrella	 on	my	way	out.	 It	might	simply	be	that	I	am	in	the	habit	of	doing	so:	come	sun,	come	rain,	I	pick	up	my	umbrella	 on	 my	 way	 out.	 However,	 it	 might	 be	 that	 I	 did	 so	 because	 I	 was	motivated	to	do	so.	If	that	was	the	case,	we	can	ask	what	it	was	that	motivated	me	to	do	so.	As	it	is	often	put:	we	can	ask	what	my	motivating	reason	was.	In	the	literature,	one	finds	two	quite	different	answers	to	that	question.	According	to	the	 long-time	 orthodoxy,	 call	 it	 ‘Psychologism’,	 motivating	 reasons	 are	 our	believing	something	(and	maybe	also	our	desiring	something).	According	 to	a	view	 that	 recently	 has	 become	 popular,	 call	 it	 ‘Non-Psychologism’,	 when	 we	specify	 the	reasons	 for	which	someone	acted,	or	 their	motivating	reasons,	we	specify	something	that	she	believed.	So,	according	to	the	Non-Psychologist,	my	motivating	 reason	 for	 picking	 up	 an	 umbrella	 will	 have	 been	 something	 I	believe,	 say,	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 According	 to	 the	 Psychologist,	 however,	 my	motivating	reason	will	have	been	my	believing	something	(and	maybe	also	my	desiring	something),	say,	my	believing	that	that	it	is	raining	(and	my	desire	to	stay	dry).	Non-Psychologism	has	a	lot	going	for	it.	For	what	I	believe	can	be	a	fact,	and	 facts	 can	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 actions,	 i.e.	 they	 can	 be	 so-called	 normative	reasons.	 So,	 the	 Non-Psychologistic	 view	 allows	 us	 to	 conceptualize	 me	 as	acting	 for	a	normative	reason,	as	 it	allows	that	my	motivating	reason	can	be	a	normative	reason.	But	Non-Psychologism	is	generally	taken	to	be	faced	with	a	problem,	 at	 least	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 what	 the	 agent	 relevantly	 believes	 is	mistaken.	For	it	is	only	natural	to	think	that	when	someone	does	something	for	a	reason,	what	explains	her	action	is	the	reason	for	which	she	did	it.	However,	
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as	what	we	believe	can	be	false,	the	view	that	motivating	reasons	are	what	we	believe	then	seems	to	imply	that	in	error-cases,	falsehoods	explain	actions,	and	falsehoods	do	not	seem	to	be	able	to	explain	anything,	let	alone	actions.	That	is,	even	 if	 Non-Psychologism,	 the	 view	 that	 motivating	 reasons	 are	 what	 we	believe,	initially	might	have	something	going	for	it,	it	is	incompatible	with	two	seeming	 truisms,	 namely,	 that	 motivating	 reasons	 explain	 actions,	 and	 that	falsehoods	cannot	explain	actions.	 If	 it	was	not	raining	 this	morning,	 it	 seems	misleading	 to	 say	 that	 I	 picked	 up	my	 umbrella	 because	 it	 was	 raining.	 For,	saying	 that	 I	picked	up	my	umbrella	because	 it	was	raining	seems	 like	saying	that	what	explains	why	I	picked	up	my	umbrella	was	that	it	was	raining.	But	if	it	is	not	true	that	it	was	raining,	how	can	it	be	that	what	explains	why	I	picked	up	an	umbrella	is	that	it	was	raining?		I	 am	 going	 to	 argue	 that	 on	 a	 certain	 understanding	 of	 the	 term	‘motivating	reason’,	Non-Psychologism	is	correct	and	insightful.	Moreover,	I	am	going	to	argue	that	on	the	understanding	of	the	term	‘motivating	reason’	under	which	Non-Psychologism	is	correct,	Non-Psychologists	do	not	have	the	problem	that	 they	 are	 generally	 taken	 to	 have,	 for	 on	 that	 understanding,	 motivating	reasons	do	not	explain	actions.	Positively,	I	will	argue	that	when	someone	does	something	 for	 a	 motivating	 reason,	 in	 the	 sense	 at	 issue,	 what	 explains	 her	action	is	the	fact	or	truth	that	she	did	what	she	did	for	that	motivating	reason,	which	 itself	 can	 be	 a	 falsehood.	 However,	 I	 am	 also	 going	 to	 argue	 that	 we	should	 be	 wary	 of	 contrasting	 Non-Psychologistic	 views	 with	 Psychologistic	views,	in	the	manner	in	which	they	usually	are	contrasted.	My	main	device	is	the	concept	of	acting	on	a	ground.	Someone	acts	on	a	ground,	I	will	say,	just	in	case	she	is	motivated	to	act	by	something	she	takes	to	
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speak	 in	 favor	 of	 so	 acting,	 and	 because	 she	 takes	 it	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 so	acting.	That	is,	something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	just	in	case	it	is	(a) taken	by	 the	agent	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	of	performing	a	 certain	 course	of	action,	and	(b) motivates	her	to	perform	that	action,	where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that	(c) what	motivates	 the	 agent	 to	 do	what	 she	 does	motivates	 her	 because	she	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	so	acting.	A	few	words	on	terminological	matters.	As	many	things	can	be	said	to	motivate	agents,	 I	will	call	the	sense	of	motivation	at	 issue	when	someone	is	motivated	by	something	she	takes	to	be	a	reason,	and	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason,	i.e.	 the	sense	of	motivation	at	 issue	when	someone	acts	on	a	ground,	 ‘rational	motivation’.	 I	 will	 reserve	 the	 term	 ‘reason’	 for	 things	 that	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	actions,	 i.e.	 for	what	are	sometimes	called	‘normative	reasons’.	As	we	will	see,	grounds	can	be	reasons,	but	it	is	not	essential	to	something	being	a	ground	that	it	is	a	reason.		I	divide	the	thesis	into	three	parts.	In	the	first	part,	I	focus	on	the	notion	of	a	reason.	Reasons,	as	I	use	the	term,	are	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	in	deliberation	and	advice.	 I	 argue	 that	 as	what	we	 seek	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	deliberation	and	advice	are	facts	that	favor	actions,	reasons	are	facts	that	favor	actions.	I	give	the	idea	that	reasons	are	facts	that	favor	actions	so	much	space	because	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 ground	 employs	 the	 concept	 of	 a	reason.	 Also,	 as	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 normative	reason,	getting	clear	on	what	reasons	are	helps	to	get	clear	on	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	 I	will	argue	 that	what	plays	 the	role	of	a	ground	 is	what	we	believe.	 And	 that	 argument	 stands	 and	 falls	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 normative	
	 9	
reasons	are	facts	that	favor	actions.	So,	in	the	first	part,	I	show	that	the	idea	of	a	fact	 that	 favors	an	action	 is	highly	ecumenical,	 in	 that	 talking	about	 facts	 that	favor	actions	(i)	leaves	it	open	whether	more	can	be	said	about	what	it	is	for	a	fact	 to	 favor	an	action,	 and	whether	more	 can	be	 said	about	what	 it	 is	 for	 an	action	to	be	favored	by	a	fact,	(ii)	leaves	it	open	why,	or	in	virtue	of	what,	some	particular	 fact	speak	 in	 favor	of	some	particular	action,	or	what	 the	source	of	the	normative	or	favoring	force	of	facts	is,	and	(iii)	leaves	it	open	whether	some	particular	 fact’s	 being	 a	 reason	 for	 some	 particular	 agent	 to	 perform	 some	particular	 action	 depends,	 in	 some	 way	 or	 another,	 on	 that	 agents	 cognitive	and/or	conative	condition.		In	the	second	part,	I	introduce	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	seek	to	show	that	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	a	host	of	contentious	issues.	With	the	help	of	the	concept	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	drawing	on	what	was	done	in	the	foregoing	part,	I	argue	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	what	we	believe,	that	 Non-Psychologists	 are	 talking	 about	 grounds	 when	 they	 use	 the	 term	‘motivating	 reason’,	 and,	 thus,	 that	 Non-Psychologism	 about	 motivating	reasons,	understood	as	Non-Psychologism	about	grounds,	is	correct.	Moreover,	I	argue	that	while	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	about	grounds	when	they	use	the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reasons’,	 Psychologists,	 when	 they	 use	 that	 term,	 are	talking	about	explanantia.	However,	this	does	not	mean	that	the	debate	rests	on	an	equivocation.	For	Non-Psychologists	often	assume	that	what	plays	the	role	of	 a	 ground	 is	 also	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 an	 explanans,	 and	 as	 long	 as	 that	assumption	is	in	play,	the	debate	between	Psychologists	and	Non-Psychologists	has	 substance.	 However,	 as	 I	 will	 argue	 in	 part	 III,	 we	 should	 give	 up	 that	assumption.	
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In	part	II,	I	also	briefly	address	the	issue	of	reductive	accounts	of	acting	on	 a	 ground,	 or	 of	 being	 rationally	motivated.	 A	 large	 body	 of	work	 done	 in	contemporary	 theory	 of	 action	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 question	what	 it	 is	 for	someone	to	act,	or	to	act	on	a	ground,	or	for	a	reason	–	where	to	give	such	an	account	 is	 to	 give	 an	 account	 in	 at	 least	 allegedly	more	basic	 or	 fundamental	terms,	like	causation	by	mental	states,	or	whatever	it	is	that	realizes	them	in	a	naturalistically	 understood	 world.	 But	 what	 I	 am	 engaged	 in	 here	 is	 neutral	with	 regard	 to	 the	 feasibility	 and	 necessity	 of	 giving	 such	 an	 account.	 It	 is	important	 to	 point	 this	 out	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 distinguishing	 what	 I	 am	engaged	in	from	this	other	project	that	a	large	body	of	work	is	engaged	in	helps	to	 clarify	 the	 project	 I	 am	 engaged	 in.	 Secondly,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 notion	 of	‘motivating	reason’	that	figures	in	such	accounts;	a	‘motivating	reason’,	on	that	usage	of	the	term,	is	a	psychological	state	(or	a	pair	of	psychological	states)	that	figures	in	a	reductive	account	of	what	it	is	to	act,	or	to	act	on	a	ground,	or	for	a	reason.	In	 the	 third	and	 final	part,	 I	will	 address	what	 is	generally	 taken	 to	be	the	main	 challenge	 for	Non-Psychologism	about	motivating	 reasons.	As	 I	 said	above:	 Motivating	 reasons	 are	 often	 taken	 to	 be	 what	 explain	 actions,	 but	surely,	falsehoods	cannot	explain	actions.	However,	if,	as	the	Non-Psychologist	holds,	motivating	reasons	are	what	we	believe,	say,	that	P,	and	what	we	believe	can	be	 false,	 then	P	can	be	a	motivating	 reason	despite	being	 false.	Replacing	the	 ambiguous	 ‘motivating	 reason’	with	 ‘ground’,	 we	 can	 put	 the	 problem	 in	terms	of	the	following	inconsistent	triad:	(i) What	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	a	falsehood.	(ii) Falsehoods	cannot	play	the	role	of	explanantia.	
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(iii) What	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 is	 also	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 an	explanantia.	Now,	 as	 part	 II	 showed	 that	 (i)	 is	 correct,	 and	 as	 I	 take	 it	 that	 we	 cannot	reasonably	challenge	(ii),	what	I	think	we	can	learn	from	this	is	that	(iii)	must	be	mistaken.	However,	 that	 (iii)	 is	mistaken	does	not	mean	that	grounds	play	no	 role	 whatsoever	 in	 explanations.	 Grounds	 can	 figure	 or	 feature	 in	explanations,	 without	 playing	 the	 role	 of	 an	 explanans.	 And	 on	 pain	 of	 not	showing	 the	 action	 to	 be	 done	 on	 a	 ground,	 they	must	 figure	 or	 feature	 in	explanations.	 But	what,	 then,	 does	 play	 the	 role	 of	 an	 explanans,	 in	 a	 case	 in	which	 S	 Φ’s	 on	 grounds	 of	 P?	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 explanantia	 are	 what	 I	 call	motivation-facts,	i.e.	facts	to	the	effect	that	some	consideration	played	the	role	of	 the	 agent’s	 ground.	 Further,	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	motivation-facts.	 If	 in	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	S	 is	Φing	for	a	normative	reason,	then	the	fact	that	she	Φed	on	grounds	of	that	reason	is	the	motivation-fact	that	explains	her	Φing.	If,	however,	in	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	S	merely	takes	herself	to	be	Φing	for	a	normative	reason	(i.e.	if	the	ground	on	which	she	Φ’s	is	not	a	reason,	 but	 is	merely	 taken	 by	 her	 to	 be	 one),	 then	 the	 fact	 that	 she	Φed	 on	grounds	 of	 the	 believed	 proposition	 P	 is	 the	motivation-fact	 that	 explains	 her	Φing.	 For	one,	my	thesis	casts	new	light	on	the	debate	between	Psychologists	and	 Non-Psychologists.	 An	 examination	 of	 the	 various	 senses	 of	 the	 term	‘motivating	reason’	is	much	needed,	as	it	helps	to	see	what	is	and	what	is	not	at	issue.	 Besides	 that,	 however,	my	 thesis	 offers	 an	 independent	 clarification	 of	the	relation	between	favorers,	motivators,	and	explanantia,	and,	thereby	(to	be	bold)	of	rational	agency.	What	motivates	is	often	conflated	with	what	explains.	
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Distinguishing	 those	 two	 things	 allows	 one	 to	 understand	 how	 favorers	 and	motivators	are	related.	
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A	Brief	Guide	to	the	Main	Distinctions		Certain	distinctions,	theoretical	options,	and	labels	will	keep	coming	up.	And	in	due	course,	 I	will	have	a	 lot	 to	 say	about	 them.	But	 to	prepare	 the	 reader	 for	what	 is	coming,	 it	 seems	helpful	 to	start	with	a	brief	overview	of	some	of	 the	main	distinctions,	options,	and	labels.	I	will	distinguish	the	following	three	roles:	(1) Speaking	in	favor	of	some	course	of	action.	(2) Motivating	someone	to	perform	some	course	of	action.	(3) Explaining	why	someone	performed	some	course	of	action.	I	 will	 use	 the	 term	 ‘reason’	 to	 talk	 about	 what	 plays	 the	 first	 role,	 the	 term	‘ground’	 to	talk	about	what	plays	the	second	role,	and	the	term	 ‘explanans’	 to	talk	about	what	plays	the	third	role.		I	will	 be	 talking	 in	 detail	 about	 all	 of	 those	 three	 roles.	 But	 especially	with	regard	to	the	notion	of	explanation,	it	might	be	helpful	to	distinguish	two	senses	of	 ‘explaining’	right	at	the	outset.	As	philosophers,	we	give	accounts	or	theories	of	things	like	action,	or	normativity,	or	values.	And	another	way	to	put	that	is	to	say	that	as	philosophers,	we	explain	action,	or	normativity,	or	values.	But	 this	 sense	 of	 ‘explaining’	 (which	 one	might	 call	 the	 philosopher’s	 sense)	should	be	held	 apart	 from	what	we	do	when	we,	 as	 agents,	explain	why,	 say,	Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump,	or	why	Donald	flipped	the	switch,	or,	for	that	matter,	why	the	bridge	collapsed,	or	the	car	did	not	start.	When	we,	as	agents,	explain	why	Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump,	we	do	not	seek	to	give	a	theory	of	her	operating	 the	pump.	Rather,	we	seek	 to	render	intelligible	her	doing	what	she	did	by	way	of	bringing	 to	 light	on	what	grounds	she	did	so,	or	by	way	of	showing	 in	 response	 to	 what	 reason,	 or	 with	 what	 end	 in	 view,	 she	 did	 so.	
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When	I	talk	about	‘explaining	why	someone	performed	some	course	of	action’,	I	will	be	talking	about	explaining	in	this	second	sense	(which	one	might	call	the	agent’s	sense),	albeit,	of	course,	 in	my	capacity	as	philosopher.	For,	of	course,	one	 can	 also	 hope	 to	 explain	 (in	 the	 philosopher’s	 sense)	 explanation	 (in	 the	agent’s	sense),	that	is,	give	a	theory	or	an	account	thereof	(cf.	II.5,	III.4).	As	we	will	see,	(2)	and	(3)	are	often	run	together.	That	is,	talking	about	something	 that	motivates	 someone	 to	perform	some	course	of	 action	 is	often	taken	 to	 be	 tantamount	 to	 talking	 about	what	 explains	why	 she	 so	 acted	 (cf.	II.2.3,	 III.1).	 One	 main	 result	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 that	 is	 a	 mistake.	Distinguishing	the	motivational	and	the	explanatory	role	at	the	outset	does	not	amount	 to	 begging	 the	 question	with	 regard	 to	 that	matter.	 Rather,	 it	 allows	one	 to	 raise	 the	 question	 whether	 things	 that	 motivate	 are	 distinct	 from	 or	identical	with	 things	 that	 explain.	 So	 it	 does	 not	 beg	 the	 question	 –	 it	 avoids	doing	so.		I	will	also	talk	about	Psychologistic	and	Non-Psychologistic	accounts.	It	is	 important	 to	 make	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 actually	 two	 Psychologism/Non-Psychologism-distinctions.	When	 it	 is	asked	what	plays	 the	role	of	an	X	 (i.e.	a	reason,	 or	 a	 ground,	 or	 an	 explanans),	 one	 answer	 to	 consider	 is	 that	
psychological	 states	 are	 what	 plays	 that	 role.	 The	 first	 type	 of	 Psychologistic	account	 is	 an	 account	 that	 gives	 such	 an	 answer.	 When	 necessary,	 I	 will	highlight	that	that	kind	of	Psychologistic	account	is	at	issue	by	terming	it	‘State-Psychologism’:	(State-Psychologism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	psychological	state.	The	according	Non-Psychologistic	answer	is	that	what	plays	the	role	of	an	X	is	not	a	psychological	state,	but	rather,	a	fact,	or	a	proposition:	
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(Propositionalism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	proposition.	(Factualism	about	X)	What	plays	the	role	of	X	is	a	fact.	Note,	 however,	 that	 as	 I	 will	 use	 the	 term,	 facts	 are	 true	 propositions.	 Thus,	Factualism	about	X	is	a	subset	of	Propositionalism	about	X.	But	 once	 a	 Non-Psychologistic	 answer	 of	 this	 first	 kind	 is	 given,	 the	possibility	of	 a	 second	 type	of	Psychologism	arises.	 If,	 for	 instance,	 one	holds	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	proposition,	or	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	reason	is	a	fact,	one	can	then	raise	the	question	whether	the	relevant	kinds	of	 facts,	 or	 propositions,	 respectively,	 are	 always	 facts	 or	 propositions	 about	psychological	matters.	When	 necessary,	 I	 will	 signify	 that	 I	 am	 talking	 about	that	second	kind	of	psychologistic	account	by	qualifying	the	view	accordingly:	(Psychologistic	Propositionalism	about	X)	What	plays	 the	role	of	X	 is	a	proposition	about	psychological	matters.	(Psychologistic	 Factualism	 about	 X)	What	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 X	 is	 a	 fact	about	psychological	matters.	Note	 that	 I	will	 not	 understand	 the	 according	Non-Psychologistic	 view	as	 the	view	that	propositions,	or	facts,	about	psychological	matters	can	never	play	the	role	 at	 issue,	 but	 rather,	 as	 the	 view	 that	 when	 facts	 or	 propositions	 about	psychological	matters	do	play	the	role	at	issue,	their	being	facts	or	propositions	
about	psychological	matters	 is	not	essential	 to	 their	playing	 the	 role	 that	 they	play	(cf.	I.5,	II.4).	Finally,	 in	 part	 III,	 I	 will	 talk	 about	 Disjunctivist	 accounts.	 As	 I	understand	it,	a	Disjunctive	account	of	X	is	an	account	that	holds	that	instances	of	 X	 come	 in	 two	 forms.	 For	 instance,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 we	 need	 a	disjunctive	 account	 of	 perceptual	 states,	 according	 to	 which	 being	 in	 a	perceptual	state	either	puts	one	in	a	position	to	acquire	knowledge	of	the	facts,	
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or	 does	 not	 put	 one	 in	 such	 a	 position,	where	 being	 in	 a	 position	 to	 acquire	knowledge	of	 the	 facts	does	not	simply	amount	 to	being	 in	a	perceptual	state	that	 is	 such	 that	 given	 that	 some	 non-circular	 condition	 holds,	 being	 in	 that	state	 amounts	 to	 being	 in	 a	 position	 to	 acquire	 knowledge	 of	 the	 facts.	 The	according	conjunctive	account	holds	that	being	in	a	perceptual	state	is	the	same	all	 along,	 but	 that	 sometimes,	 a	 certain	 non-circular	 condition	 is	 satisfied,	 so	that	 being	 in	 a	 perceptual	 state	 amounts	 to	 being	 in	 a	 position	 to	 acquire	knowledge	of	the	facts.	One	can	apply	this	idea	also	to	our	topic,	and	one	can	do	so	in	diverse	ways.	That	is,	one	can	give	a	disjunctive	account	of	reasons,	or	of	grounds,	 or	 of	 explanantia;	 but	 also,	 say,	 of	 actions	 done	 on	 grounds	 or	 for	reasons.	With	 these	 distinctions	 in	 hand,	 one	 could	 generate	 an	 unmanageable	amount	 of	 theoretical	 options.	 But	 that	 is	 not	 the	 only	 reason	why	 I	will	 not	discuss	 all	 the	 possible	 theoretical	 options.	 I	 take	 it	 that	 not	 all	 of	 those	theoretical	options	are	worth	discussing.	And	thus,	I	will	confine	my	discussion	to	those	that	(i)	seem	like	at	least	initially	plausible	alternatives	to	the	option	I	take	 to	 be	 true	 and	 for	 which	 I	 will	 argue,	 and	 to	 those	 that	 (ii)	 have	 some	prominence	in	the	literature.	In	the	introduction,	I	have	already	stated	what	I	am	going	to	argue	for.	In	the	 light	 of	 the	 distinctions	 I	 have	 introduced,	 I	 can	 now	 say	more	 precisely	what	I	am	going	to	argue	for,	namely,	that	reasons	are	(for	the	most	part)	non-psychological	 facts,	 that	 grounds	 are	 (for	 the	 most	 part)	 non-psychological	propositions,	 and	 that	 explanantia	 are	 a	 special	 kind	 of	 facts,	 namely,	what	 I	will	call	motivation-facts,	 i.e.	 facts	about	what	proposition	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	Moreover,	 I	will	 argue	 that	motivation-facts	 come	 in	 two	 kinds,	 i.e.	 I	will	give	a	disjunctive	account	of	explanantia.	
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Part	I:	Reasons		I	 will	 employ	 the	 term	 ‘normative	 reason’	 (or	 ‘reason’,	 for	 short)	 to	 signify	whatever	it	 is	that	we	seek	to	take	into	account	(i)	when	deciding	what	to	do,	and	 (ii)	 when	 advising	 others	 on	 what	 they	 are	 to	 do.1	One	 can,	 of	 course,	employ	the	term	differently.	Doing	so,	however,	would	amount	to	changing	the	topic.	I	will	come	back	to	that	below.	Normative	 reasons,	 on	 the	 suggested	 usage	 of	 the	 term,	 are	 what	 we	
seek	to	take	into	account.	But	we	do	not	always	succeed	therein.	When	deciding	on	what	to	do,	and	when	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do,	we	can	take	things	into	account	that	are	not	reasons,	but	that	we	merely	take	to	be	reasons.	Consequently,	 our	 decisions	 and	 our	 advice	 can	 be	 flawed	 in	 precisely	 that	respect.	And	importantly,	if	they	are	flawed	in	that	respect,	they	are	flawed	by	our	 own	 lights:	 if	 we	 retrospectively	 come	 to	 see	 that	 what	 we	 took	 into	account	was	not	a	reason,	we	will	thereby	come	to	see	that	we	made	a	certain	kind	of	mistake	(albeit	not	necessarily	a	mistake	for	which	we	are	culpable).	Reasons,	in	the	sense	at	issue,	also	seem	to	play	a	role	in	(iii)	evaluating	actions.	Moreover	–	or	so	I	will	argue	in	III.4	–	they	play	a	role	in	(iv)	explaining	at	least	some	actions;	notably,	in	explaining	those	actions	that	are	such	that	the	agent	 is	 (v)	motivated	 to	 perform	 them	by	 some	 reason	 to	 perform	 them	 (cf.	II.1,	III.4).	However,	let	me	put	(iii)-(v)	aside	for	now	and	focus	on	(i)	and	(ii).	
																																																								
1	That	 reasons	 are	 in	 the	 focus	 in	 deliberation	 is	 common-fare,	 cf.	 e.g.	 Raz	(1975,	 pp.	 15–16)	 and	Wallace	 (2003,	 p.	 432).	 The	 relation	 between	 reasons	and	advice	is	stressed	e.g.	by	Scanlon	(1998,	p.	20)	and	Thomson	(2003,	p.	44).	
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In	 general,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 enable	 myself	 to	 talk	 about	normative	reasons	without	venturing	too	far	into	debated	issues.	I	suggest	that	I	can	do	that	by	following	the	standard	line	of	taking	reasons	to	be	facts	that,	at	least	in	certain	circumstances,	speak	in	favor	of	actions	(I.1).	I	will	defend	this	Factualist	account	of	reasons	by	way	of	showing	that	such	an	understanding	of	reasons	is	neutral	in	many	crucial	respects:	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	whether	reasons	are	conditioned	on	the	conative	and	cognitive	situation	of	the	agent	for	whom	they	are	reasons	(I.2),	and	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	what	the	source	of	reasons	 is	 (I.3).	What	 kinds	 of	 facts	 are	 reasons?	 I	will	 suggest	 that	 ordinary	empirical	 facts	 can	 be	 reasons,	 and	 discuss	 the	 view	 that	 they	 are	 evaluative	facts	(I.4),	and	the	view	that	they	are	psychological	facts	(I.5).		
1.	The	Notion	of	a	Normative	Reason	
	In	 the	 practical	 domain,	 normative	 reasons	 –	 understood	 in	 the	manner	 just	expounded,	i.e.	understood	as	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	in	deliberation	and	advice	–	are	standardly	taken	to	be	 facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions,	or	facts	that	make	a	case	(or	at	least	part	of	a	case)	for	performing	a	certain	action	(cf.	 e.g.	 Dancy,	 2004a;	 Parfit,	 2011;	 Raz,	 1975,	 1999,	 2011b;	 Scanlon,	 1998,	2014).	At	least	in	normal	cases,	these	facts	are	facts	about	the	world	around	us,	and	 not	 facts	 about	 our	 own	 mind.	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 the	 fact	 that	 you	promised	to	Φ.	By	way	of	that	fact,	a	case	can	be	made	for	you	to	Φ.	Or	take	the	fact	 that	 it	 is	 your	mother’s	 birthday	 today.	 In	 the	 light	 of	 that	 fact,	 there	 is	something	to	be	said	for	giving	her	a	call,	or	paying	her	a	visit;	and	in	that	sense,	that	fact	can	be	said	to	speak	in	favor	of	your	giving	her	a	call,	or	paying	her	a	
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visit.	Or,	finally,	take	the	fact	that	the	building	we	are	in	is	on	fire.	By	way	of	that	fact,	a	case	can	be	made	for	leaving	the	building	as	fast	as	possible.2	As	we	will	see,	there	can	also	be	cases	in	which,	say,	the	fact	that	I	believe	that	there	are	pink	rats	living	in	my	shoes	is	a	reason	for	me	to	do	something,	namely,	to	go	and	seek	out	a	psychiatrist.	But	standardly,	reasons	are	not	such	psychological	facts	(cf.	I.5).	However,	as	we	will	also	see,	that	does	not	rule	out	that	the	mind	of	 the	 agent	whose	 reasons	we	are	 concerned	with	plays	no	 role	whatsoever	(I.2).		 Understood	very	generally,	 to	say	of	a	 fact	 that	 it	speaks	 in	 favor	of	an	action,	 or	 that	 a	 case	 can	 be	made	 for	 performing	 a	 certain	 action	 by	way	 of	pointing	out	 that	certain	 fact	obtains,	 is	 just	 to	say	 that	 that	 fact	bears	on	the	
normative	 status	 of	 the	 action	 that	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 for.	 What	 is	 the	 relevant	normative	 status?	 Is	 it	 simply	 the	 status	 of	 being	 supported	 or	 favored	 by	
reasons?	 Or	 can	 it	 be	 spelled	 out	 in	 terms	 of,	 say,	 the	 action	 being	what	 one	
ought	to	do,	or	in	terms	of	it	being	good	in	some	sense,	or	in	terms	of	it	having	some	value?	Or,	more	 sophisticated	maybe,	 is	 it	 the	 status	 of	 being	what	 any	well-informed	 rational	 agent,	 or	 any	 well-informed	 and	 fully	 virtuous	 agent,	would	do	 in	such	a	situation?	And	what	exactly	 is	 it	 for	a	 fact	 to	bear	on	 that	status?	Is	it	just	for	that	fact	to	speak	in	favor	of	performing	that	action,	where	the	concept	of	 speaking-in-favor	 is	a	primitive	concept	 (Parfit,	2011;	Scanlon,	1998,	2014)?	Or	is	it	for	it	to	be	evidence	for	believing	that	that	action	has	that	
																																																								
2	Of	course,	these	examples	take	a	stand	on	first-order	normative	issues.	But	it	is	 not	 for	 no	 reason	 that	 the	 examples	 chosen	 are	 not	 examples	 about	controversial	 issues,	such	as,	say,	euthanasia	or	abortion.	The	point	of	making	those	examples	is	not	to	push	any	particular	first-order	normative	view,	but	to	illustrate	a	structure,	assuming	hopefully	uncontroversial	first-order	normative	views.	
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status	(Kearns	&	Star,	2009)?	Or	is	 it	 for	it	to	explain,	at	 least	partially,	why	it	has	 that	 status	 (Broome,	 2004)?	 These	 are	 interesting	 and	 important	 issues.	But	for	my	present	concerns,	they	can	be	left	open.	Let	 me	 further	 clarify	 the	 relevant	 notion	 of	 a	 normative	 reason	 by	discussing	 two	 quite	 simple	 objections.	 First,	 someone	 might	 object	 to	examples	like	the	ones	given	by	concocting	a	story	in	which,	say,	someone	is	in	a	burning	house,	but	in	which	that	fact	does	not	seem	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	jump	 out	 of	 the	 window	 into	 the	 canal:	 Maybe	 she	 cannot	 swim	 and	 would	surely	drown,	were	she	to	jump	out	of	the	window	into	the	canal;	or	maybe	she	is	 on	 the	 55th	 floor	 and	 would	 certainly	 die,	 were	 she	 to	 jump	 out	 of	 the	window.	The	same,	it	would	seem,	could	be	done	for	any	other	example.	That	would	only	be	an	objection	if	the	claim	were	that	the	fact	that	the	house	is	on	fire	is	a	reason	to	jump	out	of	the	window	no	matter	what,	or	in	all	
possible	 circumstances.	 So,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 that	 simple	objection,	we	should	say	that	reason-claims	do	not	merely	relate	an	agent,	an	action,	and	a	fact	in	a	manner	that	reveals	the	fact	to	be	a	reason	for	the	agent	to	 perform	 the	 action.	 Rather,	 we	 should	 say	 that	 they	 do	 so	 only	 in	 certain	
circumstances,	or	only	given	certain	conditions	(which	need	not	 imply	 that	we	can	 exhaustively	 state	 those	 conditions	 or	 circumstances).	 In	many	 domains,	we	can	distinguish	between	something’s	being	or	 counting	as	 something,	 and	the	 conditions	 under	 which	 it	 is	 or	 counts	 as	 that	 thing.	 For	 instance,	 my	kicking	the	ball	 into	the	net	counts	as	scoring	a	goal	only	 if	 I	am	engaged	in	a	game	of	football;	if	I	am	engaged	in	a	game	of	handball,	my	kicking	the	ball	into	the	net	does	not	count	as	scoring	a	goal.	But	that	is	not	to	say	that	part	of	my	scoring	a	goal	is	my	being	engaged	in	a	game	of	football.	My	being	engaged	in	a	game	 of	 football	 is	 a	 condition	 for	 my	 kicking	 a	 ball	 into	 the	 net	 being	 or	
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counting	as	scoring	a	goal,	and	not	part	of	my	scoring	a	goal.3	In	this	spirit,	one	can	distinguish	between,	 on	 the	one	hand,	 facts	 that	 are	 reasons,	 and,	 on	 the	other	hand,	the	conditions	under	which	they	are	reasons.	Based	 on	 considerations	 such	 as	 these,	 it	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	we	should	take	reason-claims	to	be	four-place	relations.	That	is,	that	reason-claims	have	the	following	form:	R(P,	C,	S,	Φ),	where	P	is	a	fact	that,	in	circumstances	C,	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	(Cuneo,	2007,	pp.	 62–70;	 Scanlon,	 2014,	 p.	 32;	 Skorupski,	 2010,	 pp.	 35–37).4	Accordingly,	 a	reason-claim	 can	 be	 undercut	 –	 or	 a	 reason	 shown	 to	 be	 a	mere	 prima	 facie	reason	–	by	showing	that	the	relevant	circumstances	do	not	obtain.5	Secondly,	 one	might	 object	 that	 even	 if	 the	 relevant	 circumstances	 do	obtain,	 and	 the	 fact	 thus	 does	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 action,	 performing	 that	action	is	not	what	the	agent	ought	to	do.	Understood	in	the	most	natural	way,	that	 possibility	 is	 not	 actually	 an	 objection:	 It	merely	 serves	 to	 highlight	 that	reasons,	in	the	sense	at	issue,	merely	have	a	pro	tanto	force.	That	is	to	say,	they	do	not	say	 that	some	course	of	action	 is	what	we	have	most	reason	 to	do,	but	merely,	that	it	is	what	we	have	reason	to	do	to	a	certain	extent,	namely,	only	to																																																									
3	For	a	discussion	of	background	(or	enabling)	conditions,	cf.	Dancy	(2004,	chap.	3)	and	Schroeder	(2007,	chap.	2).	4	Skorupski	actually	takes	it	that	we	can	helpfully	understand	reason-claims	to	be	 six-place	 relations,	where	 the	 two	 further	 relata,	 in	his	 view,	 are	 time	 and	
strength.	5	We	 might	 also	 call	 prima	 facie	 reasons	 ‘apparent	 reasons’,	 as	 they	 merely	
appear	to	be	reasons.	But	we	should	note	that	there	is	something	else	that	one	might	with	equal	justice	call	‘apparent	reasons’.	In	the	example	given,	a	reason-claim	 was	 undercut	 by	 bringing	 in	 more	 of	 the	 relevant	 background	 story.	However,	 there	 is	also	another	sense	 in	which	something	 that	 is	presented	to	be	a	reason	can	be	shown	to	merely	apparently	be	a	reason,	namely,	by	way	of	showing	 the	 fact	 that	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 reason	 does	 not	 obtain.	 This	 is	 how	Alvarez	(2010,	p.	140)	employs	the	term	‘apparent	reason’.	
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the	 extent	 that	 there	 are	 no	 other	 weightier	 reasons	 that	 speak	 against	 that	course	of	action,	or	in	favor	of	some	other	incompatible	course	of	action.	Thus,	when	we	say	 that	 some	 fact	 is	a	 reason	 for	S	 to	Φ,	we	 leave	 it	open	whether	there	might	be	other	reasons	against	Φing,	or	in	favor	of	Ψing	(where	Ψing	is	incompatible	with	Φing).6	
	
1.1	Facts		I	have	just	said	that	normative	reasons	are	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions.	But	what	do	I	mean	by	‘fact’?	As	I	will	use	the	term,	when	S	believes	that	P,	and	P	is	true,	then	what	S	believes	is	a	fact.	That	is,	as	I	will	use	the	term,	facts	are	true	 thoughts,	 or	 true	 propositions	 (Frege,	 2003;	McDowell,	 1994;	 Strawson,	1949).	And	thus,	by	saying	that	reasons	are	facts,	I	am	saying	that	reasons	are	true	propositions	(cf.	e.g.	Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	40–44;	Darwall,	1983,	p.	31;	Lord,	
																																																								
6	I	will	not	attempt	to	say	how	we	get	from	a	view	about	what	speaks	in	favor	of	what	to	a	view	about	what	we	have	most	reason	to	do.	However,	it	seems	safe	to	say	that	‘most	reason’	does	not	mean	‘most	reasons’,	that	is,	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	we	have	most	reason	to	do	what	there	are	most	reasons	for	us	to	do.	For	surely,	there	can	be	many	minor	reasons	in	favor	of	Φing	(it	would	please	A,	 and	 it	 would	 please	 B,	 and	 it	 would	 please	 C)	 which	 are	 trumped	 by	 one	major	reason	against	it	(it	would	severely	injure	D).	In	fact,	it	is	not	even	clear	at	the	outset	whether,	on	a	conceptual	level,	the	question	really	is	the	question	how	we	get	from	a	view	about	what	is	a	reason	for	what	to	a	view	about	what	we	have	most	reason	to	do.	It	might	be	that	we	have	to	start	with	a	view	about	what	we	have	most	reason	to	do,	and	understand	what	we	have	a	reason	to	do	in	 terms	 of	 what	 we	 would	 have	 most	 reason	 to	 do,	 were	 things	 slightly	different	 than	 they	 are.	 For	 an	 extensive	 –	 but	 partial	 –	 discussion	 of	 such	issues,	cf.	Dancy	(2004a).	
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2008;	Scanlon,	1998,	p.	57;	Setiya,	2014;	contrast	Bittner,	2001,	p.	109;	Dancy,	2002,	pp.	116–118).7	What	is	the	appeal	of	taking	reasons	to	be	propositional?	There	seems	to	be	a	close	connection	between	reasons	and	reasoning.	That	 is,	 if	P	 is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ,	then	it	seems	possible	that	S	can	conclude	from	P	that	she	ought	to	Φ,	or	that	were	she	to	Φ,	she	would	be	acting	well,	or	doing	the	right	thing.	If	we	take	reasons	to	be	propositional,	we	can	make	good	sense	of	that	idea.	For	if	reasons	are	propositional,	it	is	immediately	clear	that	they	are	such	that	we	can	draw	conclusions	from	them	(cf.	Alvarez,	2010,	p.	42).	But	it	might	seem	clearly	wrong	 that	 reasons	are	 true	propositions.	 Let	me	discuss	 a	 forceful	 objection	and	show	how	one	can	counter	it.	Let	us	say	that	Peter	is	the	only	man	in	the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts.	Now,	the	propositions	(1) Peter	is	drowning,	and	(2) The	only	man	in	the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts	is	drowning	are	clearly	distinct.	For	one	can	believe	(1)	but	not	believe	(2),	and	vice	versa.	But	it	would	seem	that	if	by	embedding	(1)	into	(3) That	___	is	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard	generates	a	 truth,	 then	so	does	embedding	 (2)	 into	 (3).	After	all,	 if	 you	know	that	Peter	is	the	only	man	in	the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts,	it	seems	that	you	cannot	consistently	hold																																																										7	Some	authors	want	to	remain	neutral	on	the	issue,	cf.	Raz	(2011d,	pp.	14–16).	And	 Scanlon,	 while	 explicitly	 holding	 that	 reasons	 are	 propositions,	 also	maintains	that	“[w]hat	is	special	about	reasons	is	not	the	ontological	category	of	things	that	can	be	reasons,	but	rather	the	status	of	being	a	reason,	that	is	to	say,	of	counting	in	favor	of	some	judgment-sensitive	attitude.”	Scanlon	(1998,	p.	56)	For	illuminating	discussions	of	the	issue	that	go	far	beyond	what	I	will	say	here,	cf.	Everson	(2009)	and	Mantel	(2015).	
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(4) That	Peter	is	drowning	is	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard,	but	deny	(5) That	 the	 only	man	 in	 the	 vicinity	wearing	 red	 shorts	 is	 drowning	 is	 a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard.	And	 the	 same	holds	vice	versa:	 If	 you	know	 that	Peter	 is	 the	only	man	 in	 the	vicinity	wearing	red	shorts,	 it	seems	that	you	cannot	consistently	hold	(5)	but	deny	(4).	Moreover,	 it	 seems	 that	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 do	 not	 concern	 two	 different	reasons,	but	one	and	the	same	reason.	It	is	absurd	to	think	that	(4)	identifies	a	reason,	and	that	over	and	above	the	reason	that	(4)	 identifies,	 (5)	 identifies	a	further	 reason.	 There	 clearly	 is	 just	 one	 reason	 to	 immediately	 notify	 the	lifeguard,	one	that	I	can	impress	on	you	either	by	(4)	or	by	(5).	But	 if	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 are	 both	 true,	 and	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 are	 different	propositions,	and	reasons	are	true	propositions,	that	would	seem	to	lead	to	the	absurd	 result	 that	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 do	 not	 concern	 one	 and	 the	 same	 reason,	 but	different	 reasons.	 And	 thus,	 it	 might	 seem	 that	 reasons	 are	 not	 true	propositions	(cf.	Mantel,	2015,	pp.	10–11).	But	that	follows	only	if	the	proposition	that	(4)	identifies	as	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard	is	(1),	and	the	proposition	that	(5)	identifies	as	a	reason	is	(2).	And	there	are	good	reasons	to	doubt	that.	After	all,	that	the	man	who	 is	drowning	goes	by	 the	name	 ‘Peter’,	 and	 that	he	 is	wearing	red	shorts,	does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 normatively	 significant	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 action	 of	immediately	 notifying	 the	 lifeguard.	 After	 all,	 nothing	 would	 change	 with	regard	 to	 immediately	 notifying	 the	 lifeguard	 being	 favored,	 if	 the	 man	drowning	 would	 not	 go	 by	 the	 name	 ‘Peter’,	 but	 by	 some	 other	 name,	 and	likewise,	 nothing	 would	 change	 if	 the	 man	 drowning	 were	 not	 wearing	 red	
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shorts,	 but	blue	 shorts,	 or	no	 shorts	 at	 all,	 for	 that	matter.	What	 seems	 to	be	normatively	 significant,	 in	 the	 case	 at	 hand,	would	 seem	merely	 to	 be	 that	 a	human	 being	 is	 drowning.8	And	 thus,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 proposition	 that	 (4)	identifies	as	a	reason	to	immediately	notify	the	lifeguard	is	not	(1),	despite	the	overt	structure	of	(4),	but	rather:9	(6) A	human	being	is	drowning.	Furthermore,	 it	 seems	 that	 (6)	 is	 also	 the	 proposition	 that	 (5)	 identifies	 as	 a	reason	 to	 immediately	notify	 the	 lifeguard,	 despite	 the	overt	 structure	of	 (5).	So,	I	submit	that	(4)	is	not	a	straightforward	instance	of	(7) P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ,	but	rather,	that	the	underlying	structure	of	(4)	is	a	conjunction	of	the	following	form:	(8) (Q	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ)	and	R,	where	‘Q’	stands	for	(6)	and	‘R’	stands	for	(9) The	man	who	is	drowning	goes	by	the	name	‘Peter'.	The	same	holds,	I	submit,	for	(5),	mutatis	mutandis.	This	is	a	good	result.	For	if	the	proposition	that	(4)	and	(5)	identify	as	reason	is	not	(1)	or	(2),	respectively,	but	 (6),	 then	 there	 is	nothing	absurd	about	holding	 that	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 are	both	
																																																								
8	Compare:	from	Sue	owns	a	red	sports	car,	Peter	does	not	own	a	car,	and	People	
who	own	cars	do	not	use	public	transport	as	frequently	as	people	who	do	not	own	
cars,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 Sue	 does	 not	 use	 public	 transport	 as	 frequently	 as	
Peter	 does.	 But	 that	 the	 car	 that	 Sue	 owns	 is	 a	 red	 sports	 car	 is	 inferentially	speaking	 irrelevant.	What	 is	 inferentially	speaking	relevant	 is	merely	that	Sue	owns	a	car.	9	Alternatively,	one	could	say	 that	 the	 reason	 that	both	 (4)	and	 (5)	 identify	 is	something	like	the	value	of	saving	a	drowning	man’s	life.	However,	for	reasons	I	will	come	to	(cf.	I.4),	I	would	prefer	to	say	that	the	value	of	saving	a	drowning	man’s	life	is	a	candidate	for	what	makes	(6),	i.e.	the	fact	that	a	man	is	drowning,	a	reason	to	save	his	life,		as	opposed	to	being	the	reason	to	save	his	life	(cf.	I.3).	
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true,	 that	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 are	 different	 propositions,	 and	 that	 reasons	 are	propositions.	Thus,	the	objection	is	refuted.	Note,	however,	that	that	does	not	mean	that	always	when	a	fact	that	is	a	reason	is	a	fact	about	a	person,	the	way	in	which	the	reason-statement	singles	out	 that	person	has	no	normative	significance.	Consider	the	 following	reason-statement:	(10) That	my	friend	is	in	financial	trouble	is	a	reason	for	me	to	help	him	out.	Here,	that	the	person	who	is	in	trouble	is	my	friend	is	normatively	significant.10	Given,	 at	 least,	 that	 it	 is	 not	 a	 moral	 requirement	 to	 support	 all	 people	 in	financial	 trouble	 (at	 least	 not	 for	 people	 of	moderate	means)	 the	proposition	that	(10)	identifies	as	a	reason	is		(11) that	my	friend	is	in	financial	trouble,	and	not	(12) that	someone	is	in	financial	trouble.	We	could	of	course	also	construct	a	reason-statement	that	expresses	what	(10)	expresses,	 but	 that	 has	 the	 structure	 that	 I	 claimed	 that	 (4)	 and	 (5)	 exhibit,	namely,	the	structure	of	a	conjunction.	Consider,	for	instance:	(13) That	my	friend	Jonas	 is	 in	 financial	 trouble	 is	a	reason	for	me	to	help	him	out.	While	 Jonas’	being	my	friend	 is	normatively	significant,	his	going	by	 the	name	‘Jonas’	is	not.	And	thus,	what	(13)	identifies	as	reason	is	(11),	and	not		
																																																								
10	The	reason	that	(10)	identifies	is	what	is	sometimes	described	as	an	‘agent-relative’	 reason,	 i.e.	 a	 reason	 that	 “include[s]	 an	 essential	 reference	 to	 the	person	who	has	it”,	as	Nagel	puts	it	in	a	classical	discussion.	The	reason	that	(4)	and	(5)	 identify,	however,	 is	an	 ‘agent-neutral’	reason,	 i.e.	a	reason	that	“does	not	 include	an	essential	 reference	 to	 the	person	who	has	 it”	 (Nagel,	1986,	pp.	152–153).	
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(14) My	friend	Jonas	is	in	financial	trouble,	despite	the	overt	appearance	of	(13).	I	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 wrong	 about	 saying	 that	 reasons	 are	true	propositions,	but	that	we	have	to	decide	on	a	case-to-case	basis	what	the	reason	is	that	a	given	reason-statement	identifies.	Of	course,	much	more	would	have	to	be	said	 in	order	to	give	a	 fully	satisfying	account	of	 the	pragmatics	of	reason-statements.11	But	for	my	purposes,	this	is	not	necessary.		
2.	Conditions	on	Facts’	Being	Reasons		It	 is	 important	to	note	that	 in	saying	that	reasons	are	facts,	one	is	not	already	saying	 that	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 agent	 for	 whom	 they	 are	 reasons	 plays	 no	 role	whatsoever.	The	notion	of	a	normative	 reason,	 as	 I	have	 just	 introduced	 it,	 is	compatible	 with	 their	 being	 conative	 and/or	 cognitive	 conditions	 on	 some	fact’s	 being	 a	 reason;	 but	 it	 is	 also	 compatible	 with	 their	 being	 no	 such	conditions.					
																																																								
11	Consider:	 On	 the	 face	 of	 it,	 if	 I	 tell	 you	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 something	 is	happening	 to	 Peter	 that	 Sue	 is	 telling	 Clarissa	 about	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 you	 to	immediately	notify	Jim,	what	I	say	is	unintelligible.	But	if	it	is	clear	to	both	of	us	that	 what	 Sue	 is	 telling	 Clarissa	 is	 that	 Peter	 is	 drowning,	 and	 that	 Jim	 is	 a	lifeguard,	our	statement	does	manage	to	bring	to	light	that	the	fact	that	a	man	(who	 incidentally	 goes	 by	 the	 name	 of	 ‘Peter’,	 and	whose	 fate	 is	 incidentally	being	communicated	to	Clarissa)	is	drowning	is	a	reason	for	you	to	immediately	notify	a	lifeguard.	
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2.1	Conative	Conditions		Some	have	thought	that	some	fact’s	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	is	conditioned,	in	some	 sense,	 on	 her	 conative	 situation,	 i.e.	 on	 her	 desires,	 on	what	 she	 cares	about	 or	 subjectively	 values,	 or	 on	 her	 interests.	 That	 is,	 some	 have	 thought	that	all	reasons	are	internal	in	Bernard	Williams'	(1980)	influential	sense.	What	is	 meant	 when	 it	 is	 said	 that	 all	 reasons	 are	 internal?	 The	 internal/external	contrast	is	not	a	contrast	between	reasons	being	facts	about	the	world	around	us	 and	 them	being	psychological	 states,	 or	psychological	 facts.	Both	 external-reason	 theorists	 and	 internal-reason	 theorists	 can	 (and	 should)	 agree	 that	reasons	are,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	facts	about	the	world	around	us	(i.e.	that	they	 are	 ‘external’	 in	 some	other	 sense).	 The	 idea	 is	 also	not	 that	P’s	 being	 a	
reason	for	S	to	Φ	is	straightforwardly	dependent	on	her	having	a	present	desire	
to	Φ,	or	to	bring	about	what	Φ	will	bring	about.	That	is	to	say,	the	idea	is	not	the	very	implausible	idea	that	when,	say,	Susanne	hits	someone	while	driving,	she	has	a	reason	to	stop,	give	first	aid,	and	call	the	ambulance	only	if	she	presently	desires	to	help	injured	people,	or	does	not	want	the	person	she	hit	to	die.	The	idea	that	a	fact’s	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	depends	on	S’s	conative	situation	is	subjectivist,	 in	 that	 the	agent’s	or	 subject’s	 conative	situation	 is	 relevant	with	regard	 to	 whether	 some	 particular	 fact	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 perform	 some	particular	action,	but	it	is	not	the	bold	(and	very	implausible)	claim	that	P	is	a	reason	for	you	to	Φ	only	if	you	presently	desire	to	Φ.	To	 see	 what	 the	 idea	 is,	 let	 us	 look	 at	 the	 standard	 argument	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 all	 reasons	 are	 internal.	 It	 rests	 on	 two	 premises.	 The	 first	premise	is	the	claim	that	if	there	are	no	rational	means	by	way	of	which	S	could	
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be	brought	to	be	motivated	by	P	to	Φ,	then	P	cannot	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	12	Rational	means,	here,	can	be	understood	in	an	open	fashion.	A	rational	means	by	way	of	which	I	can	bring	you	to	be	motivated	to	do	what	you	initially	were	not	motivated	 to	do	 is,	 say,	 informing	you	about	 your	 factual	 errors.	Another	such	 rational	 means	 is	 pointing	 out	 inconsistencies	 in	 your	 principles,	 or	commitments.	Contrast	rational	means	with	various	forms	of	manipulation,	like	moving	 rhetoric,	 that	 can	also	effect	 change.	The	 second	premise	 is	 the	 claim	that	whether	 S	 can	 be	 brought	 by	 rational	means	 to	 be	motivated	 by	 P	 to	Φ	depends	 on	 her	 current	 state	 of	 mind,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 that	 whether	 S	 can	 be	brought	by	rational	means	to	be	motivated	by	P	to	Φ	depends	on	where	S	starts	out.	 From	 these	 two	premises,	 it	 follows	 that	P’s	being	a	 reason	 for	S	 to	Φ	 is	conditioned	 on	 her	 current	 state	 of	mind,	 but	 not	 in	 the	 straightforward	 and	rather	 implausible	manner	mentioned	 above.	 Rather,	 if	 the	 two	premises	 are	true	 and	 the	 argument	 valid,	 it	 follows	 that	 P’s	 being	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ	 is	conditioned	on	her	current	state	of	mind	 in	 the	sense	that	 if	she	could	not	be	brought	by	rational	means	 from	her	current	state	of	mind	to	being	motivated	by	P	to	Φ,	then	P	is	not	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ	(cf.	Williams,	1980).13	I	 just	said	 that	 the	conclusion	 follows	 if	 the	 two	premises	are	 true	and	the	argument	valid.	McDowell	 (1995)	has	doubted	 the	 first	premise.	He	asks:	what	 is	wrong	with	moving	 rhetoric?	Why	 should	 the	 fact	 that	 you	 can	 only	bring	the	man	who	beats	his	wife	 to	stop	doing	so	by	way	of	moving	rhetoric																																																									12	Williams	 does	 not	 talk	 about	 ‘rational	 means’	 by	 way	 of	 which	 S	 can	 be	‘brought	to	be	motivated’,	but	rather,	about	a	‘sound	deliberative	route’	by	way	of	 which	 the	 agent	 could	 arrive	 at	 a	 state	 of	 mind	 sufficient	 for	 her	 to	 be	motivated	by	P.	 I	move	 from	his	 first-personal	 rendering	 to	a	more	dialogical	rendering	because	I	take	that	way	of	putting	things	to	more	perspicuous.	13	For	a	collection	of	the	main	contributions	(with	an	illuminating	introduction)	cf.	Setiya	&	Paakkunainen	(2012).	
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show	that	he	does	not	have	a	reason	to	stop	doing	so?	That	is,	he	questions	the	need	for	the	change	required	to	be	a	rational	one;	after	all,	he	urges,	it	is	not	by	way	of	 rational	means	 that	we	are	 initiated	 into	 the	 ‘realm	of	 reasons’	 in	 the	first	place,	 so	why	not	 think	 that	 someone	might	only	be	able	 to	 come	 to	 see	what	 she	all	 along	had	 reason	 to	do	only	after	 something	 like	a	 conversion.14	Korsgaard	(1986)	and	Smith	(2000,	pp.	164–174),	in	rather	different	fashions,	have	doubted	the	second	premise.	They	argue	that	at	least	in	principle,	one	can	get	to	the	state	of	mind	required	to	be	motivated	by	the	reasons	there	are	from	any	 starting	 point.15	It	 is	 not	 part	 of	 this	 project	 to	 determine	 whether	 all	reasons	 are	 internal,	 i.e.	 psychologically	 conditioned.	 My	 point,	 here,	 is	 that	whatever	 the	 truth	 is	 about	 this	 issue:	 both	 sides	 can	 agree	 that	 reasons	 are	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	some	agent	performing	some	action.	For	facts	that	are	reasons,	I	said	above,	are	reasons	not	in	all	possible	circumstances,	but	only	in	 certain	 circumstances.	 The	 disagreement	 can,	 thus,	 be	 understood	 as	 the	disagreement	 whether	 facts	 about	 the	 agent’s	 conative	 condition	 are	 always	part	of	the	relevant	circumstances	or	not	(cf.	Scanlon,	2014,	p.	32).	If	all	reasons	
																																																								14	One	 might	 think	 that	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 the	 man	 who	 beats	 his	 wife	 has	 a	reason	to	stop	doing	so,	as	his	beating	his	wife	is	cruel	and	insensitive,	and	as	it	would	be	a	good,	were	he	 to	stop	doing	so.	But	Williams	 is	happy	 to	concede	that	 the	man	who	 beats	 is	wife	 is	 cruel	 and	 insensitive,	 and	 that	 it	would	be	good,	were	he	to	stop	doing	so.	In	an	unorthodox	contribution,	Stephen	Finlay	suggests	that	the	disagreement	might	at	heart	actually	be	one	about	the	term	of	a	normative	reason:	that	for	Williams,	the	term	does	not	signify	favorers	(as	it	does	for	most	authors),	but	rather,	possible	“explanation[s]	of	an	agent’s	action	
under	the	condition	of	the	absence	of	false	belief	or	ignorance”	 (Finlay,	2009,	p.	14;	his	emphasis).	15	In	her	article,	Korsgaard	turns	the	tables	on	Williams.	Williams	argues	that	as	reasons	must	be	able	to	motivate,	if	S	cannot	be	got	(by	rational	means)	to	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	P,	P	cannot	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	Korsgaard	argues	that	as	reasons	must	be	able	to	motivate,	it	must	be	that	S	can	(by	rational	means)	be	brought	to	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	P,	if	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ.	
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are	 internal,	 then	 the	 circumstances	 in	which	P	 is	 a	 reason	 for	S	 to	Φ	always	include	 some	 fact	 about	 S’s	 conative	 condition.	 If	 some	 or	 all	 reasons	 are	external,	 then	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 P	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ	 will	 not	necessarily	include	some	fact	about	S’s	conative	situation.		
2.2	Cognitive	Conditions		As	we	just	saw,	 it	 is	a	contentious	 issue	whether	some	fact’s	being	the	reason	that	it	is	depends	on	the	conative	condition	of	the	agent	for	whom	it	is	a	reason.	It	 is	 also	 a	 contentious	 issue	 whether	 some	 fact’s	 being	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ	depends	 on	 the	 agent’s	 cognitive	 condition;	 so	 that,	 for	 instance,	 some	 fact	 is	ruled	out	as	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	by	S’s	inability	to	come	to	know	that	P,	or	on	the	general	inaccessibility	of	P.	Call	the	view	that	some	fact’s	being	a	reason	is	 in	 some	 sense	 so	 conditioned	 Perspectivism,	 and	 the	 view	 that	 it	 is	 not,	Objectivism.16	To	see	what	Perspectivists	and	Objectivists	disagree	about,	consider	the	following	 case:17 	Fred	 is	 ill.	 Drug	 A	 will	 kill	 him.	 Drug	 B	 will	 cure	 him	completely.	Drug	C	will	cure	him	partially,	and	in	a	way	that	will	preclude	that	he	will	ever	be	able	to	be	completely	cured.	His	doctor	knows	that	C	will	cure	him	partially,	but	in	a	way	that	will	preclude	him	ever	being	completely	cured.	And	 she	knows	 that	 either	A	will	 kill	 him	and	B	will	 cure	him	 completely,	 or	
																																																								
16 	For	 discussions,	 see	 e.g.	 Kiesewetter	 (forthcoming),	 Raz	 (2011a),	Zimmerman	(2008).	The	two	options	I	mention	are	not	exhaustive.	Zimmerman	presents	an	alternative	to	both	Objectivism	and	Perspectivism.		17	Adapted	from	Jackson	(1991).	A	structurally	similar	case	concerning	miners	is	 discussed	 in	 Parfit	 (2011,	 pp.	 150–164).	 Discussions	 of	 such	 cases	 often	resolve	around	the	understanding	not	of	reasons,	but	of	oughts.	
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that	 B	 will	 kill	 him	 and	 A	 will	 cure	 him	 completely.	 But	 she	 does	 not	 know	which	of	the	two	disjuncts	of	the	disjunctive	truth	that	she	knows	is	true.	And	there	is	no	way	in	which	she	can	find	out.	Everyone	agrees	that	if	his	doctor	is	a	conscientious	doctor,	she	will	give	Fred	 drug	 B.	 After	 all,	 it	 is	 better	 to	 be	 safe	 than	 sorry.	 But	 according	 to	Objectivists,	 it	 is	 nevertheless	 the	 case	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 A	 will	 cure	 Fred	completely	is	a	reason	for	his	doctor	to	give	Fred	drug	A;	that	she	is	not	able	to	learn	about	that	fact	is	neither	here	nor	there,	her	epistemic	situation	is	of	no	import	 with	 regard	 to	 what	 is	 and	 what	 is	 not	 a	 reason.	 According	 to	Perspectivists,	however,	the	fact	that	she	is	not	able	to	learn	about	the	fact	that	A	will	cure	Fred	completely	effectively	excludes	that	fact	from	being	a	reason	for	her	to	give	Fred	drug	A.	In	their	view,	when	Fred’s	doctor	administers	drug	B,	she	does	not	only	act	as	any	conscientious	doctor	with	her	level	of	information	would	act,	her	action	 is	also	 fully	 in	 line	with	the	reasons	there	are	 for	her	to	act.	By	contrast,	 for	 the	Objectivist,	what	 the	conscientious	doctor	does	 is	not	fully	in	line	with	the	reasons	there	are	for	her	to	act.	The	idea	that	reasons	are	facts	is	neutral	with	regard	to	this	issue.	Even	if	Perspectivism	is	the	correct	theory,	reasons	are	still	 facts.	And	they	are	still	facts	about	the	world	around	us,	at	least	for	the	most	part.	It	is	just	that	for	the	Perspectivists,	some	facts	that	the	Objectivists	holds	to	be	reason	are	excluded	from	being	reasons	by	the	agent’s	cognitive	situation.	As	facts	are	the	reasons	that	 they	 are	 only	 in	 certain	 circumstances,	 the	 issue	 between	 Perspectivists	and	Objectivists,	similar	to	the	issue	between	Internalists	and	Externalists,	can	be	 conceived	of	as	 the	 issue	whether	an	agent’s	 cognitive	 condition	 is	 always	part	of	the	circumstances	in	which	a	fact	is	a	reason	for	her	to	do	something.	
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3.	The	Source	of	Reasons		I	 suggested	 that	we	 can	helpfully	 conceive	 of	 reasons	 as	 facts	 that	 stand	 in	 a	four-place	relation,	where	the	other	three	relata	are	agents,	courses	of	actions,	and	 circumstances.	 I	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 question	 whether	 there	 are	conative	 and/or	 cognitive	 conditions	 on	 facts	 being	 reasons	 is	 the	 question	whether	 the	 circumstances	 in	which	 some	 fact	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 some	 agent	 to	perform	 some	 action	 always	 include	 that	 agent’s	 conative	 and/or	 cognitive	condition	or	 not.	An	 Internalist	 about	 reasons,	 for	 instance,	 is	 a	 theorist	who	holds	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	only	in	circumstances	in	which	S	has	it	in	her,	in	 some	 sense	 or	 another,	 to	 be	motivated	 by	 P	 to	Φ.	 A	 Perspectivists	 about	reasons	 is	 a	 theorist	 who	 holds	 that	 P	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ	 only	 in	circumstances	in	which	S	believes,	or	knows,	that	P,	or,	at	least,	is	in	a	position	to	 come	 to	 believe,	 or	 know,	 that	 P.	 But	 it	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 ask	 whether	 the	circumstances	C	 in	which	P	 is	a	 reason	 for	S	 to	Φ	always	 include	S’s	conative	and/or	cognitive	condition,	and	 it	 is	another	 thing	to	ask	whether	we	can	say	anything	more	illuminating	about	why	it	is	true	(when	it	is	true)	that	P,	in	C,	is	a	reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ,	 than	 just	 that	 it	 is	 true.	 Whether,	 that	 is,	 we	 can	 give	 an	account	 or	 an	 explanation	 of	 why	 P,	 in	 C,	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ.	 I	 call	 the	question	about	why,	or	in	virtue	of	what	(if	anything)	P,	in	C,	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	the	question	about	the	source	of	P’s	normative	significance.	However,	I	raise	this	question	not	in	order	to	answer	it,	but	in	order	to	point	out	that	saying	that	reasons	are	facts	is	neutral	with	regard	to	how	(if	at	all)	this	question	should	be	answered.	In	lieu	of	an	extensive	discussion,	which	would	serve	no	purpose	given	the	overall	project,	let	me	just	give	a	brief	feel	of	
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the	possibilities	by	broadly	distinguishing	two	kinds	of	accounts	of	the	source	of	reasons:	realist	accounts	and	response-dependent	accounts.18	Roughly,	realist	accounts	explain	why	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	by	appeal	to	 some	 allegedly	 basic	 normative	 or	 evaluative	 fact.	 In	 the	 most	straightforward	case,	the	idea	will	be	that	what	explains	why	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	 Φ	 is	 the	 simple	 normative	 fact	 that	 this	 is	 so,	 or	 the	 obtaining	 of	 the	according	reason-relation.	As	Scanlon	writes:	[C]laims	about	reasons	can	be	correct	or	incorrect,	and	such	claims	are	fundamental	–	not	reducible	to	or	explainable	in	terms	of	claims	of	other	kinds.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	15)	But	realist	accounts	might	also	appeal	to	allegedly	basic	facts	about,	say,	what	is	of	value	(Raz,	2011c,	pp.	75–9),	or	about	the	goodness	(Foot,	2001;	Thomson,	2003,	2008)	of	 S’s	Φing,	or	her	S’s	Φing	 in	 response	 to	P,	 in	order	 to	explain	why	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ.	In	 contrast	 to	 all	 such	 broadly	 realist	 accounts,	 response-dependent	accounts	 seek	 to	 explain	why	P	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	Φ	by	 appeal	not	 to	 some	allegedly	 basic	 normative	 or	 evaluative	 fact	 (i.e.	 a	 fact	 about	 something	 just	being	a	reason,	or	about	the	goodness	or	value	of	acting	in	a	certain	way),	but	by	 appeal	 the	 counterfactual	 that	 S	would	 treat	 P	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 Φ	(where	‘treating’	can	be	spelled	out	in	various	ways),	were	 it	the	case	that	she	were	 suitably	 different	 than	 she	 in	 fact	 is.	 Say,	 provided	 that	 she	 had	 all	 the	relevant	true	beliefs	and	no	mistaken	beliefs	and	were	fully	rational	in	some	to	be	specified	sense	(Smith,	2000),	or	provided	that	her	‘faculty	of	desire’	were	to																																																									
18	That	is	not	meant	to	imply	that	this	is	an	exclusive	distinction;	there	may	be	other	options	not	caught	up	in	such	a	typology.	Cf.	Finlay	(2010)	for	a	helpful	overview.	
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accord	with	the	Categorical	Imperative	(Korsgaard,	1996).	Here,	appeal	is	made	to	an	idealized	notion	of	reason	(understood	as	a	faculty	or	power),	or	rational	agency,	and	the	reasons	that	apply	to	us	non-ideal	possessors	of	reason,	or	us	rational	 agents,	 is	 determined	 by	 what	 our	 ideal	 counterparts	 treat	 as	reasons.19	Note	 that	 independent	 of	 constitutive	 claims	 –	 i.e.	 claims	 about	 what	constitutes	the	normativity	of	reasons	–	are	claims	about	the	relations	between	normative	concepts	or	truths.	That	is,	for	instance,	given	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ,	it	is	at	least	arguably	the	case	that	(i)	it	is	a	fact	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ,	that	(ii)	were	S	to	Φ	in	response	to	P,	she	would	be	acting	well	or	be	doing	
something	of	value,	and	that	(iii)	were	S	fully	rational	or	virtuous,	and	were	she	to	have	all	the	relevant	true	beliefs	and	no	false	beliefs,	she	would	treat	P	as	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ	–	regardless	of	whether	P’s	reason-giving	status	or	quality	can	or	must	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	the	concepts	in	play	in	(i),	(ii),	or	(iii).	
	
4.	Reasons	as	Evaluative	Facts		So	 far,	 I	 have	 presupposed	 that	 the	 facts	 that	 are	 normative	 reasons	 are	ordinary	empirical	facts,	like	the	fact	that	it	is	your	mother’s	birthday	today,	or	the	fact	that	it	is	raining.	This	is	the	view	that	e.g.	Scanlon	explicitly	takes.	In	an	exemplary	passage,	he	writes:	The	 things	 that	 can	 be	 reasons	 are	 not	 a	 special	 kind	 of	 entity	 but	ordinary	facts,	in	many	cases	facts	about	the	natural	world.	For	example,																																																									19	Or,	 in	 the	 twist	 that	 Smith	 (1995)	 gives	 the	 idea	 (in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 so-called	conditional	fallacy):	the	reasons	that	apply	to	us	non-ideal	possessors	of	reason,	 or	 us	 rational	 agents,	 is	 determined	 by	 what	 our	 ideal	 counterparts	would	advise	us	to	do.
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the	fact	that	the	edge	of	a	piece	of	metal	is	sharp	is	a	reason	for	me,	now,	not	to	press	my	hand	against	it.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	30)	Later	on,	he	remarks:	It	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 although	 the	 facts	 that	 are	 reasons	 are	 often	natural	 facts,	 normative	 facts	 can	also	be	 reasons.	 So,	 for	 example,	 the	fact	that	the	law	would	be	unjust	may	be	a	reason	for	me	to	vote	against	it	if	I	am	in	a	position	to	do	so.	(Scanlon,	2014,	p.	32)	On	 his	 view,	 therefore,	 there	 is	 no	 restriction	 on	 what	 kinds	 of	 facts	 can	 be	normative	reasons:	both	natural	and	normative	(or	evaluative)	facts.	I	call	this	the	‘Liberal	Interpretation’	of	Factualism.	Not	 everyone	 is	 so	 liberal.	 The	 idea	 that	 reasons	 are	 facts	 is	 often	understood	more	narrowly	as	 the	 idea	 that	only	 certain	kinds	of	 facts	 can	be	reasons,	namely,	 that	only	 facts	about	Φing	having	some	evaluative	quality	 can	be	 reasons	 to	 Φ.	 Call	 this	 the	 ‘Narrow	 Interpretation’.	 The	 Narrow	Interpretation	 has	many	 followers.	 Raz,	 for	 example,	writes	 that	 “reasons	 for	action	consist	of	the	fact	that	the	action	has	some	value”	and	that	“reasons	for	action	 are	 that	 the	 actions	 have	 some	 value”	 (Raz,	 2011c,	 p.	 75)	 And,	 in	 a	different	context,	that	[t]he	fact	that	options	have	a	certain	value	–	that	performing	them	is	a	good	 thing	 to	 do	 because	 of	 the	 intrinsic	merit	 of	 the	 action	 or	 of	 its	consequences	 –	 is	 the	 paradigmatic	 reason	 for	 actions.	 (Raz,	 2001,	 p.	63)20	Similarly,	Wedgwood	maintains	that	
																																																								20	Raz	(2001)	is	arguing	against	the	view	that	reasons	are	desires.	The	relevant	passages	in	Raz	(2011a)	are	concerned	with	Scanlon’s	buck-passing	thesis.	
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a	 reason	 in	 favour	of	 a	 course	of	 action	 is	 simply	 an	 intrinsically	 good	feature	of	that	course	of	action.	(Wedgwood,	2009,	pp.	336–337)	Thomson	offers	us	the	following	biconditional:	A	fact	is	a	reason	for	a	person	to	do	a	thing	if	and	only	if	it	is	a	fact	to	the	effect	that	his	doing	it	would	be	good	in	a	way,	or	his	not	doing	it	would	be	bad	in	a	way,	or	his	doing	it	would	be	better	in	a	way	than	his	doing	anything	else,	or	someone	has	a	right	that	he	do	it,	or	…	[sic]	Leaving	 room	 for	other	 evaluative	 facts	 to	be	 added.	…	But	only	other	evaluative	facts.	(Thomson,	2003,	pp.	37–8)	Leaving	aside	the	differences	in	these	formulations	(and	in	the	overall	views	of	their	 respective	 authors),	 these	 are	 all	 clear	 expressions	 of	 the	 Narrow	Interpretation.	The	Narrow	Interpretation	has	something	to	go	for	it.	 It	does	not	seem	all	 that	 controversial	 to	 say	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 edge	 of	 a	 piece	 of	metal	 is	sharp	is	a	reason	for	me	not	to	press	my	hand	against	it.	But	crucially,	it	is	not	that	 fact	by	itself	 that	 favors	not	pressing	my	hand	against	 it.	The	fact	by	itself	can	 favor	 anything	 and	 everything	 –	 or	 nothing	 at	 all.	 It	 is	 a	 reason	 only	 in	
suitable	circumstances	(where,	as	we	saw,	these	circumstances	might	or	might	not	 include	 the	 conative	 and/or	 cognitive	 situation	 of	 the	 agent).	 As	 Scanlon	emphasizes:	Whether	a	certain	fact	 is	a	reason,	and	what	it	 is	a	reason	for,	depends	on	an	agents	circumstances.	The	fact	that	this	piece	of	metal	is	sharp	is	a	reason	 for	 me	 not	 to	 press	 my	 hand	 against	 it,	 but	 under	 different	
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circumstances	 it	 might	 be	 a	 reason	 to	 press	 my	 hand	 against	 it,	 and	under	still	different	circumstances	a	reason	 to	do	something	else,	 such	as	to	put	it	into	the	picnic	basket	if	I	will	later	have	reason	to	want	to	cut	cheese.	(Scanlon,	2014,	pp.	30–31)	By	contrast,	the	fact,	say,	that	making	tasteless	yokes	about	disappearing	planes	to	 someone	whose	whole	 family	was	 on	 flight	MH	 370	 is	 cruel	 is	 something	that,	 one	 might	 think,	 by	 itself	 speaks	 against	 making	 tasteless	 yokes	 about	disappearing	planes	to	such	a	person.	(Of	course,	whether	it	is	cruel	depends	on	the	 circumstances.	Making	 such	 yokes	 to	 someone	who	 is	 prone	 to	 a	 certain	sort	of	grim	humor	might	not	be	cruel.	Thus,	depending	on	the	circumstances,	the	relevant	fact	might	not	obtain.	But	if	it	does	obtain,	then	it	is	a	reason,	in	a	way,	 all	 by	 itself.)	 Likewise	 (and	with	 according	 qualifications),	 the	 fact	 that	eating	apples	is	healthy,	and	the	fact	that	pressing	my	hand	against	this	sharp	piece	of	metal	will	be	painful,	would	seem	to	by	 themselves	speak	 in	 favor	of	eating	apples,	or	to	speak	in	favor	of	refraining	from	pressing	my	hand	against	this	sharp	piece	of	metal,	respectively.	Evaluative	facts	thus	seem	to	fare	better	with	 regard	 to	making	 sense	of	 the	 favoring	 character	of	 reasons	–	provided,	that	is,	that	one	takes	it	that	reasons	are,	or	need	to	be,	such	as	to	by	themselves	speak	in	favor	of	actions.	As	Thomson	puts	it,	making	the	relevant	supposition	explicit:	If	we	suppose	that	a	reason	for	a	person	to	do	a	thing	is	itself	something	that	 counts	 in	 favor	 of	 his	 doing	 it,	 then	 we	 should	 limit	 reasons	 for	actions	to	evaluative	facts	….	It	is	their	being	evaluative	that	marks	these	
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facts	as	reasons	for	action	–	since	it	is	in	virtue	of	their	being	evaluative	that	they	count	in	favor	of	an	action.	(Thomson,	2003,	p.	38)21	But	 why	 make	 that	 supposition?	 As	 long	 as	 a	 proponent	 of	 the	 Liberal	Interpretation	 helps	 herself	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 facts	 are	 reasons	 only	 in	 certain	
circumstances,	 and	 has	 a	 view	 about	 the	 source	 of	 facts’	 normative	significance22,	 she	need	not	be	worried	about	 the	 fact	 that	 facts	 that	 speak	 in	favor	of	actions	do	not	do	so	by	themselves.			Moreover,	there	is	one	respect	in	which	the	Liberal	Interpretation	seems	preferable	over	the	Narrow	Interpretation:	The	Liberal	Interpretation	is	more	ecumenical	than	the	Narrow	Interpretation.	Given	that	when	there	is	a	reason	for	 S	 to	Φ,	Φing	 has	 some	positive	 evaluative	 quality	 (that	 is,	 say,	 that	when	there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	save	Peter’s	life,	saving	Peter’s	life	is	good,	at	least	in	some	respect),	the	Liberal	Interpretation	leaves	it	open	whether	what	explains	why	 some	 fact	P	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	Φ	 is	 that	Φing	has	 a	positive	 evaluative	quality,	or,	conversely,	whether	P’s	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	explains	why	Φing	has	a	positive	evaluative	quality.	And,	thus,	 it	 leaves	it	open	whether	we	must	account	 for	 the	 normative23	in	 terms	 of	 the	 evaluative,	 or	 vice	 versa.24	The	Narrow	 Interpretation,	 however,	 starts	 out	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 Φing	 has	 a	positive	evaluative	quality,	and	tells	us	that	that	fact	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ.	Thus,																																																									
21	Heuer	 (2006,	 7)	 also	 emphasizes	 that	 ordinary	 facts	 do	 not	 by	 themselves	speak	in	favor	of	actions.		22	Which	in	Scanlon’s	case	is	just	the	view	that	we	should	call	off	the	search	for	such	a	source,	cf.	I.3	above.	23	Understood	in	the	narrow	sense	in	which	it	contrasts	with	the	evaluative,	not	in	 the	broad	sense	 in	which	 it	encompasses	the	evaluative	and	contrasts	with	the	‘natural’.	24	That	is	(to	use	the	metaphor	that	gives	the	contemporary	discussion	of	that	issue	its	name),	whether	the	‘buck’	of	explaining	is	passed	from	the	normative	to	the	evaluative,	or	vice	versa.	The	term	is	introduced	in	Scanlon	(1998,	pp.	95–100).	
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it	 is	 built	 into	 the	 Narrow	 Interpretation	 that	 the	 evaluative	 explains	 the	normative.		
5.	Psychologism	about	Normative	Reasons		We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 one	 can	 agree	 that	 reasons	 are	 facts	 that	 favor	actions,	but	disagree	about	why,	i.e.	in	virtue	of	what,	facts	are	the	reasons	that	they	are.	Thus,	one	can	say	 that	 reasons	are	 facts	 that	 favor	actions,	but	hold	that	key	to	understanding	normativity	are	values,	or	principles	–	or	desires.	Nevertheless,	it	is	still	sometimes	said	that	those	who	say	that	normative	reasons	 are	 facts	 that	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 actions	 are	 making	 a	 controversial	claim.	 As	 for	 instance	 Whiting	 (2014)	 puts	 it,	 one	 the	 one	 hand,	 there	 is	Factualism,	according	to	which	facts	are	reasons,	and	on	the	other	hand,	there	is	Psychologism,	according	to	which	reasons	are	mental	states:	Reasons	for	acting	are,	or	are	given	by,	facts.	Call	this	view	[F]actualism.	According	to	it,	the	fact	that	it	is	snowing	might	be	a	reason	for	Holly	to	put	on	winter	clothes,	while	the	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	might	be	a	reason	for	Todd	to	 feed	her.	…	Factualism	contrasts	with	the	view	that	reasons	for	acting	are,	or	are	given	by,	one’s	mental	states.	Call	this	view	
[Psychologism]25.	According	 to	 it,	Holly’s	belief	 that	 it	 is	 snowing	might	be	 a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	 put	 on	 warm	 clothes,	 while	 Todd’s	 belief	 that	Maybelle	 is	 hungry	 might	 be	 a	 reason	 for	 him	 to	 feed	 her.	 (Whiting,	2014,	pp.	1–2)	
																																																								25	Whiting	actually	speaks	about	‘Mentalism’.	In	keeping	with	my	terminology,	I	have	replaced	that	with	‘Psychologism’.	
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Note,	first,	that	there	are	two	contrasts	in	play	in	what	Whiting	says,	namely,	a	
mental/extra-mental	contrast,	and	a	fact/state	contrast.	And	the	latter	contrast	–	between	facts	and	states	–	does	not	seem	to	be	particularly	relevant.	After	all,	in	the	situation	at	hand,	it	is	not	only	a	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry,	it	is	also	a	fact	that	Todd	believes	that	Maybelle	 is	hungry.	And	likewise,	not	only	Todd’s	believing	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	is	a	state,	but	also	Maybelle’s	being	hungry	is	a	 state.	 What	 is	 of	 theoretical	 interest,	 it	 would	 thus	 seem,	 is	 the	 question	whether	the	reason	at	 issue	 ‘comes	from’	Maybelle	or	 from	Todd,	and	not	the	question	whether	it	is	a	state	or	a	fact.	However,	even	with	that	clarification,	it	 is	not	clear	what	Psychologism	exactly	comes	down	to.	Here	are	three	possibilities:	1. It	is	a	view	about	the	conditions	under	which	something	is	a	reason.	2. It	 is	a	view	about	what	kinds	of	facts	 speak	 in	 favor	of	actions,	namely,	exclusively	facts	about	the	mind	of	the	agent	for	whom	they	are	reasons	(for	such	an	understanding	of	Psychologism,	cf.	e.g.	Thomson,	2003,	pp.	26–32).	3. It	 is	 the	view	 that	 reasons	are	not	 things	 that	 speak	in	favor	of	actions,	but	 things	 that	 do	 something	 else,	 say,	 things	 that	 render	 actions	
reasonable	(cf.	e.g.	Gibbons,	2010).26	But	 if	 (1),	 then	Psychologism	 is	no	contester	 to	Factualism,	but	a	 claim	about	how	to	complement	it	(see	I.2).	For	maybe,	the	fact	that	Maybelle	is	hungry	is	a																																																									26 	Actually,	 Gibbons’	 view	 oscillates	 between	 (a)	 the	 view	 that	 normative	reasons	are	mental	states	that	render	actions	reasonable,	and	(b)	the	view	that	what	 normative	 reasons	 there	 are	 for	 someone	 depends	 on	 her	 epistemic	perspective,	i.e.	on	her	mental	states	(cf.	I.3	above).	These	two	views	are	clearly	independent	from	one	another	(indeed,	it	 is	not	even	quite	clear	that	they	are	compatible	with	one	another).	Note	that	(b)	is	a	claim	that	readily	goes	together	with	Factualism,	cf.	I.2	above.	
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reason	for	Todd	to	give	her	some	food	only	if	Todd	believes	or	knows	that	she	is	hungry,	or	is	in	a	position	to	come	to	know	that	she	is	hungry.	And	if	(2),	then	Psychologism	 is	 actually	 but	 a	 species	 of	 Factualism,	 albeit	 (as	 I	will	 argue)	 a	very	 implausible	 one.	 And	 if	 (3),	 then	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 in	 which	 sense	Psychologism	is	in	conflict	with	Factualism,	other	than	verbally.	Thus,	I	believe	that	by	saying	that	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	when	deciding	what	to	do,	and	when	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do,	are	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	 actions,	 one	 is	 not	 so	 much	 making	 a	 claim	 about	 how	 to	 conceive	 of	something	that	we	have	an	independent	understanding	of,	but	rather,	that	one	is	thereby	introducing	a	topic	about	which	one	can	then	make	claims:	for	instance,	as	we	saw,	about	whether	what	facts	are	reasons	for	some	agent	is	conditioned	on	 her	 motivational	 propensities,	 or	 about	 what	 constitutes	 facts’	 favoring	status	 or	 quality	 or	 role	 (or,	 say,	 about	 how	 the	 reasons	 that	 there	 are	 for	someone	to	do	something	are	related	to	whether	she	is	justified	 in	doing	what	she	does,	and	so	on).	As	 I	 have	already	 talked	about	 (1)	 above,	 let	me	 say	a	 few	words	 first	about	(3),	and	then	about	(2).	Some	authors	say	that	we	should	not	conceive	of	normative	reasons	as	facts	 that	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	 actions,	 but	 rather,	 as	 mental	 states	 that	 render	actions	 reasonable.	 Gibbons	 (2010),	 for	 instance,	 explains	 that	 reasons	 are	things	 that	 make	 actions	 reasonable,	 that	 what	 makes	 things	 reasonable	 are	mental	states,	and,	thus,	that	normative	reasons	are	mental	states.	As	he	puts	it:		My	 basic	 idea	 of	 a	 reason	 is	 relatively	 straightforward.	 Reasons	 are	supposed	 to	 make	 things	 reasonable.	 Good	 reasons	 do	 what	 they’re	supposed	to	do.	(Gibbons,	2010,	p.	344)	
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The	way	 he	 frames	 things,	 that	 view	 is	opposed	 to	 the	 view	 that	 reasons	 are	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions.	But	it	is	hard	to	see	that	there	indeed	is	such	an	opposition.	After	all,	 there	 is	no	problem	in	saying	both	that	 facts	speak	 in	favor	of	actions,	and	that	mental	states	render	actions	reasonable.	For	instance,	given	that	I	want	to	be	on	the	other	side	of	the	road,	the	fact	that	right	now	no	cars	 are	 coming	 speaks	 in	 favor	 of	 crossing	 right	 now,	 and	my	believing	 that	right	 now	 no	 cars	 are	 coming	 would	 render	 crossing	 the	 street	 right	 now	reasonable	 (or	would	 at	 least	 be	 among	 the	 things	 that	 render	 crossing	 right	now	reasonable).	Note	 that	 a	 course	of	 action	 that	 is	 rendered	 reasonable	by	your	mental	states	need	not	be	a	course	of	action	that	 is	 favored	by	the	 facts,	and	vice	versa.	For	instance,	 if	you	–	albeit	mistakenly	–	believe	 that	right	now	no	traffic	is	coming,	then	crossing	right	now	is	a	reasonable	thing	to	do	(at	least	in	one	sense	of	 the	term	 ‘reasonable’),	but	as	traffic	 is	coming,	doing	so	 is	not	what	is	favored	by	the	facts;	and	if	you	mistakenly	believe	that	traffic	is	coming,	crossing	 would	 not	 be	 reasonable,	 but	 as	 no	 traffic	 is	 coming,	 crossing	 is	rendered	 eligible	 by	 the	 facts	 as	 they	 are.	 And	 so,	 it	 would	 seem	 as	 if	 the	apparently	substantial	 issue	about	what	reasons	are	boils	down	to	the	merely	terminological	issue	about	how	to	use	the	word	‘normative	reason’:	for	things	that	 favor	 actions,	 or	 for	 things	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 rendering	 actions	reasonable.	Of	course,	we	might	have	an	independent	notion	of	a	normative	reason	in	mind,	and	about	that	notion,	we	might	ask:	are	normative	reasons	better	to	be	conceived	of	as	facts	that	favor	or	as	mental	states	that	render	reasonable?	In	fact,	we	do	have	such	a	notion.	Normative	reasons,	 in	the	sense	in	which	I	am	interested	in,	are	what	we	seek	to	take	into	account	when	deciding	what	to	do,	and	in	advising	others	on	what	they	are	to	do.	But	given	that	normative	reasons	
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are	things	that	play	that	role,	it	is	highly	implausible	to	think	that	mental	states	that	render	reasonable	are	serious	contesters.	Let	 me	 first	 focus	 on	 advice.	 Consider:	 If	 you	 could	 choose	 to	 go	 for	advice	either	to	someone	who	would	focus	on	what	courses	of	action	would	be	rendered	 reasonable	by	 your	mental	 states	 and	 advise	 you	 accordingly,	 or	 to	someone	who	would	 focus	on	what	courses	of	action	are	 favored	by	 the	 facts	and	 advise	 you	 accordingly,	 you	 would	 –	 given	 the	 possibility	 that	 what	 is	reasonable	 and	what	 is	 favored	 can	 come	 apart	 –	 surely	 choose	 to	 go	 to	 the	latter.	The	former	would	just	not	be	giving	you	very	good	advice.	Or	look	at	it	like	this:	Imagine	yourself	advising	me	on	when	to	cross	the	road.	 Your	 advice	would	be	 very	 bad	 advice,	were	 you	 to	 focus	 on	my	beliefs	
about	the	traffic,	as	opposed	to	the	facts	about	the	traffic.	For	in	order	to	ensure	that	I	get	safely	over	the	street,	what	you	have	to	do	is	focus	on	the	traffic,	and	not	on	my	beliefs	about	 the	traffic.	Given	the	possibility	 that	my	beliefs	about	the	traffic	are	mistaken,	focusing	on	them,	as	opposed	to	focusing	on	the	facts	about	the	traffic,	might	very	well	fail	to	safely	get	me	over	the	road.	Of	 course,	 if	 your	 advice	 is	 good	 and	 successful,	 it	will	 effect,	 in	 some	sense	anyway,	that	my	beliefs	about	the	traffic	line	up	with	the	facts	about	the	traffic.	For	presumably,	 I	will	advise	you	 to	go	now	by	 impressing	on	you	 the	fact	 that	 now,	 no	 cars	 are	 coming,	 i.e.	 by	 drawing	 your	 attention	 to	 the	 facts	about	 the	 traffic,	 thereby	bringing	your	beliefs	 in	 line	with	 those	 facts.	 If	 that	were	not	so,	 the	case	would	be	more	 like	a	case	 in	which	 I	 issue	an	order	 for	you	to	blindly	follow.	But	if	anything,	that	strengthens	the	point.	And	 think	 about	what	 it	 is	 like	 to	 try	 to	 figure	 out	what	 to	 do;	 say,	 to	figure	out	when	to	cross	the	road.	What	you	want	to	do	is	to	get	over	the	road	safely.	 Clearly,	what	 bears	 on	when	 to	 go	 are	 facts	 about	 the	 traffic,	 and	 not	
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your	beliefs	about	the	traffic.	So	clearly,	when	seeking	to	figure	out	when	to	go,	you’ll	focus	on	facts	about	the	traffic,	and	not	on	facts	about	your	beliefs	about	the	traffic.	As	Simon	Blackburn	nicely	puts	it:	The	 last	 thing	you	want	 to	do	when	you	are	wondering	when	 to	make	your	dash	through	the	traffic	…	is	to	take	your	mind	off	the	traffic	….	In	fact,	this	may	be	the	last	thing	you	ever	want	to	do	(Blackburn,	1998,	p.	254).	Now,	 there	 are	 cases	 in	which	what	 you	question	 are	not	 the	 facts	 about	 the	world	around	you,	but	 facts	 about	your	mental	 states.	Consider	 the	 following	case:	You	are	in	a	meeting	and	the	chairman	bids	all	those	who	believe	that	P	to	raise	 their	 hands	 (cf.	 Hacker,	 2009,	 p.	 88).	 What	 you	 will	 take	 to	 bear	 on	whether	to	raise	your	hand,	in	the	case	at	issue,	will	not	be	what	you	believe,	i.e.	P,	but	your	believing	that	P.	For,	as	you	see	it,	your	reason	will	vary	not	with	the	facts,	but	with	your	beliefs	about	the	facts.	You	will	understand	that	if	 it	were	the	case	that	 the	 facts	were	different,	but	your	beliefs	 the	same,	your	reasons	would	 be	 the	 same;27	but	 that	 were	 your	 beliefs	 different,	 and	 the	 facts	 the	same,	 your	 reason	 would	 be	 different	 (cf.	 also	 Alvarez,	 2010,	 pp.	 131–132;	Dancy,	2002,	pp.	124–125;	Hyman,	1999,	p.	444;	Thomson,	2003,	pp.	24–25).	But	note	that	also	in	such	cases,	you	question	your	beliefs	with	regard	to	what	they	 favor	 that	 you	 do,	 not	with	 regard	 to	what	 course	 of	 action	 they	would	render	reasonable.	I	believe	that	we	can	conclude	that	if	by	‘normative	reasons’,	we	mean:	things	that	play	the	role	of	being	what	we	seek	to	focus	on	in	deciding	what	to																																																									27	Of	course,	you	will	also	understand	that	if	the	facts	were	different,	your	beliefs	ought	to	be	different.	But	that	is	compatible	with	understanding	that	given	that	your	beliefs	were	to	remain	as	they	are,	despite	the	facts	changing,	your	reasons	would	not	change.	
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do,	 and	 in	 advising	 others	 on	 what	 they	 are	 to	 do,	 then	 normative	 reasons	clearly	are	facts	that	favor,	and	not	states	that	render	reasonable.	Even	in	those	cases	in	which	states	(or	facts	about	states)	are	what	we	focus	on,	we	focus	on	them	with	regard	to	their	role	as	favorers,	and	not	with	regard	to	their	role	as	things	that	render	reasonable.		
6.	Summary			In	the	next	part,	 I	will	be	relying	on	the	 idea	that	normative	reasons	are	 facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions,	and	that	the	facts	that	are	normative	reasons	are,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	non-psychological	facts.	In	this	section,	I	have	sought	to	 render	 that	 idea	plausible.	By	way	of	a	conclusion,	 let	me	recount	why	 the	idea	that	normative	reasons	are	psychological	states,	or	facts	about	such	states,	is	implausible.	As	 I	 explained	 above,	 the	 idea	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 always	psychological	facts	seems	wrong,	on	grounds	of	the	fact	that	normative	reasons,	as	we	have	been	using	the	term	here,	are	what	are	in	play	in	advice	and	first-personal	 deliberation.	 For	 in	 normal	 circumstances,	 no	 sane	 advisor	 would	advise	you	to	do	something	based	on	considering	your	mental	states,	or	those	alone;	 and	 no	 sane	 agent	 would	 seek	 out	 the	 advice	 of	 someone	 whom	 she	would	 know	 to	 do	 that.	 And	 likewise,	 in	 normal	 circumstances,	 no	 sane	deliberator	would	seek	to	figure	out	what	is	to	be	done	by	way	of	considering	her	 mental	 states,	 or	 those	 alone.	 The	 argument,	 note,	 is	 not	 an	 apriori	argument,	 but	 an	 appeal	 to	 mundane	 examples	 like	 that	 when	 you	 advise	others	on	when	to	cross	the	road,	you	are	focused	not	on	their	beliefs	about	the	traffic,	but	on	the	facts	about	the	traffic	(at	least	as	you	understand	them	to	be).	
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If	 it	 is	 effective,	 it	 is	 effective	 not	 in	 that	 it	 shows	 us	 that	 we	 cannot	 even	conceive	of	a	rational	being	for	whom	all	reasons	are	facts	about	her	own	mind,	but	merely	in	that	it	shows	us	that	that	is	not	how	it	is	with	us.	Given	 what	 I	 have	 said,	 we	 can	 distinguish	 the	 idea	 that	 normative	reasons	are	psychological	facts	from	some	more	plausible	ideas.	The	view	that	normative	reasons	are	always	psychological	facts	is	not	the	view	that	a	fact	is	a	reason	for	you	to	do	something	only	if	you	believe	that	fact,	or	know	that	fact,	or	 if	 you	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 come	 to	 believe	 of	 know	 it,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 not	Perspectivism,	 the	 view	 that	 there	 are	 cognitive	 conditions	 on	 facts	 being	reasons.	It	is	one	thing	to	say	that	the	fact	that,	say,	your	child	is	ill	is	a	reason	for	you	to	do	something	about	it	only	if	you	know	or	believe	that	she	is	ill,	or	if	you	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 be	 able	 to	 know	 or	 believe	 that	 she	 is	 ill.	 It	 is	 quite	another	 thing	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	 fact	 that	 your	 child	 is	 ill	 that	 speaks	 in	favor	of	doing	something	about	 it,	but	your	believing	 that	she	 is	 ill.	While	 the	former	may	or	may	not	be	correct,	 the	latter	 is	surely	false.	Likewise,	 it	 is	not	the	 idea	 that	 all	 reasons	 are	 internal,	 i.e.	 dependent	 your	 being	 able	 to	 be	brought	(by	rational	means)	from	your	present	‘motivational	set’	to	one	that	is	such	that	you	can	become	motivated	by	that	reason.	The	claim	that	P	is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	only	if	S	has	a	certain	desire	is	not	the	claim	that	that	desire,	or	her	having	 that	 desire,	 is	 the	 reason.	 Also,	 the	 idea	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	always	psychological	facts	is	not	 the	view	that	your	believing	as	you	do	opens	you	up	to	charges	of	irrationality,	or	submits	you	to	requirements	of	rationality.	To	take	up	our	example:	It	is	one	thing	to	say	that	if	you	believe	that	your	child	is	ill,	it	is	irrational	for	you	(at	least	in	normal	circumstances)	not	do	something	about	it,	regardless	of	whether	she	is	in	fact	ill	or	not.	It	is	another	thing	to	say	that	it	is	that	fact	about	yourself,	i.e.	that	you	believe	that	your	child	is	ill,	that	
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speaks	 in	 favor	 of	 doing	 something	 about	 the	 illness	 of	 your	 child.	While	 the	former	may	 or	may	 not	 be	 correct,	 the	 latter	 is	 surely	 false.	 The	 noted	 three	views	 are	 views	 that	 are	 rightly	 controversial	 and	up	 to	 debate.	 But	 the	 idea	that	 normative	 reasons	 are	 always	 psychological	 facts,	 when	 it	 is	 suitably	distinguished	from	those	other	three	views,	can	be	put	aside.	 	
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Part	II.	Rational	Motivation	
	This	part	consists	of	two	main	chapters.	In	the	first	chapter,	I	will	introduce	the	notion	of	a	ground	(II.1.2).	A	ground,	as	 I	will	use	 the	term,	 is	something	that	motivates	 someone	 to	do	 something	because	 she	 takes	 it	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	of	doing	what	 she	does	 (II.1.1).	 I	will	 argue	 that	 propositions	 are	what	 play	 the	role	 of	 a	 ground	 (II.1.3),	 and,	 for	 the	 most	 part,	 not	 propositions	 about	psychological	 matters	 (II.1.4).	 I	 will	 briefly	 address	 what	 the	 function	 of	psychological	 vocabulary	 in	 ground-statements	 might	 be	 (II.1.5),	 and	 I	 will	contrast	 the	 project	 I	 am	 engaged	 in	 to	 the	 reductivist	 project	 (II.1.6).	 In	 the	second	chapter,	I	will	address	the	debate	on	whether	motivating	reasons	are	to	be	 conceived	 of	 Psychologistically	 or	Non-Psychologistically	 (II.2).	 I	will	 start	out	by	examining	the	various	notions	of	a	motivating	reason	that	can	be	found	in	 the	 literature	 (II.2.1).	 Some	 authors	 use	 the	 term	 to	 signify	 grounds,	 or	 a	certain	 class	 of	 grounds.	 Others,	 however,	 use	 it	 to	 signify	 explanantia,	 or	employ	 the	 term	 in	 the	 course	 of	 giving	 a	 reductive	 account	 of	 acting	 on	 a	ground.	I	will	examine	whether	that	means	that	the	contemporary	debate	about	Psychologism	might	simply	rest	on	an	equivocation	(II.2.2	and	II.2.3).	
	
1.	The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation		We	often	take	it	that	there	is	a	reason	for	us	to	do	something.	We	sometimes	do	what	we	 take	 there	 to	 be	 a	 reason	 for	 us	 to	 do.	 Those	 two	 things	 can	 come	together	by	accident.	It	is,	however,	not	a	plausible	thought	that	they	could	only	ever	come	together	accidentally.	As	Michael	Smith	puts	it	at	one	point:	
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[S]upposing	that	 the	connection	between	what	we	decide	to	do,	on	the	basis	 of	 rational	 deliberation,	 and	 what	 we	 do	 do,	 is	 altogether	contingent	and	fortuitous	…	is	patently	absurd.	When	we	deliberate,	and	decide	 what	 we	 have	 a	 rational	 justification	 for	 doing,	 that	 very	 fact	sometimes	makes	a	difference	to	what	we	do.	(Smith,	2000,	p.	132)	Also,	 consider	what	our	predicament	would	be,	 if	our	 taking	 it	 that	 there	 is	a	reason	for	us	to	do	something	and	our	doing	what	we	take	there	is	a	reason	for	us	 to	 do	 could	 only	 ever	 come	 together	 accidentally.	 It	 seems	 that	 our	predicament	would	be	that	of	the	‘favored	creature’	that	Kant	describes	in	the	Groundwork:	If	such	a	creature	could	form	views	about	facts	being	reasons	for	her	to	act,	this	would	serve	it		only	 to	 contemplate	 the	 fortunate	 constitution	of	 its	 nature,	 to	 admire	this,	to	delight	in	it,	and	to	be	grateful	for	it	to	the	beneficent	cause,	but	not	to	submit	its	faculty	of	desire	to	…	guidance	(Kant,	1998,	4:395)	But	this	is	clearly	not	our	predicament.	When	we	do	what	we	take	there	to	be	reason	 for	 us	 to	 do,	 our	 stance	 towards	 our	 action	 is	 not	 like	 the	 stance	we	might	 have	 towards	 our	 body	 when	 we	 delight	 in	 its	 being	 able	 to	 run	 a	marathon,	 or	 like	 the	 stance	 we	might	 have	 towards	 our	 liver	 when	 we	 are	grateful	that	it	can	process	the	vast	amounts	of	alcohol	we	consume.	So,	our	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	do	something	and	our	acting	accordingly	 can	 be	 non-accidentally	 related.	 When	 are	 they	 non-accidentally	related	in	the	right	way?	I	suggest	that	they	are	non-accidentally	related	in	the	right	way	just	in	case	we	are	motivated	by	the	reason	we	take	there	to	be.	Call	the	principle	that	actions	can	be	motivated	by	reasons	we	take	there	to	be	for	us	 to	 so	act	 the	 ‘Principle	of	Rational	Motivation’,	 and	call	 actions	 that	 are	 so	motivated	actions	that	are	‘rationally	motivated’:	
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(The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation)	S	is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	just	in	case,	and	because,	S	takes	it	that	X	is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and	Φ’s,	and	is	motivated	to	Φ	by	X,	due	to	her	taking	X	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	Note	 that	 given	 what	 is	 surely	 plausible,	 namely,	 that	 S’s	 take	 on	 X	 can	 be	correct,	 so	 that	 X	 really	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 S	 to	 Φ,	 this	 entails	 that	 reasons	themselves	 can	 rationally	 motivate.	 Or,	 as	 we	 can	 also	 put	 it,	 it	 entails	 that	when	S	is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ,	it	is	possible	that	what	rationally	motivates	her	to	Φ	is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	But	as	S’s	 take	can	also	be	 incorrect,	not	all	cases	of	rational	motivation	are	cases	of	motivation	by	reasons.	Note	also	that	the	term	‘motivation’	is	ambiguous,	in	that	many	different	things	can	be	said	to	‘motivate’	 in	very	different	ways.	 I	will	say	a	bit	more	about	both	 issue	 in	 the	next	section.		I	 take	 it	 that	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation	 is,	 as	 such,	 not	particularly	contentious.	For	 to	say	 that	S	can	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	she	takes	to	favor	that	she	Φ’s	is,	in	a	sense,	just	like	saying	that	S	can	infer	P	from	something	she	takes	to	entail	that	P.	And,	as	the	possibility	of	inferring	P	from	something	we	take	to	entail	that	P	is	surely	a	datum,	it	also	seems	to	be	a	datum	that	we	can	be	motivated	to	Φ	by	something	we	take	to	favor	that	we	Φ.	What	is	contentious,	however,	is	the	question	whether	we	can,	or	must,	spell	out	what	it	is	for	an	action	to	be	rationally	motivated	(or	what	it	is	for	someone	to	infer	P	from	Q)	in	other,	allegedly	more	basic	terms,	i.e.	whether	we	can,	or	must,	give	a	reductive	account	of	being	rationally	motivated	(or	of	inferring).	I	will	come	back	 to	 that	 matter	 below	 (II.1.5).	 First,	 however,	 I	 would	 like	 to	 say	 more	about	rational	motivation.	Specifically,	I	would	like	to	note	that	the	Principle	of	Rational	 Motivation	 is	 neutral	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 host	 of	 (other)	 contentious	
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issues,	 introduce	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 ground,	 and	 argue	 that	 grounds	 are	 to	 be	conceived	of	in	a	Non-Psychologistic	fashion.		
1.1	Neutrality	With	Regard	to	Some	Contentious	Issues		(i)	Above,	I	said	that	it	is	possible	that	cases	in	which	S	is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	are	cases	in	which	she	is	rationally	motivated	by	a	reason,	but	that	a	case	of	being	rationally	motivated	is	not	as	such	a	case	of	being	rationally	motivated	by	a	reason.	Saying	so	much	leaves	it	open	what	conditions	or	factors	render	a	case	in	which	someone	is	rationally	motivated	by	what	she	takes	to	be	a	reason	a	case	 in	 which	 she	 is	 rationally	 motivated	 by	 a	 reason	 (a	 plausible	 necessary	condition	is	that	the	agent	has	knowledge	of	the	relevant	fact,	cf.	Hornsby,	2008;	Littlejohn,	 2012,	 Chapter	 4.5;	 McDowell,	 2013).	 Moreover,	 it	 leaves	 it	 open	whether	 one	 can	 or	 cannot	 give	 a	 non-circular	 account	 of	 those	 factors	 or	conditions,	i.e.	an	account	that	does	not	already,	at	least	implicitly,	presuppose	the	notion	of	being	rationally	motivated	by	a	reason	(for	skepticism	that	some	such	account	is	forthcoming,	cf.	e.g.	Hornsby,	2008;	McDowell,	2013;	Roessler,	2014).	(ii)	 According	 to	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation,	 we	 can	 be	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	we	take	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	Φ.	This	leaves	it	open	whether	 motivation	 is,	 or	 can	 be,	 a	 matter	 of	 supposed	 normative	 reasons	alone,	or	whether	other	factors	also	play	a	crucial	role	in	motivation;	that	is,	it	leaves	 it	 open	 whether	 taking	 there	 to	 be	 a	 normative	 reason	 for	 one	 to	 Φ	
suffices	for	one	to	be	motivated	to	Φ,	or	whether	there	are	other	factors	that	are	
necessary	 (say,	 pre-existing	 desires,	 dispositions,	 etc.).	 Thus,	 the	 Principle	 of	
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Rational	Motivation	 remains	neutral	with	 regard	 to	what	 has	 been	 called	 the	issue	of	judgment	internalism/externalism	(e.g.	Darwall,	1983,	p.	52).	(iii)	Let	me	note,	at	this	point,	that	given	that	there	are	other	necessary	factors,	those	other	factors	might	with	equal	right	be	called	 ‘motivators’,	or	be	
described	 as	 ‘what	 motivates	 us’.	 Let	 us	 say	 that	 Sam	 realizes	 that	 there	 is	something	 in	 her	 possession	 that	 belongs	 to	 Paul,	 and	 gives	 it	 back	 to	 him,	motivated	(as	I	would	say)	by	what	she	realized,	namely,	that	it	belongs	to	Paul.	And	let	us	say	that	what	Sam	realizes,	namely,	that	it	belongs	to	Paul,	motivates	her	to	give	 it	back	to	him	only	because	she	has	a	certain	desire	or	disposition,	say,	the	desire	to	be	just,	or	the	disposition	of	justice.	We	can,	with	equal	right,	say	 that	 Sam	was	motivated	 by	 her	 desire	 to	 be	 just,	 or	 by	 justice.	 Also,	 we	might	say	that	Sam	was	motivated	by	her	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	to	give	it	back	to	Paul.	So,	many	things	can	be	called	‘motivators’.	That	I	reserve	the	term	for	 supposed	normative	 reasons	 is	a	 terminological	point,	not	a	philosophical	claim.	That	is	to	say,	being	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	one	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	one	to	Φ	does	not,	as	such,	exclude	that	other	things	can	also	be	said	to	motivate	one	to	Φ	(cf.	also	II.1.4	below	for	a	distinction	between	two	senses	of	‘motivate’).	(iv)	 Accordingly,	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation	 leaves	 it	 open	whether	 taking	 there	 to	 be	 a	 normative	 reason	 for	 one	 to	Φ	 is	necessary	 for	motivation,	 or	 whether	 motivation	 can	 be	 in	 place	 without	 views	 about	normative	 reasons.	What	 it	 states	 is	 just	 that	 taking	 there	 to	 be	 a	 normative	reason	 for	one	 to	Φ	 is	necessary	 for	rational	motivating,	 in	 the	defined	sense.	Thus,	it	remains	neutral	on	the	contentious	question	whether	all	intentional	or	motivated	 actions	 are	 performed,	 as	 it	 is	 said,	 ‘under	 the	 guise	 of	 the	 good’;	specifically,	 here,	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 an	 (at	 least	 apparent)	 normative	 reason	
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(e.g.	 Boyle	 &	 Lavin,	 2010;	 Gregory,	 2013;	 Raz,	 2011;	 Setiya,	 2010;	 Velleman,	1992).	 If	 it	 is	not	 true	 that	all	 intentional	or	motivated	actions	are	performed	under	the	guise	of	normative	reasons,	 then	what	 I	have	to	say	 is	restricted	to	cases	in	which	they	are	so-performed;	if	it	is	true,	then	what	I	have	to	say	is	not	restricted	in	such	a	manner.	(v)	 According	 to	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation,	 we	 can	 be	motivated	to	Φ	by	the	reason	we	take	there	to	be	for	us	to	Φ.	This	leaves	it	open	how	to	conceive	of	the	relevant	‘taking	there	to	be	a	normative	reason’	that	is	involved.	It	might	be	that	taking	there	to	be	a	reason	for	one	to	Φ	amounts	to	having	a	belief	with	 the	content:	 such-and-such	 is	a	 reason	 for	me	 to	Φ.	Or	 it	might	 be	 that	 it	 merely	 amounts	 to	 believing	 that	 such-and-such,	 and	 that	taking	or	 treating	 such-and-such	as	a	 reason	 is	not	a	matter	of	 the	content	 of	one’s	 relevant	 belief	 (cf.	 Lavin,	 2011;	 Raz,	 2011d).	 The	 Principle	 of	 Rational	Motivation	is	silent	on	those	matters.	Given	 that	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation	 is	 open	 enough	 to	 be	innocuous	in	all	the	respects	just	indicated,	one	might	very	well	ask	if	it	is	not	just	too	trivial	to	at	all	discuss.	Far	from	it:	given	that	the	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation	is	open	enough	to	be	able	to	be	accepted	by	all	sides,	it	can	help	us	understand	what	 the	many	controversies	 in	 the	 field	are	controversies	about,	and	whether	they	at	all	are	controversies.		
1.2	Grounds		The	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation	 states	 that	 when	 we	 take	 it	 that	 X	 is	 a	reason	for	us	to	Φ,	it	is	possible	that	we	can	Φ	because	we	are	motivated	to	Φ	by	X,	and	because	we	take	X	to	be	a	reason	for	us	to	Φ.	In	order	to	facilitate	the	
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upcoming	discussions,	 I	would	 like	 to	 introduce	 the	 term	 ‘ground’.	When	S	 is	rationally	motivated	to	Φ	by	X,	then	(a) X	is	taken	by	S	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and	(b) X	motivates	her	to	Φ,		where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that	(c) X	motivates	her	to	Φ	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	In	such	cases,	I	will	say	that	X	plays	the	role	of	a	ground;	or	for	short,	that	X	is	a	ground.	And	I	will	say	that	S,	in	Φing,	is	acting	on	a	ground.28	What	 I	 suggest	 that	 we	 call	 a	 ground	 is	 sometimes	 also	 called	 an	‘agential	reason’	(Hacker,	2009),	or	an	‘operative	reason’	(Scanlon,	1998,	p.	19).	Usually,	 however,	 it	 is	 called	 a	 ‘motivating	 reason’,	 or	 ‘a	 reason	 for	 which	someone	does	something’	(see	also	II.2.1).	But	as	we	will	see	below,	employing	the	term	‘reason’	(and	especially	the	term	‘motivating	reason’)	in	such	contexts	is	 misleading	 in	 various	 respects.	 That	 is	 why	 I	 will	 avoid	 such	 and	 other	reason-employing	terms	and	phrases	when	I	talk	about	grounds.29		
1.3	What	Plays	the	Role	of	a	Ground?		As	I	have	just	defined	the	term,	‘ground’	is	the	name	for	something	that	plays	a	certain	role.	So,	to	specify	a	ground	on	which	S	Φ’s	is	to	specify	what	motivates	her	 to	Φ,	 due	 to	 her	 taking	 it	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	Φing.	 That	 is,	 grounds	 are																																																									28	For	 similar	usages	of	 the	 term	 ‘ground’,	 cf.	 such	divers	 authors	 like	Hyman	(2015,	chap.	6)	and	Pettit	&	Smith	(1997,	pp.	72–78).	29	Many	of	the	quotes	I	will	give,	however,	employ	the	phrase	‘acting	for	a	reason’,	and	often	in	order	to	talk	about	grounds	(sometimes,	however,	in	order	to	talk	only	about	grounds	that	are	also	normative	reasons,	cf.	II.2.1).	When	necessary,	I	will	explicitly	state	that	we	should	understand	that	phrase	as	meaning	‘acting	for	a	ground’.	
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supposedly	normative	motivators,	as	one	could	put	it.	The	question	I	now	want	to	raise	is	the	question:	what	plays	such	a	role?	Here	are	some	options:	(State-Psychologism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground	on	which	S	Φs	is	to	specify	a	mental	state	of	S’s	(Factualism	 About	 Grounds)	 To	 specify	 the	 ground	 on	 which	 S	 Φs	 is	 to	specify	a	fact	S	has	in	mind30	(Propositionalism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground	on	which	S	Φs	is	to	specify	what	S	believes31	I	hope	to	have	established	in	part	I	that	what	we	take	to	favor	actions	are	facts.	This	 immediately	 rules	 out	 State-Psychologism	About	Grounds.	 For	 (as	 part	 I	showed)	 if	what	we	 take	 to	 favor	 actions	 are	 facts,	 and	 (as	 follows	 from	 the	definition	given	above)	a	necessary	condition	for	something	being	a	ground	is	that	it	is	taken,	by	the	agent,	to	favor	what	she	is	doing,	then	grounds	cannot	be	mental	states.	For	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	must	be	able	to	be	taken	to	be	a	 fact,	and	mental	states	are	not	taken	to	be	 facts.	For	 future	reference,	 let	me	label	that	argument	the	Argument	from	the	Wrong	Kind,	as	the	argument	is	that	mental	states	are	of	the	wrong	ontological	kind	to	play	the	role	of	grounds	
																																																								
30	Factualists	about	Grounds	can	disagree	about	whether	‘having	a	fact	in	mind’	amounts	to	having	a	true	belief,	or	whether	it	amounts	to	having	knowledge	of	that	fact.		31	I	omit	one	option,	namely,	 that	what	plays	 the	role	of	a	ground	 is	a	state	of	
affairs	 (i.e.	 not	 a	 true	 proposition,	 but	 what	 makes	 a	 true	 proposition	 true),	where	a	 state	of	 affairs	 can	play	 the	 role	of	 a	 ground	also	 if	 it	does	not	 exist.	This	surprising	view	is	the	view	of	Jonathan	Dancy,	one	of	the	most	influential	Non-Psychologists	(Dancy,	2002,	pp.	112–120).	In	what	follows,	however,	I	will	treat	Dancy	as	a	Propositionalist	about	Grounds.	Exegetically	speaking,	this	is	of	course	not	quite	fair.	But	as	far	as	I	see,	 it	makes	no	difference,	systematically	speaking,	at	least	for	my	purposes.	That	is	my	justification	for	doing	so.	
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(cf.	Dancy,	2002,	pp.	102-112;	Darwall,	1983,	p.	32;	Hyman,	1999,	p.	443;	Stout,	2009,	pp.	55–56).	This	 leaves	 us	 with	 Factualism	 about	 Grounds	 and	 Propositionalism	about	Grounds.	Above,	I	said	that	when	S	Φ’s	on	a	ground,	what	plays	the	role	of	 her	 ground	 is	 something	 that	 motivates	 her	 to	 Φ	 because	 she	 takes	 it	 to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing.	Given	that	what	S	takes	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing	can	be	what	in	fact	does	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	and	that	things	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions	are	facts	(cf.	part	I),	it	follows	that	it	is	possible	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	fact	(a	fact	that	is	a	reason).	But	from	the	possibility	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	fact	(that	is	a	reason),	it	does	of	course	not	follow	that	being	a	fact	(and	thus,	a	fortiori,	being	a	reason)	is	essential	to	being	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	ground.	What	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	something	that	the	agent	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	act.	And	while	understood	de	dicto,	what	we	take	to	be	reasons	for	us	to	act	are	facts	that	are	reasons,	what	is	taken	by	us	to	be	a	reason	(i.e.	what	we	take	to	be	a	reason,	understood	de	re),	when	we	take	 it	 that	 some	 particular	 fact	 is	 a	 reason	 for	 us	 to	 act,	 need	 neither	 be	 a	reason,	nor	need	it	even	be	a	fact.	Knowing	that	P,	I	can	take	P	to	be	a	reason	for	me	to	Φ,	even	if	P	is	not	a	reason	for	me	to	Φ.	For	I	can	be	mistaken	about	the	normative	significance	of	P.	In	such	a	case,	what	is	taken	by	me	to	be	a	reason	is	a	fact,	but	not	a	reason.	And	believing	that	P,	I	can	take	P	to	be	a	reason	for	me	to	Φ,	even	if	my	belief	is	mistaken,	that	is,	even	if	P	is	not	a	fact.	In	such	a	case,	what	is	taken	by	me	to	be	a	reason	is	not	even	a	fact,	and,	thus,	a	fortiori,	also	not	 a	 reason.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 what	 is	 taken	 by	 me	 to	 be	 a	 reason	 is	 merely	something	that	I	believe,	i.e.	a	proposition	(or	a	consideration,	as	I	will	also	put	it,	following	established	practice).	And	thus,	for	something	to	be	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	ground,	it	suffices	that	it	is	a	proposition;	it	is	not	necessary	that	that	
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proposition	 is	 true,	 let	alone	 that	 it	 is	a	 reason.	This	 shows	us,	 in	one	breath,	that	 Factualism	 about	 Grounds	 is	 false,	 and	 that	 Propositionalism	 about	Grounds	is	true.	In	part	I,	I	said	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	reason	are	true	propositions,	or	facts.	I	have	just	said	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	are	propositions.	This	difference	also	 comes	out	when	we	consider	 retrospective	 reactions.	Let	us	say	that	at	t1,	S	believes	that	P,	takes	it	that	P	 is	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	and	Φ’s,	where	what	motivates	her	to	Φ	is	P,	due	to	her	taking	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	Now	let	us	say	that	P	is	false,	and	that	at	t2,	S	comes	to	see	that	P	is	false.	Looking	back,	S	would	retreat	from	any	claims	to	the	effect	that	there	was	a	 reason	 for	 her	 to	Φ.	 She	might	 say	 that	 at	 the	 time,	 she	 took	 there	 to	 be	 a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	but	that	(as	she	now	sees)	she	was	mistaken	therein.	But	she	would	not	say	that	what	motivated	her	at	t1	was	not	what	she	at	the	time	took	to	be	what	motivated	her;	although	she	would	of	course	concede	that	she	had	 been	 mistaken	 about	 the	 status	 of	 what	 motivated	 her.	 Also,	 she	might	come	to	realize	that	at	the	time,	she	had	been	mistaken	about	what	motivated	her,	but	what	could	show	her	that	could	not	be	the	mere	fact	that	at	the	time,	she	was	mistaken	about	the	facts.	I	believe	that	any	lingering	resistance	to	the	idea	that	considerations	are	what	play	the	role	of	grounds,	in	the	sense	defined	above,	is	due	to	the	idea	that	grounds	 are	what	 explain	 actions	 and	 that	what	 explains	 actions	 can	 only	 be	truths.	For	 if	grounds	are	what	explain	actions,	and	what	explains	actions	can	only	 be	 truths,	 then	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 considerations	 are	 unsuited	 to	 be	grounds,	as	considerations	need	not	be	truths.	In	the	next	and	final	part,	I	will	address	that	issue,	and	argue	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	think	that	grounds	are	what	
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explain	actions.	As	 I	will	argue,	grounds	 figure	or	 feature	 in	explanations,	but	are	not	explanantia.		
1.4	Two	Kinds	of	Propositionalism	About	Grounds		One	 might	 think	 that	 my	 dismissal	 of	 Psychologism	 About	 Grounds	 was	 too	cursory.	For	maybe	saying	that	mental	states	are	grounds	is	just	a	loose	way	of	saying	 that	 propositions	 about	mental	 states	 are	 grounds.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	distinction	between	Psychologism	About	Grounds	and	Propositionalism	About	Grounds	 might	 be	 understood	 not	 so	 much	 as	 a	 distinction	 of	 category,	 but	rather,	as	a	distinction	of	content.	This	would	give	us	the	following	two	options:	(Psychologistic	Propositionalism	About	Grounds)	To	specify	the	ground	on	which	S	Φs	is	to	specify	a	proposition	about	S’s	mind	that	S	believes.	(Non-Psychologistic	 Propositionalism	 About	 Grounds)	 To	 specify	 the	ground	 on	which	 S	Φs	 is	 to	 specify	 a	 proposition	 of	whatever	 content	that	S	believes.	Now,	 I	 am	 not	 aware	 of	 anyone	 actually	 defending	 Psychologistic	Propositionalism	 About	 Grounds.	 And	 that	 does	 not	 seem	 particularly	astonishing.	 For	 grounds	 are	 considerations	 that	 motivate	 an	 agent	 to	 do	something	 because	 she	 takes	 them	 to	 be	 reasons	 for	 her	 to	 so	 act.	 Hence,	Psychologistic	 Propositionalism	 About	 Grounds	 is	 the	 view	 that	 we	 can	 be	motivated	only	by	 (apparent)	 facts	 about	our	own	mind.	And	 that	 seems	 just	wrong.	As	Michael	Smith	puts	it,	such	a	view	fl[ies]	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 facts.	 The	 considerations	 that	motivate	 us	 are	only	 rarely,	 if	 ever,	 considerations	 about	 our	 own	 psychology.	 (Smith,	2003,	p.	151)	
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It	is	often	argued	that	there	are	cases	in	which	the	considerations	that	motivate	us	 are	 considerations	 about	 our	 own	 mind.	 However,	 that	 if	 we	 consider	examples	 of	 such	 cases,	 we	 see	 that	 that	 cannot	 be	 how	 it	 normally	 is.	 For	future	reference,	let	me	term	that	argument	the	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases.	Consider	someone	who	wants	to	kill	his	parents.	Such	a	person	may	reflect	on	that	 fact	 about	 his	 own	 psychology,	 conclude	 that	 he	 better	 seek	 out	professional	help,	and	consequentially	go	ahead	and	seek	out	such	help.	About	such	 a	 person,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 what	 played	 the	 role	 of	 his	 ground	 was	 a	consideration	 about	 his	 own	 mind.	 If,	 however,	 he	 goes	 ahead	 and	 kills	 his	parents,	then	the	considerations	that	played	the	role	of	his	ground	(if	indeed	his	action	was	an	action	done	on	a	ground)	will	have	been	a	considerations	about	parents,	 not	 a	 consideration	 about	 his	 desires	 vis-à-vis	 them	 (cf.	 Anscombe,	1989,	p.	381).	Or	consider	someone	who	believes	that	there	are	pink	rats	living	in	her	shoes.	Such	a	person	may	call	a	psychiatrist.	If	that	is	what	she	does,	then	(among)	the	considerations	that	motivated	her	will	have	been	a	fact	about	her	psychology:	that	she	has	this	persistent	belief	that	 just	will	not	go	away.32	But	she	 might	 call	 an	 exterminator,	 and	 in	 such	 a	 case,	 there	 will	 be	 no	considerations	about	her	psychology	among	the	considerations	that	motivated	her.	For	what,	in	her	view,	will	have	spoken	in	favor	of	calling	an	exterminator	will	not	have	been	that	she	believes	 that	there	are	rats	living	in	her	shoes,	but	that	(as	she	believes)	there	are	rats	living	in	her	shoes	(cf.	Dancy,	2002,	p.	125;	Hyman,	1999,	p.	444).	Some	 remarks	 about	 the	 Argument	 from	 Unusual	 Cases	 are	 in	 order.	First,	while	it	is	most	often	given	in	terms	of	what	one	might	call	psychiatrist-																																																								32	We	can	debate	about	to	what	extent	we	still	want	to	call	the	state	of	mind	she	is	in	a	belief.	But	that	is	incidental	to	the	example.	
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cases	(cf.	also	Alvarez,	2016),	there	are	also	other	cases	that	do	not	depend	on	the	agent’s	not	 ‘really’	believing	or	desiring,	 i.e.	not	holding	what	she	believes	true,	 and	 not	 taking	 to	 be	 desirable	 what	 she	 desires.	 Dancy	 (2002,	 p.	 124)	discusses	 the	 case	 of	 someone	 who	 believes	 that	 the	 cliff	 in	 front	 of	 him	 is	crumbly,	and	imagines	that	she	may	keep	away	from	it	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	crumbly,	and	also	on	grounds	of	her	believing	that	it	is	 crumbly.	 For	 it	 may	 be	 that	 she	 suspects	 that,	 believing	 as	 she	 does,	 she	would	become	very	nervous,	were	she	to	go	near	the	cliff,	and,	thus,	would	be	likely	to	misstep.	Therefore,	she	may	be	motivated	to	keep	away	from	the	cliff	not	only	by	a	consideration	about	the	cliff,	but	also	by	a	consideration	about	her	own	 mind. 33 	Also,	 there	 may	 be	 cases	 of	 what	 one	 might	 call	 indirect	motivation:	Someone	might	be	motivated	 to	do	something	by	a	 consideration	about	her	own	mind,	not	because	she	takes	it	that	her	being	in	some	particular	state	of	mind	 speaks	 in	 favor	of	doing	what	 she	 is	motivated	 to	do	 (as	 in	 the	cases	 discussed	 above),	 but	 rather,	 because	 she	 takes	 that	 particular	 state	 of	mind	 to	be	an	 indication	 that	 the	world	 is	 in	a	certain	way,	a	way	 that	 favors	doing	what	she	is	motivated	to	do.	Thomson	constructs	such	a	case:	Suppose	 that	Charles	has	 loved	Dora	 for	years,	but	his	suit	had	always	seemed	hopeless.	He	 is	now	suddenly	 struck	by	 the	 thought	 that	Dora	loves	him	 too.	He	 concludes	 –	 from	 the	very	 fact	 that	he	now	believes	she	does	–	that	there	must	have	been	some	evidence	of	her	love	for	him	in	her	past	behavior,	evidence	that	was	unrecognized	by	him	at	the	time,	and	is	still	unclear	to	him	now.	(Thomson,	2003,	pp.	24–5)	
																																																								
33	For	another	non-psychiatrist	case,	cf.	Hacker	(2009,	p.	88).	
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As	Thomson	observes,	cases	like	the	case	of	Charles	seem	possible,	but	they	are	surely	unusual.	We	cannot	take	things	generally	to	be	like	that.	Secondly,	 and	more	 important	 than	 those	other	kinds	of	examples	 just	noted,	 is	 the	 prevention	 of	 possible	misunderstandings	 of	 the	 argument.	 One	might	think	that	being	motivated	to	do	something	is	a	matter	of	being	in	certain	mental	 states.	 Consequently,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 as	 being	 motivated	 is	 a	matter	of	being	in	a	certain	mental	state,	only	mental	states	can	motivate	one	to	act.	Recall	the	example	of	the	person	who	believes	that	there	are	rats	living	in	her	 shoes.	 One	 might	 think	 that	 both	 in	 the	 case	 in	 which	 she	 seeks	 out	professional	 help	 and	 in	 the	 case	 in	 which	 she	 calls	 an	 exterminator,	 what	motivates	 her	 to	 perform	 those	 respective	 actions	 is	 a	 mental	 state:	 in	 the	former	case,	the	second-order	state	of	believing	that	she	believes	that	there	are	rats	in	her	shoes,	and	in	the	latter	case,	the	first-order	belief	that	there	are	rats	living	in	her	shoes.	Now,	that	might	or	might	not	be	true.	However,	even	if	it	is	true,	it	would	not	show	us	that	only	considerations	about	one’s	own	mind	can	play	the	role	of	grounds.	For	the	sense	in	which	considerations	can	be	said	to	
motivate	is	not	the	sense	in	which	mental	states	can	be	said	to	motivate.	Being	motivated	by	a	consideration	might	amount	to	being	in	a	certain	mental	state,	and	consequently,	that	mental	state	can	also	be	said	to	motivate	–	but	when	one	says	that	mental	states	motivate,	one	evidentially	is	using	the	term	‘motivate’	in	a	different	 sense	 than	when	one	 says	 that	propositions	or	 considerations	 can	motivate;	motivating	states	(as	we	might	call	them)	do	not	motivate	because	we	take	them	to	favor	(cf.	Dancy,	2002,	p.	14;	Garrard	&	McNaughton,	1998,	p.	53;	Parfit,	2011,	p.	37,	endnote).	That	is,	it	is	one	thing	to	say	that	being	motivated	to	Φ	by	X	is	a	matter	of	being	in	certain	mental	states,	and	quite	another	thing	to	say	that	X	can	only	be	(a	consideration	about)	a	mental	state.	
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Thirdly,	 let	me	 note	 that	 I	 have	 all	 along	 been	 relying	 on	what	 part	 I	argued	for,	namely,	that	what	we	take	to	be	normative	reasons	are,	at	 least	in	normal	cases,	not	facts	about	our	own	mind,	but	rather,	 facts	about	the	world	around	us.	For	 if	 it	were	 the	case	 that	what	we	 take	 to	be	normative	 reasons	were	only	facts	about	our	own	mind,	it	would	of	course	follow	that	what	plays	the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 could	 also	 only	 be	 considerations	 about	 our	 own	mind.	That	is,	from	a	Psychologistic	conception	of	normative	reasons	one	can	arrive,	via	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	 Motivation,	 at	 a	 Psychologistic	 conception	 of	grounds.	But	part	I,	I	hope,	has	shown	that	normative	reasons	are	not	generally	facts	about	our	own	mind.	So,	of	the	two	options	distinguished	in	this	section,	we	should	clearly	opt	for	 the	 latter:	 for	 what	 I	 called	 Non-Psychologistic	 Propositionalism	 about	Grounds.	 Note,	 however,	 that	 a	 Non-Psychologistic	 Propositionalist	 about	Grounds	 does	 not	 hold	 that	 the	 considerations	 that	 motivate	 can	 never	 be	considerations	 about	 one’s	 own	 mind,	 she	 merely	 holds	 that	 the	 relevant	considerations	are	not	restricted	to	such	consideration.		
1.5	Psychologized	Ways	of	Talking	About	Non-Psychologistic	Grounds		It	is	one	thing	to	ask	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	It	is	another	to	ask	how	we	
talk	about	agents	acting	on	grounds.	We	have	just	seen	that	psychological	states	do	 not	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground,	 and	 that	 considerations	 about	 one’s	 own	psychological	 states	 only	 rarely	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 But	 that	 does	 not	mean	 that	 psychological	 vocabulary	 need	 only	 rarely	 figure	 in	 our	 talk	 about	agents	 acting	 on	 grounds.	 Importantly,	 forms	 of	 expression	 that	 employ	psychological	 terms	 are	 not	 reserved	 for	 Psychologists	 about	 Grounds.	 The	
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psychological	 terms	 in	 such	 forms	 of	 expression	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	performing	other	functions	than	referring	to	whatever	it	is	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Given	that	S	Φed	on	grounds	of	P,	it	seems	fine	to	say	not	only:	(1) “S	Φed	on	grounds	of	P”,	or,	with	equivalent	meaning	(at	least	with	regard	to	what	S’s	ground	was):	(2) “S	Φed	because	P”,	but	also	to	say	things	like	(3) “S	Φed	because	she	believed	that	P”.	Let	me	 first	 say	 something	 about	 the	 relation	 between	 (1)	 and	 (2),	 and	 then	something	about	the	relation	between	(1)/(2)	and	(3).	(2)	is	a	very	general	form	of	expression,	instances	of	which	are,	say,	(4) “Samantha	bit	a	policeman	because	she	was	drunk”,	and	 (5) “Samantha	took	out	an	umbrella	because	it	was	raining”.	It	 is	very	hard	to	hear	(4)	as	a	way	of	expressing	the	thought	that	Sam	took	it	that	she	was	drunk,	took	that	supposed	fact	to	be	a	reason	to	bite	a	policeman,	and	was	motivated	to	bite	a	policeman	by	the	supposed	fact	that	she	was	drunk,	due	to	taking	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	bite	a	policeman,	i.e.	it	is	very	hard	to	hear	(4)	as	a	manner	of	expressing	on	what	grounds	Sam	bit	a	policeman.	For	it	would	be	very	odd	 for	someone	to	 take	 it	 that	 the	(supposed)	 fact	 that	she	 is	drunk	 is	 a	 reason	 to	 bite	 a	 policeman.	 Most	 naturally,	 (4)	 is	 heard	 as	 a	decisively	non-rational	explanation	of	why	Sam	bit	a	policeman.	She	was	drunk,	and	people	do	all	sorts	of	stupid	things	when	they	are	drunk.	(Cf.	Hyman,	2015,	chap.	6.3.)	Things	are	different,	however,	with	(5).	(5)	 is	most	naturally	taken	as	equivalent	in	meaning,	at	least	with	regard	to	what	Sam’s	ground	was,	with	
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(6) “Sam	took	out	an	umbrella	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	raining”.	Note	that	 it	may	be	that	with	employing	(5),	as	opposed	to	employing	(6),	we	take	on	an	additional	 commitment,	namely,	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	 truth	 of	 the	consideration	that	functions	as	Sam’s	ground.	That	is,	maybe	it	is	paradoxical	to	employ	 (5)	 in	 cases	 in	which	 one	 thinks	 that	 it	 is	 not	 raining,	 as	maybe,	 (5)	conversationally	implicates,	or	even	implies,	that	it	is	raining	(for	claims	to	that	effect,	 cf.	 e.g.	 Dancy,	 2002,	 pp.	 134–5;	 Sandis,	 2013,	 para.	 3;	 Smith,	 1998,	 pp.	155–8).	Let	me	 now	 turn	 to	 (3).	 (3)	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 statement	 to	 the	effect	that	S’s	ground	was	a	consideration	about	her	own	mind,	but	it	need	not	be	 so	 understood.	 Using	 brackets	 to	 indicate	 the	 part	 of	 the	 statement	 that	specifies	the	ground	on	which	S	Φed,	we	can	distinguish	between	two	readings	of	(3),	namely,	(7) “S	Φed	because	(she	believed	that	P)”,	and	 (8) “S	Φed	because	she	believed	(that	P)”.	(7)	is	the	mold	into	which	the	special	cases	discussed	in	the	foregoing	section	fit.	 Remember,	 for	 instance,	 the	 person	 who	 sought	 out	 a	 psychiatrist	 on	grounds	 of	 believing	 that	 rats	 are	 living	 in	 her	 shoes.	 About	 her,	we	 can	 say	(using	 the	 convention	 just	 introduced)	 that	 she	 sought	 out	 a	 psychiatrist	“because	(she	believed	that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes)”.	But	let	us	say	that	she	did	not	seek	out	a	psychiatrist,	but	called	Rentokill.	We	can	still	say	that	she	did	what	she	did	“because	she	believed	that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes”,	but	what	we	 thereby	will	 be	 saying	 is	 that	 she	did	what	 she	did	 “because	 she	believed	(that	rats	are	living	in	her	shoes)”.	
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When	is	it	apt	to	employ	(8),	as	opposed	to	(2),	i.e.	when	is	it	apt	to	use	the	 psychologizing	 form?	 I	 suggested	 above	 that	 forms	 of	 expression	 like	 (2)	might	commit	one	to	the	view	that	the	ground	at	issue	was	a	truth.	Accordingly,	(8)	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 form	 of	 expression	 that	 cancels	 any	 such	commitment.	 If	 that	 is	 true,	 then	 it	 is	apt	 to	employ	(8)	 in	cases	 in	which	one	takes	 it	 that	 S	 is	mistaken	 about	 P,	 or	 in	which	 one	wants	 to	 remain	 neutral	with	 regard	 to	 whether	 P.	 Let	 us	 say	 that	 Sam	mistakenly	 believes	 that	 it	 is	raining,	and	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out.	 What	 I	 have	 just	 suggested	 helps	 explain	 why	 Sam,	 when	 questioned,	would	not	say	that	she	is	picking	up	an	umbrella	because	she	believes	that	it	is	raining,	but	because	 it	 is	 raining.	For	Sam,	of	course,	stands	 firm	 in	her	belief	that	it	is	raining;	otherwise	she	would	not	pick	up	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out.	Now	let	us	say	that	as	soon	as	she	steps	out	onto	the	street,	she	realizes	that	it	is	 not	 raining.	 What	 I	 have	 just	 suggested	 also	 helps	 explain	 why	retrospectively,	Sam	would	not	say	that	she	picked	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	 because	 it	 was	 raining,	 but	 rather,	 that	 she	 would	 say	 that	 she	 did	 so	because	 she	 believed	 (that	 it	 was	 raining).	 For	 now	 knowing	 that	 it	 is	 not	raining,	 Sam	would	 no	 longer	want	 to	 take	 on	 any	 commitment	 to	 the	 effect	that	was	is	raining.	It	also	helps	explain	why	an	onlooker	who	knows	all	along	that	it	is	not	raining	would	say	that	Sam	is	picking	up	an	umbrella	because	she	believes	that	it	is	raining,	and	not	because	it	is	raining.	Knowing	all	along	that	Sam’s	 belief	 is	 mistaken,	 the	 onlooker	 does	 not	 want	 to	 take	 on	 any	commitment	to	the	effect	that	it	is	raining.	The	point	I	want	to	make,	however,	does	 not	 concern	 the	 intricacies	 of	 conversational	 implicatures.	 The	 point	 I	want	 to	 make	 is	 merely	 that	 the	 ubiquitousness	 of	 psychological	 vocabulary	does	not	imply	the	ubiquitousness	of	psychological	grounds.	
	 67	
1.5	Reduction	and	Explanation		Above,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 Principle	 of	 Rational	Motivation,	which	we	 can	 now	understand	 as	 the	 view	 that	 rational	 agents	 are	 such	 that	 they	 can	 act	 on	considerations,	 is	 neutral	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 host	 of	 contested	 philosophical	issues.	 I	 now	 want	 to	 note	 two	 further	 issues	 about	 which	 the	 Principle	 of	Rational	Motivation	is	neutral,	namely,	it	is	neutral	with	regard	to	the	necessity	and	feasibility	of	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	 it	 is	silent	on	the	 question	 what	 explains	 someone’s	 action	 when	 she	 acts	 on	 a	 ground.	Having	these	issues	on	the	table	will	be	relevant	in	what	I	go	on	to	say	below.	Let	me	begin	with	the	question	about	reduction.	We	can	give	an	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	in	the	manner	in	which	I	did	it	above.	But	once	we	have	clarified	 the	 notion	 of	 acting	 on	 a	 ground,	 we	 can	 also	 raise	 the	 question	whether	we	can	(or	need	to)	say	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	in	other,	allegedly	more	 basic,	 terms.	 That	 is,	we	 can	 raise	 the	 question	whether	 a	 non-circular	account	of	the	form	
What	it	is	for	S	to	Φ	on	grounds	of	P	is	___	is	 forthcoming.	 Reductivists	 (e.g.	 Davis,	 2005;	 Setiya,	 2007;	 Smith,	 2000;	Velleman,	 2000)	 hold	 that	 such	 an	 account	 is	 forthcoming,	 and	 are	 working	towards	providing	such	an	account.	Davis,	for	instance,	tells	us	that	[o]nce	 we	 have	 accepted	 the	 fact	 that	 people	 act	 for	 reasons,	 we	 can	raise	the	following	question:	What	is	it	to	act	for	a	reason?	In	particular,	what	 is	 it	 for	Mary	to	act	 for	the	reason	that	there	 is	not	enough	light?	She	could	have	had	any	number	of	 reasons,	or	none	at	all.	What	made	that	 her	 reason?	 What	 made	 that	 her	 reason	 for	 flipping	 the	 switch	rather	than	some	of	the	other	things	she	was	doing?	My	answer	in	brief	
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is	that	what	it	is	to	act	for	a	reason	is	for	the	action	to	result	in	a	certain	way	from	a	belief	and	a	(volitive)	desire.	(Davis,	2005,	pp.	68–9)34	That	is,	Davis	suggests	(following	Davidson,	1980)	that	we	can	say	what	it	is	for	someone	to	act	on	grounds	of	some	consideration	in	terms	of	her	representing	that	consideration	 in	a	manner	that	 is	efficacious	with	regard	to	her	acting	as	she	is	acting.	Note,	importantly,	that	a	Reductivist	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	that	holds	that,	say,	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	is	“for	the	action	to	result	in	a	certain	way	 from	 a	 belief	 and	 a	 (volitive)	 desire”,	 is,	 as	 such,	 silent	 on	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Notably,	it	is	compatible	with	what	I	above	showed	to	 be	 correct,	 namely,	 Non-Psychologistic	 Propositionalism	 about	 Grounds.	Here	is	Setiya:	[T]he	 best	 way	 to	 think	 about	 the	 belief-desire	 model	 of	 acting	 for	reasons	is	not	as	the	claim	that	our	reasons	for	acting	are	really	beliefs	and	desires,	but	as	an	attempt	to	say	what	it	is	to	act	for	a	reason	(where	the	reason	is	a	putative	fact)	in	causal-psychological	terms.	It	is,	in	effect,	a	reductive	metaphysical	account	of	"acting	because	p"	or	"acting	for	the	reason	 that	 p"	 –	 not	 a	 rejection	 of	 that	 common-sense	 idiom.	 (Setiya,	2007,	p.	30)35	Non-Reductivists	(e.g.	Dancy	2002;	Hacker	2009)	hold	that	no	such	account	is	forthcoming,	 and	 the	work	 they	do	amounts	 to	 clarifying	 the	 idea	of	Φing	on	grounds	 of	 P	 by	 relating	 it	 to	 other	 concepts	 (like,	 say,	 the	 concept	 of	knowledge,	 or	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 normative	 reason,	 and	 so	 on),	 as	 opposed	 to	
reducing	it	to	other	concepts.	Here,	for	instance,	is	Dancy:	
																																																								34	Here,	‘acting	for	a	reason’	is	to	be	understood	as	acting	on	a	ground.	35	See	the	foregoing	note.		
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[T]he	difference	between	 those	reasons	 for	which	 the	agent	did	 in	 fact	act	 and	 those	 for	 which	 he	 might	 have	 acted	 but	 did	 not	 is	 not	 a	difference	 in	 causal	 role	 ….	 It	 is	 just	 the	 difference	 between	 the	considerations	 in	 the	 light	 of	which	he	 acted	 and	other	 considerations	which	he	took	to	favour	acting	as	he	did	but	which	were	not	in	fact	the	ones	in	the	light	of	which	he	decided	to	do	it.	This	is	admittedly	not	very	informative,	since	we	have	to	allow	that	we	have	offered	no	analysis	or	philosophical	account	of	the	'in	the	light	of'	relation.	I	suspect,	however,	that	 no	 such	 analysis	 or	 account	 is	 available	 to	 be	 given,	 without	therefore	supposing	that	this	has	any	tendency	to	show	that	the	relation	concerned	does	not	exist.	It	is	what	it	is,	and	not	another	thing;	and	if	it	cannot	be	analyzed,	so	much	the	worse	for	the	more	global	pretensions	of	analysis.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	163)	The	Principle	of	Rational	Motivation,	as	such,	is	neutral	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	reduction.	I	will	not	attempt	to	take	a	stand	on	that	issue.	I	take	it	that	if	what	I	say	is	acceptable,	it	is	acceptable	to	both	Reductivists	and	to	Non-Reductivists,	for	also	a	Reductivist	has	to	get	clear	on	what	she	wants	to	reduce	before	she	can	attempt	to	do	so.	Let	me	now	turn	to	explaining.	Giving	an	account,	or	a	theory,	of	acting	on	a	 ground	–	whether	 it	 is	 a	 reductive	or	 a	non-reductive	one	–	 amounts	 to	
explaining	acting	on	a	ground,	in	one	sense	of	‘explaining’.	But	explaining	acting	on	a	ground,	in	the	sense	of	giving	a	theory	or	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	is	not	 the	 same	 thing	as	 explaining	why	 some	particular	 agent	performed	 some	particular	action.	Giving	a	theory	or	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	(or	of	values,	or	 normativity,	 or	 perception,	 or	 whatever)	 is	 something	 that	 we	 do	 in	 our	capacity	 as	 philosophers.	 Accordingly,	 one	 might	 call	 such	 explanations	
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Philosopher’s	 Explanations,	 or	 the	 sense	 of	 ‘explanation’	 the	 philosophical	sense.	 But	 explaining	 why	 some	 particular	 agent	 performed	 some	 particular	action	is	something	that	we	do	as	agents	when	confronted	with	the	actions	of	other	agents.	Elisabeth	is	operating	the	pump.	Donald	is	flipping	the	switch.	You	may	wonder	why	Elisabeth	and	Donald	are	doing	what	they	are	doing.	That	is,	you	might	want	an	explanation	of	their	respective	actions.	But	when	you	want	an	 explanation	 of	 their	 respective	 behaviors,	 you	 will	 not	 want	 a	 theory	 of	action,	you	will	want	to	 learn	something	that	renders	their	actions	 intelligible	in	some	respect,	say,	as	done	with	a	certain	end	in	view,	or	as	done	on	a	certain	ground.	As	these	are	the	kinds	of	explanations	that	we,	as	agents,	seek	of	one	another,	one	might	call	such	explanations	Agent’s	Explanations,	and	the	sense	of	‘explanation’	the	agential	sense.	Now,	of	course,	as	philosophers,	we	can	also	give	an	account	or	a	theory	of	Agent’s	Explanations.	But	such	account	or	theory	(which	we	might	call	a	theory	of	action-explanation)	is	something	other	than	an	account	 or	 theory	 of	 acting	 on	 a	 ground	 (which	 we	 might	 call	 a	 theory	 of	action).36	Above,	 I	 introduced	 the	 notion	 of	 rational	 motivation,	 or	 acting	 on	 a	ground,	in	a	way	that	is	independent	of	any	theory	of	action-explanation.	That	is,	given	just	what	I	say	about	rational	motivation,	 it	might	turn	out	that	what	rationally	 motivates	 us	 is	 also	 what	 explains	 our	 actions,	 or	 does	 so	 under	certain	conditions,	but	it	might	turn	out	that	what	rationally	motivates	us	and	
																																																								
36	That	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 those	 two	 things	 might	 not	 be	 intimately	 related.	Anscombe	(2000),	for	instance,	seems	to	have	held	that	we	can	give	a	theory	of	intentional	action	by	way	of	giving	a	theory	of	action-explanation.	Conversely,	one	might	hold	 that	a	 theory	of	action-explanation	needs	 to	be	 informed	by	a	theory	of	what	it	is	to	act	intentionally.	See	also	my	remarks	on	Smith	in	II.2.1	below.	
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what	 explains	 our	 actions	 are	 two	 quite	 different	 things.	 I	 will	 come	 to	 that	issue	in	the	next	part.	I	will	argue	that	what	rationally	motivates	us	is	not	what	explains	our	actions.	But	that	is	a	substantial	result.	It	is	important	to	point	out	that	 no	 account	 of	 action-explanation	 is	 built	 into	 the	 notion	 of	 rational	motivation.	 As	we	will	 see,	 that	 is	 one	 of	 the	merits	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 rational	motivation	that	I	have	introduced.			
2.	The	Psychologism-Debate	
	So	far,	I	have	introduced	the	concept	of	a	normative	reason,	and	the	concept	of	a	ground.	Now,	in	the	literature,	talk	about	‘motivating	reasons’	(or	‘reasons	for	which’)	abounds.	A	casual	reader	gets	the	impression	that	there	is	grand-scale	disagreement	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 motivating	 reasons:	 disagreement	 about	whether	they	are	mental	states,	or	maybe	facts	about	mental	states,	or	whether	they	 are	 propositions	 (that	 are	 not	 restricted	 to	 propositions	 about	 mental	states),	or	maybe	 facts	 (that	are	not	 restricted	 to	 facts	about	mental	 states)	–	proponents	 of	 the	 former	 view	 being	 called	 Psychologists	 and	 proponents	 of	the	latter	view	being	called	Non-Psychologists	(or	Anti-Psychologists).	Call	this	the	 Psychologism-Debate	 about	 Motivating	 Reasons	 (or	 the	 Psychologism-Debate,	 for	 short).	Here	 are	 two	 examples	 of	 the	way	 in	which	Psychologism	and	Non-Psychologism	are	contrasted:	In	a	typical	passage	(that	is,	in	a	passage	typical	to	contemporary	theorizing	about	reasons),	Maria	Alvarez	tells	us	that	[o]n	 the	 one	 hand,	 we	 have	 the	 psychological	 conception,	 which	 says	that	 someone’s	 reason	 for	 acting	 is	 her	 believing	 something.	 On	 the	other	 hand,	we	 have	 the	 non-psychological	 view,	which	 holds	 that	 the	reason	is	what	the	agent	believes,	not	her	believing	it.	For	instance,	 if	 I	
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buy	a	magazine	because	I	believe	it	contains	the	TV	listings	for	the	week,	according	 to	 the	 psychological	 conception	 my	 reason	 for	 buying	 the	magazine	 is	 that	 I	 believe	 (or	 my	 believing)	 that	 it	 contains	 the	 TV	listings;	while	according	to	the	non-psychological	conception	it	is	that	it	
contains	the	TV	listings.	(Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	129–30)	Similarly,	James	Pryor	takes	it	that	we	can	sensibly	ask:	[I]f	you’re	aware	that	your	secretary	plans	to	expose	you,	and	you	resign	to	avoid	a	scandal,	what	 is	your	reason	for	resigning?	…	Is	your	reason	
the	fact	that	your	secretary	plans	to	expose	you?	…	Or	are	reasons	rather	
attitudes?	Are	your	reasons	for	resigning	your	belief	that	your	secretary	plans	to	expose	you,	and	your	desire	to	avoid	a	scandal?	…	Or	are	reasons	
propositions?	(Pryor,	2007,	p.	217)	The	 stage	 is	 set	 in	 like	manner	by	many	other	 authors	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Bittner,	 2001;	Dancy	2002;	Gibbons,	2010;	Hacker,	2009;	Mayr,	2011;	Miller,	2008;	O’Brien,	2015;	Stout,	2009;	Stoutland,	2007;	Turri,	2009;	Wiland,	2012).	Who	is	right?	Is	the	Psychologist	right,	or	is	the	Non-Psychologist	right?	The	problem,	as	I	see	it,	is	that	it	 is	not	really	clear	what	the	controversy	is	supposed	to	be	about.	The	obvious	 rejoinder	 is:	 it	 is	 a	 controversy	about	motivating	 reasons.	But	what	 I	mean	is:	it	is	not	clear	what	motivating	reasons	are.	By	this,	I	do	not	mean:	it	is	not	 clear	 what	 they	 are	 ontologically	 speaking.	 For	 that	 is	 just	 what	 the	controversy	 seems	 to	 be	 about:	 whether	 they	 are	 mental	 states,	 or	propositions,	 or	maybe	 facts.	 Rather,	what	 I	mean	 is:	 it	 is	 not	 clear	what	 the	
relevant	concept	of	a	 ‘motivating	reason’	is.	Specifically,	 it	 is	not	clear	whether	both	 (or	 all)	 sides	 are	 using	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 to	 signify	 the	 self-same	 concept.	 To	put	 it	 differently,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	whether	 both	 (or	 all)	 sides	agree	on	what	role	the	things	that	they	call	‘motivating	reasons’	play,	and	then	
	 73	
disagree	 about	 what	 is	 best	 suited	 to	 play	 that	 role,	 or	 whether	 seemingly	contradictory	 claims	about	motivating	 reasons	are	actually	 compatible	 claims	about	things	playing	quite	different	roles.	I	 will	 start	 out	 by	 distinguish	 various	 sense	 of	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	reason’	that	we	find	in	the	literature,	and	then	show	why	one	might	think	that	Psychologists	and	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	cross-purpose.	I	will	conclude	by	suggesting	that	under	the	assumption	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	also	is	an	explanans,	we	can	conceive	of	the	debate	as	substantial	after	all.		
2.1	Varieties	of	Motivating	Reasons		In	part	 I,	 I	 talked	about	 facts	 that	 speak	 in	 favor	of	actions,	and	 I	 called	 them	
reasons.	 Specifically,	 I	 called	 them	 normative	 reasons.	 What	 the	 qualification	‘normative’	signifies	is	that	facts	that	speak	in	favor	of	actions	are	in	focus	with	
regard	to	their	being	what	we	seek	to	get	at	when	thinking	about	what	we	and	
others	should	do.	Now,	 some	 authors	 (e.g.	 Alvarez,	 2010)	 hold	 that	 those	 same	 favoring	
facts	can	also	be	in	a	different	kind	of	focus,	namely,	that	they	can	be	in	focus	when	we	are	 attempting	 to	explain	why	 someone	did	what	 she	did.	They	 say	that	when	an	agent	 takes	a	 certain	 fact	 to	be	a	 reason	 for	a	 certain	 course	of	action,	 and	 performs	 that	 action	 because	 she	 is	 motivated	 to	 do	 so	 by	 that	reason,	 we	 can	 describe	 what	 motivates	 her	 as	 a	 ‘motivating	 reason’.	 The	qualification	 ‘motivating’,	 in	 that	usage,	signifies	 that	 that	 fact	 is	 in	 focus	with	regard	to	 its	being	caught	up	 in	 the	right	kind	of	way	(i.e.	 in	 the	way	that	 the	Principle	 of	 Rational	Motivation	 describes)	 in	 the	 agent’s	 exercise	 of	 rational	agency.	Alvarez	writes:	
	 74	
[M]otivating	reasons	are	true	beliefs,	 that	 is,	 the	things	that	we	believe	that	are	true	–	and	since,	if	the	belief	that	p	is	true,	it	follows	that	it	is	the	case	that	p	and	therefore	that	it	is	a	fact	that	p,	we	can	also	conclude	that	the	 reasons	 that	motivate	us	 to	 act	 are	 truths	 or	 facts.	 (Alvarez,	 2010,	163)	It	follows	that	false	considerations,	when	they	play	the	role	of	a	ground,	are	not	motivating	reasons,	although	they	are	motivating	considerations		(or	grounds,	in	our	terminology):	[S]omeone	who	acts	on	a	 false	belief	acts	 for	no	reason	…	 for	 the	 false	belief	 is	 not	 a	 motivating	 reason	 even	 though	 …	 it	 is	 a	 motivating	consideration.	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	141)	‘Motivating	reasons’,	in	that	usage	of	the	term,	are	thus	a	subclass	of	what	I	call	grounds.	 When	 S	 believes	 that	 P,	 takes	 it	 that	 P	 favors	 that	 she	 Φ,	 and	 is	accordingly	motivated	to	Φ	by	what	she	believes,	i.e.	P,	then	P	is	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	And	if	the	ground	is	normative	reason,	then	–	according	to	the	terminological	 convention	 at	 issue	 –	 we	 can	 call	 her	 ground	 a	 motivating	reason.	 Put	 in	 a	 slogan:	 motivating	 reasons	 are	 normative	 reasons	 that	motivate.37																																																									37	Susanne	Mantel	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 view	 that	 “[b]eing	 a	motivating	 reason	 is	being	a	normative	reason	that	motivates”	cannot	be	correct,	“because	an	agent	can	act	for	a	motivating	reason	without	being	motivated	by	a	normative	reason	…	For	 example,	 I	may	 go	 to	 the	 station	because	 I	mistakenly	 believe	 that	my	train	 is	 leaving	 although	 the	 station	 is	 closed.	 Surely	 I	 go	 to	 the	 station	 for	 a	motivating	reason,	but	 this	motivating	reason	cannot	be	a	normative	reason.”	(Mantel,	2014,	p.	5;	my	emphasis)	But	why	is	it	‘sure’	that	Susanne	“goes	to	the	station	for	a	motivating	reason”?	It	all	depends	on	what	is	meant	by	‘motivating	reason’.	 If	by	 ‘motivating	reason’,	one	means	 ‘ground’,	 then	I	go	to	 the	station	for	a	motivating	reason.	There	is	nothing	wrong	with	using	the	term	like	that.	But	 there	 is	 also	 nothing	 wrong	 with	 emphasizing	 the	 ‘reason’-part	 in	‘motivating	reason’	and	reserving	 the	 term	for	cases	 in	which	 the	grounds	on	
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Other	 authors	 –	 e.g.	 Dancy	 (2002)	 –	 are	 happy	 to	 employ	 the	 term	‘motivating	 reason’	 more	 broadly.	 For	 them,	 all	 grounds	 are	 motivating	reasons.	‘Motivating	reason’,	on	that	usage,	is	just	another	term	for	ground:	When	 someone	 does	 something,	 there	 will	 (normally)	 be	 some	considerations	in	the	light	of	which	he	acted	–	the	reasons	for	which	he	did	what	he	did.	…	[N]ormally	there	will	be,	for	each	action,	the	reasons	in	the	light	of	which	the	agent	did	that	action,	which	we	can	think	of	as	what	persuaded	him	to	do	it.	When	we	think	in	terms	of	reasons	in	this	way,	we	think	of	 them	as	motivating.	The	consideration	that	motivated	the	agent	was	his	reason	for	doing	what	he	did.	…	The	consideration	in	the	 light	of	which	someone	acted	as	he	did	need	not	have	been	a	very	good	reason;	what	he	did	may	have	been	a	pretty	silly	thing	to	do,	with	
little	or	nothing	actually	 to	be	 said	 in	 its	 favour.	 (Dancy,	 2002,	 pp.	 1–2;	my	emphasis)	‘Motivating	 reason’,	 in	 this	 usage	 of	 the	 term,	 does	 not	 so	 much	 mean	‘normative	 reason	 that	 motivates’,	 but	 rather,	 ‘motivator	 that	 motivates	because	it	is	taken	to	be	a	normative	reason’.	For,	as	Dancy	says,	you	can	act	for	a	motivating	reason	even	if	there	is	“nothing	actually	to	be	said	in	…	favour”	of	doing	what	you	are	doing.	Once	we	 are	 clear	 on	 the	 distinction	 between	 grounds	 and	 normative	reasons,	 it	 does	 not	 really	 seem	 to	matter	 how	we	 use	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	reason’:	whether	we	use	it	interchangeably	with	grounds,	or	whether	we	use	it	only	for	grounds	that	are	what	they	purport	to	be,	namely,	normative	reasons.																																																																																																																																																													which	we	act	are	 reasons	 (and	not	 just	apparent	 reasons),	 and,	 thus,	denying	that	Susanne	goes	to	the	station	for	a	motivating	reason.			
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However,	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 is	 also	 used	 in	 (at	 least)	 two	further	ways.	For	some	authors,	the	notion	of	a	‘motivating	reason’	is	the	notion	of	an	explanantia	that	is	such	as	to	explain	the	action	by	way	of	“making	sense”	of	it.	According	to	Wallace,	for	instance,	[t]he	motivating	reason	–	the	consideration	we	cite	in	the	perspective	of	explanation,	to	make	sense	of	what	the	agent	has	already	done	–	is	the	agent’s	 seeing	 [a]	 normative	 consideration	 as	 counting	 in	 favor	 of	 the	action	performed	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	435)38	‘Motivating	reasons’,	as	he	uses	 the	 term	here,	are	evidently	not	grounds.	For	grounds,	according	to	how	I	defined	the	term,	are	what	Wallace	is	talking	about	when	 he	 talks	 about	 the	 “normative	 considerations”	 that	 the	 agent	 sees	 as	“counting	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 action	 performed”.	 Wallace’s	 ‘motivating	 reasons’,	however,	 are	 not	 what	 the	 agent	 sees	 as	 counting	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 action	performed.	They	are	her	seeing	a	normative	consideration	as	counting	in	favor	of	 the	 action	 performed.	 And	 as	 her	 seeing	 a	 normative	 consideration	 as	counting	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 action	 performed	 is	 what,	 according	 to	Wallace,	 we	“cite	in	the	perspective	of	explanation,	to	make	sense	of	what	the	agent	has	…	done”,	 ‘motivating	reasons’,	as	he	uses	the	term,	are	explanantia	that	are	such	as	to	“make	sense”	of	actions,	they	are	not	motivators.	There	is	yet	another	sense	in	which	the	term	‘motivating	reason’	is	used.	Above,	I	quoted	Setiya,	who	suggests	that	
																																																								38	Cf.	also:	”What	are	called	‘motivating	reasons’	are	…	explanations	of	action	in	terms	 of	 reasons	 in	 the	 normative	 sense	 –	 as	 I	 have	 put	 it,	 psychological	explanations	 that	 render	 intelligible	 agents’	 normative	 understanding	 of	 the	action	they	were	performing.”	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	435)	
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the	best	way	to	think	about	the	belief-desire	model	of	acting	for	reasons	is	 …	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 say	 what	 it	 is	 to	 act	 for	 a	 reason	 …	 in	 causal-psychological	terms.	(Setiya,	2007,	p.	30)	Some	 authors	 –	 notably,	Michael	 Smith	 –	 use	 the	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 to	talk	about	the	causally	efficacious	belief/desire-pair	that	figure	in	their	account	of	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground.	Let	me	explain.	Smith	considers	the	situation	in	which	he	types	some	words.	He	writes:	In	deciding	whether	or	not	to	type	these	words	I	reflect	on	certain	facts:	that	it	would	be	desirable	to	write	a	book	and	that	I	can	do	so	by	typing	these	 words.	 These	 are	 among	 the	 considerations	 I	 actually	 take	 into	account	in	deciding	what	to	do	before	I	do	it;	they	give	my	reasons;	they	constitute	my	rational	justification.	…	[T]hese	considerations	constitute	my	 normative	 reasons	 for	 doing	 what	 I	 do,	 at	 least	 as	 these	 reasons	appear	to	me.	(Smith,	2000,	p.	131)	Smith	 here	 seems	 to	 be	 talking	 about	 grounds	 (or	 anyway,	 about	 something	resembling	 grounds)	 when	 he	 talks	 about	 ‘considerations	 one	 takes	 into	account	 in	 deciding	 what	 to	 do’,	 but	 he	 does	 not	 call	 those	 considerations	‘motivating	 reasons’.	 Rather,	 he	 calls	 them	 ‘the	 agent’s	 normative	 reasons’,	presumably	because	they	are	taken	(albeit	maybe	mistakenly)	to	be	normative	reasons.	What	then	about	his	notion	of	a	‘motivating	reason’?	As	Smith	sees	it,	what	it	is	for	S	to	Φ	on	grounds	of	P	is,	roughly,	that	the	following	happens:		S	 takes	 P	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	 of	Φing	à	 S	 desires	 to	Φ	 (and	 has	 beliefs	about	how	to	go	about	in	order	to	Φ)	à	S	Φ’s,	where	 the	 arrow	 signifies	 a	 causal	 relation	 (cf.	 Smith,	 2000,	 chap	 4–5).	 And	what	he	calls	‘motivating	reasons’	are	the	belief/desire-pairs	that	figure	in	the	
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second	 link	 of	 this	 causal	 chain	 leading	 from	 judgment	 to	 action.	 Thus,	 he	writes	that		[m]otivating	 reasons	would	 seem	 to	be	psychological	states	 that	play	a	certain	explanatory	role	in	producing	action	(Smith,	2000,	p.	96).	Contrast	this	notion	of	a	motivating	reasons	with	Wallace’s	notion.	According	to	Wallace,	 psychological	 facts	 explain	 actions,	 in	 that	 they	 are	 what	 we	(allegedly)	 need	 to	 know	 in	 order	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 action.	 According	 to	Smith,	 however,	 psychological	 states	 explain	 actions	 in	 that	 they	are	 (at	 least	part	 of)	 what	 produce	 actions.	 While	 Wallace	 is	 giving	 an	 account	 of	 what	explains	actions,	Smith	is	giving	an	account	of	what	actions	are.39	The	 view	 that	 motivating	 reasons	 are	 psychological	 states	 is	 often	credited	 to	Davidson;40	and,	 thus,	 it	 seems	 in	order	 to	say	some	words	on	his	view.	Notably,	Davidson	himself	does	not	use	the	term	‘motivating	reason’.	But	he	does	 talk	about	belief/desire-pairs	being	 reasons,	or	 ‘primary	 reasons’.	He	holds	that	
R	 is	 a	primary	 reason	why	an	agent	performed	 the	action	A	 under	 the	description	d	 only	 if	R	 consists	 of	 a	 pro	 attitude	 of	 the	 agent	 towards																																																									
39	However,	it	is	a	small	step	from	an	account	to	the	effect	that	what	actions	are	is:	events	caused	by	belief/desire-pairs,	to	an	account	to	the	effect	that	what	explains	actions,	in	the	sense	of	making	them	intelligible,	are	such	belief/	desire-pairs.		40	Here	is	Alvarez:	“Following	Davidson,	most	philosophers	today	maintain	that	a	person’s	reason	for	acting	is	a	combination	of	a	belief	and	a	desire.	Belief	and	desire,	 in	 turn,	 are	 thought	 of	 as	 mental	 states	 with	 contents	 that	 can	 be	expressed	propositionally:	Tom	believes	that	apples	are	healthy;	Henry	desires	
that	there	are	eggs	for	breakfast.	So	reasons	are	states	of	belief	and	desire	with	propositional	 contents.	Or	 so	 it	 is	 said.	…	 In	 recent	years,	however,	 there	has	been	 growing	 dissatisfaction	 with	 this	 conception	 of	 reasons.	 The	dissatisfaction	is,	I	think,	well	founded	and	it	calls	for	a	wholesale	rethinking	of	the	nature	of	our	reasons	for	acting.”	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	2)		
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actions	with	a	 certain	property,	 and	a	belief	of	 the	agent	 that	A,	 under	the	description	d,	has	that	property	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	5),	and,	famously,	that	[a]	primary	reason	for	an	action	is	its	cause.	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	12)	But	thereby,	he	is	not	talking	about	grounds.	He	does	have	something	similar	to	what	I	call	grounds	in	view.	He	writes	that	[c]orresponding	 to	 the	 belief	 and	 attitude	 of	 a	 primary	 reason	 for	 an	action,	we	can	always	construct	(with	a	little	ingenuity)	the	premises	of	a	syllogism	from	which	it	follows	that	the	action	has	some	(as	Anscombe	calls	it)	'desirability	characteristic'.	(Davidson,	1980,	p.	9)	At	least	roughly,	those	premises,	and	not	the	belief/desire-pair,	are	the	agent’s	grounds.	Talking,	as	he	does,	about	belief-desire-pairs	causing	events,	thereby	rendering	them	intentional	actions,	can	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	give	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	premises,	or	grounds.	The	upshot	of	this	little	excursion	is	that	there	are	(at	least)	three	things	that,	in	the	literature,	the	term	‘motivating	reason’	is	used	to	signify:	A. Grounds	a. All	grounds	(e.g.	Dancy,	2002)	b. Those	grounds	that	are	normative	reasons	(e.g.	Alvarez,	2010)	B. Explanantia	of	action-explanations	(e.g.	Wallace,	2003)	C. Psychological	states	that	figure	in	a	reductive	account	of	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	(e.g.	Smith,	2000)	With	this	disambiguation	at	hand,	let	me	return	to	the	Psychologism-Debate.				
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2.2	Defusing	the	Psychologism-Debate		At	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	I	asked:	what	is	the	Psychologism-Debate	actually	a	debate	about?	What,	that	is,	is	the	relevant	notion	of	a	‘motivating	reason’	in	terms	of	which	the	debate	should	be	framed?	Remember	 the	 two	 arguments	 I	 presented	 above:	 the	 Argument	 from	the	Wrong	Kind	that	is	directed	against	State-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	and	the	 Argument	 from	 Unusual	 Cases	 that	 is	 directed	 against	 Psychologistic	Propositionalism	 about	 Grounds.	 Note	 that	 both	 arguments	 are	 arguments	against	a	certain	view	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground:	given	that	they	are	successful	(and	I	believe	that	they	are),	they	show	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	 is	 neither	 a	 psychological	 state,	 nor,	 at	 least	 not	 in	 general,	 a	consideration	 about	 a	 psychological	 state.	 But	 they	 do	 not,	 or	 at	 least	 not	directly,	address	a	view	to	the	effect	that	explanantia	are	psychological	states,	or	facts	about	psychological	states.	Nor	do	they	address	a	view	to	the	effect	that	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	in	terms	of	psychological	states	and	their	causal	role	should	be	given.	Taking	either	one	of	those	two	arguments	to	refute	either	one	of	those	two	views	would	seem	to	be	to	commit	an	ignoratio	
elenchi.		Jonathan	Dancy	is	one	of	the	most	valiant	contemporary	proponents	of	the	 Non-Psychologistic	 side	 of	 the	 Psychologism-Debate	 (indeed	 he	might	 be	seen	 as	 responsible,	 at	 least	 in	 part,	 for	 there	 being	 such	 a	 debate).	 It	 is	noteworthy	 that	 our	 two	 arguments	 are	 among	 the	 two	main	 arguments	 he	gives	 against	 Psychologism.	 The	 Argument	 from	 the	 Wrong	 Kind	 figures	 in	Dancy	(2002,	chap.	5),	and	the	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases	figures	in	Dancy	(2002,	chap.	6).	This	shows	that,	at	least	as	he	understands	the	Psychologism-
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Debate,	 it	 is	a	debate	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	 i.e.	about	what	 is	such	as	to	be	able	to	motivate	an	agent	to	Φ	due	to	her	taking	it	 to	favor	that	she	Φ’s.	Many	other	contributions	 to	 the	Psychologism-Debate	also	presuppose	all	along	that	both	sides	are	talking	about	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	when	they	are	talking	about	motivating	reasons.	Here	is,	for	instance,	Alvarez:	In	general	…	what	seems	to	me	to	make	my	action	right	or	appropriate	is	what	I	believe,	not	my	believing	it.	Consider	an	example.	Suppose	that	I	give	my	cousin	some	money	because	I	believe	what	he	tells	me,	namely,	that	he	needs	it	to	pay	his	rent.	It	would	seem	that	what	motivates	me	to	give	 him	 the	money	 is	 that	 he	 needs	 it:	 it	 is	 that	 that	 seems	 to	me	 to	make	 the	 action	of	 giving	him	money	 right	 or	 appropriate	 and	not	my	
believing	 that	 he	 needs	 it.	 …	 So	 it	 seems	 that	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 a	motivating	 reason	 is,	 typically,	 what	 the	 agent	 believes	 and	 not	 his	believing	 it.	 And	 this	 is	 what	 the	 non-psychological	 conception	 says	motivating	reasons	are.	(Alvarez,	2010,	pp.	131–132)	This	argument	presupposes	that	motivating	reasons	are	things	that	motivate	by	virtue	 of	 their	 appearing,	 to	 the	 agent,	 to	 be	 facts	 that	 favor;	 it	 presupposes,	that	is,	that	motivating	reasons	are	grounds.	The	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases	faulted	Psychologism	for	treating	unusual	cases	as	the	only	kinds	of	cases	there	are.	 Alvarez	 here	 appeals	 directly	 to	 usual	 cases,	 to	what	 kinds	 of	 things	we	usual	 take	 to	 speak	 in	 favor	 of,	 say,	 giving	 our	 cousins	 some	 money.	 If	 her	argument	 is	 effective,	 it	 is	 effective	 only	 against	 those	 that	 are	 talking	 about	
grounds,	but	are	denying	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	(and	for	the	most	part	 is)	 a	 consideration	 that	 is	not	 a	 consideration	about	one’s	own	mind.		
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Or	consider	the	following	argument,	given	by	Stout:		For	R	to	be	a	motivating	reason	for	S	to	Φ	R	must	be	S's	reason	for	Φ-ing.	S	 must	 Φ	 in	 the	 light	 of	 R.	 R	must	 be	 a	 reason	 or	 consideration	 that	motivates	S	to	Φ.	For	any	of	these	conditions	to	be	the	case	R	must	be	a	consideration	 that	 is	 taken	 by	 S	 to	 favour	 Φ-ing.	 For	 R	 to	 be	 S's	motivating	 reason	 for	 Φ-ing,	 R	must	 be	 taken	 by	 S	 to	 be	 a	 normative	reason	 for	 Φ-ing.	 …	 [But]	 [i]f	 motivating	 reasons	 must	 be	 potentially	normative	 reasons,	 it	 cannot	 be	 the	 case	 that	 normative	 reasons	 are	facts	about	the	world	and	motivating	reasons	are	only	ever	facts	about	the	agent's	psychological	state.	(Stout,	2009,	pp.	55-56)	Like	 Alvarez,	 Stout	 is	 talking	 about	 grounds	 and	 showing	 us	 why	 grounds	should	not	be	conceived	of	Psychologistically.	Again,	his	argument	 is	effective	only	 against	 those	who	 are	 talking	 about	grounds,	 but	 are	 denying	 that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	(and	for	the	most	part	is)	a	consideration	that	is	not	a	consideration	about	one’s	own	mind	We	saw	above,	however,	that	when	Smith,	following	Davidson,	says	that	motivating	 reasons	 are	 belief/desire-pairs,	 and	 that	 when	 Wallace	 says	 that	motivating	 reasons	 are	 “the	 agent’s	 seeing	 [a]	 normative	 consideration	 as	counting	in	favor	of	the	action	performed”,	i.e.	a	normative	belief,	they	are	not	talking	 about	 grounds.	 They	 are	 talking	 about	 explanantia,	 or	 about	 the	psychological	 states	 figuring	 in	 a	 reductive	 account	 of	 acting	 on	 a	 ground,	respectively.	 What	 they	 respectively	 say	 is	 completely	 compatible	 with	 the	upshot	of	the	Argument	from	the	Wrong	Kind	and	the	Argument	from	Unusual	Cases,	 namely,	 that	 grounds	 are	 neither	 psychological	 states	 nor	 facts	 about	psychological	states.	
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Consider,	 also,	 that	 when	 Wallace	 argues	 against	 Dancy’s	 Non-Psychologistic	view,	he	does	not	do	that	by	way	of	arguing	that,	say,	 it	 is	 true	after	all	that	when	we	think	about	what	favors	what	in	an	efficacious	way,	i.e.	in	a	way	that	leads	to	action,	our	thinking	is	directed	upon	our	own	mind,	and	not	upon	 the	world	 around	 us	 (which	 is	 something	 that	 the	 Psychologists	 about	Grounds	would	have	to	say).	Rather,	he	argues	that	we	need	an	account	that	 allows	 psychological	 states	 or	 facts	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 reason	
explanations	across	the	board	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	430),	that	 is,	 he	 seems	 to	be	 faulting	his	Non-Psychologistic	 opponent	 for	her	 view	about	explanantia,	not	for	her	view	about	grounds.	This	 does	 not	 prove	 that	 the	 Psychologism-Debate	 rests	 on	 an	equivocation.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 does	 strongly	 suggest	 that	 while	 the	 Non-Psychologists	 in	 the	 debate	 are	 talking	 about	 grounds,	 their	 alleged	Psychologistic	 opponents	 are	 talking	 about	 something	 else,	 and	 that	 there	seems	to	be	disagreement	only	because	unfortunately,	both	sides	use	the	same	term,	 i.e.	 ‘motivating	 reason’	 (cf.	 Darwall,	 2003;	 Davis,	 2005;	 Mantel,	 2016;	Sandis,	2012;	Setiya,	2011).	Note	also	that	despite	all	the	ink	spilled	on	arguing	against	Psychologism	about	Grounds	(in	its	 ‘Statist’	 form,	or	in	its	 ‘Propositionalist’	 form),	there	is	a	lack	of	defenders	of	Psychologism	about	Grounds.41	And	that	is	no	surprise.	For	
																																																								
41	There	 are	 only	 two	 authors	 I	 know	 of	 who	 are	 self-avowed	 Psychologists	about	grounds:	Gibbons	(2010)	and	Turri	(2009).	As	far	as	I	see,	Turri	holds	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	according	to	which	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground	is	for	one’s	mental	states	to	stand	in	appropriate	relations	(note	that	Turri	is	talking	about	epistemic	grounds,	but	takes	what	he	says	to	carry	over	also	to	practical	grounds,	i.e.	grounds	on	which	we	act,	and	discusses	views	on	practical	grounds	like	Dancy's).	The	mistake	he	makes	seems	to	be	to	identify	something	 that	 figures	 in	 the	 explanandum	 of	 the	 reduction	 (grounds)	 with	
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conceiving	 of	 grounds	 as	 either	 psychological	 states,	 or	 considerations	 about	psychological	 states,	 seems	 so	 obviously	 wrong.	 We	 should	 not	 be	 mislead	when	 someone	 like	 Smith	 says	 (as	 I	 already	quoted	him	saying	 in	 II.2.1)	 that	“[m]otivating	 reasons	would	 seem	 to	be	psychological	states”	 (Smith,	2000,	p.	96).	For	notably,	the	very	same	author	is	happy	to	admit	that	(as	I	have	already	quoted	him	saying	in	II.1.4)	[the	view	that]	the	considerations	that	motivate	…	[are]	considerations	about	our	beliefs	and	desires	…	or	considerations	about	our	beliefs	…,	as	Dancy	 rightly	 points	 out,	 …	 fl[ies]	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 facts.	 The	considerations	 that	motivate	us	 are	only	 rarely,	 if	 ever,	 considerations	about	our	own	psychology.	(Smith,	2003,	p.	151)		
2.3	A	Debate	After	All		But	 maybe	 that	 conclusion	 is	 too	 hasty.	 I	 have	 just	 said	 that	 the	 Non-Psychologists	 about	Motivating	Reasons	are	 talking	about	grounds	when	 they	use	the	term	‘motivating	reason’	(the	kinds	of	arguments	they	give	show	that),	but	 that	 the	 Psychologists,	 when	 they	 use	 the	 term,	 are	 talking	 about	
explanantia	of	action-explanations,	or	about	the	psychological	states	figuring	in	a	 reductive	 account	 of	 acting	 on	 a	 ground,	 respectively.	 I	 suggested	 that	 that	
																																																																																																																																																												something	 that	 figures	 in	 the	 explanans	 of	 the	 reduction	 (mental	 states	standing	 in	 appropriate	 relations).	 Gibbons,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 holds	 a	psychologistic	 view	 of	 grounds	 because	 he	 holds	 a	 psychologistic	 view	 of	normative	reasons.	 In	part	 I,	 I	discussed	why	I	 think	what	he	calls	 ‘normative	reasons’	 are	 not	 normative	 reasons	 in	 the	 sense	 at	 issue	 here	 throughout.	 In	brief,	what	he	calls	‘normative	reasons’	are	not	what	figure	in	deliberation	and	advice,	rather,	 they	are	what	render	actions	reasonable	or	rational.	And,	 thus,	they	are	not	(what	I	call)	normative	reasons.	
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shows	that	the	two	sides	of	the	debate	most	likely	are	talking	at	cross-purposes.	However,	 that	 is	 true	only	if	 the	proponents	of	 the	debate	agree	 that	grounds	are	not	explanantia.	For	 if	 one	 takes	 it	 that	 grounds	are	 explanantia,	 and	 one	 takes	 it	 that	explanantia	are,	say,	always	facts	about	psychological	states,	then	one	will	have	a	real	issue	with	someone	who	holds	that	grounds	are	only	very	rarely	(only	in	‘unusual	cases’)	facts	about	psychological	states.	Conversely,	if	one	takes	it	that	grounds	are	considerations,	and	one	assumes	that	grounds	are	explanantia,	one	will	 have	 a	 real	 issue	 with	 someone	 who	 holds	 that	 explanantia	 are,	 say,	psychological	 states.	 For	 while	 considerations	 can	 be	 about	 psychological	states,	 they	are	not	 identical	with	 them.	So	perhaps,	 the	Psychologism-Debate	does	not	just	come	down	to	equivocation	after	all.	Given	that	it	is	agreed	upon	that	grounds	are	explanantia,	it	really	does	get	off	the	ground.		I	 started	 this	 part	 by	 introducing	 rational	motivation	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	independent	from	any	account	of	explanation.	It	is	more	common,	however,	to	start	with	the	notion	of	explanation,	and	to	introduce	rational	motivators	as	a	special	kind	of	explanantia.	Darwall	(1983),	for	instance,	distinguishes	between	(i) reasons	why	someone	did	something,	or	explanantia,	(ii) a	‘person’s	reason	for	acting’,	or	a	motivating	reason,	and	(iii) a	reason	for	someone	to	do	something,	or	a	normative	(or,	as	he	puts	it,	justificatory)	reason.	He	then	suggests	that	we	can	understand	(ii)	with	the	help	of	(i)	and	(iii).	As	he	puts	 it,	 a	 ‘person’s	 reason	 for	 acting’	 is	 a	 subset	 of	 explanantia	 of	 actions,	namely,	it	is	an	explanantia	that	is	such	as	to	be	regarded	by	the	agent	to	be	a	normative	(justificatory)	reason:	
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Having	said	something	about	justificatory	reasons	[i.e.	(iii)]	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	distinguish	the	subset	of	reasons	of	the	first	kind	[i.e.	(i)],	purely	 explanatory	 reasons,	 that	 is	 comprised	 of	 agents'	 reasons	 for	having	 acted,	 reasons	 of	 the	 second	 kind	 [i.e.	 (ii)].	 The	 notion	 of	 an	agent's	 reason	 brings	 the	 idea	 of	 justificatory	 reasons	 essentially	 into	play.	 Something	 may	 be	 somebody's	 reason	 for	 having	 acted	 without	having	been	a	reason	 for	him	so	 to	have	acted	(a	reason	of	 the	second	kind	without	being	a	reason	of	the	third	kind),	but	 it	must	nonetheless	be	 a	 consideration	 that	 he	 regarded	…	 as	 a	 reason	 for	 him	 so	 to	 act.	(Darwall,	1983,	p.	32)	On	 this	 view,	 it	 is	 built	 into	 the	very	definition	of	 a	 rational	motivator	 that	 it	explains.	And	if	this	is	how	the	term	is	introduced,	it	is	no	surprise	that	one	has	the	Psychologism-Debate	on	one’s	hands.	In	a	similar	spirit,	Christian	Miller	tells	us	that	Motivating	reasons	…	[are]	considerations	in	the	light	of	which	an	agent	can	deliberate,	decide,	and	intentionally	act,	and	suggests	that	[a]	motivating	reason	is	…	supposed	to	play	at	least	two	functional	roles.	First,	it	is	potentially	explanatory	of	an	action	performed	by	an	agent	…	Similarly,	motivating	reasons	are	reasons	by	the	agent’s	own	lights,	and	thus	from	the	agent’s	perspective	serve	to	implicitly	justify	the	action	as	well	 as	 the	 formation	 of	 mental	 states	 which	 bring	 it	 about.	 (Miller,	2008)	As	he	says	 that	what	he	calls	 ‘motivating	reasons’	are	 “reasons	by	 the	agent’s	own	lights”,	and	that	they	are	“considerations	in	the	light	of	which	an	agent	can	…	intentionally	act”,	it	seems	safe	to	assume	that	he	is	talking	about	something	
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that	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 But	 right	 at	 the	 outset,	 he	 seems	 also	 to	 be	assuming	 that	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 also	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 an	explanans.		As	we	will	see	in	the	next	part,	one	of	the	foremost	proponents	of	Non-Psychologism	 –	 Jonathan	 Dancy	 –	 also	 takes	 it	 that	 grounds	 are	 explanantia.	Dancy	holds	that	when	someone	acts	on	grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	acting	as	she	does	 is	P,	 the	consideration	 that	plays	 the	role	of	a	ground.	As	we	will	also	 see,	 this	 further	 assumption	 is	 what	makes	 his	 Non-Psychologistic	 view	vulnerable	 in	a	way	that	a	mere	Non-Psychologistic	view	of	grounds	is	not.	 In	part	III,	I	will	show	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	assume	that	grounds	are	explanantia.		The	upshot	is	that	it	would	be	better	not	to	say	that	the	Psychologism-Debate	rests	on	an	equivocation,	but	rather,	that	it	rests	on	a	false	assumption,	namely,	the	assumption	that	grounds	are	explanantia.		
3.	Summary		In	 this	part,	 I	 introduced	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground.	Someone	acts	on	a	ground,	I	said,	just	in	case	she	is	motivated	to	do	what	she	does	by	something	she	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	so	act,	where	she	is	motivated	by	what	she	takes	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	so	act	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	so	act.	Further,	I	argued	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	are	propositions	or	considerations.	 I	 then	turned	to	the	Psychologism-Debate	about	Motivating	Reasons.	I	argued	that	as	long	as	Non-Psychologists	are	talking	about	grounds,	they	are	quite	 right	 in	maintaining	 that	 (i)	what	plays	 the	 role	of	 a	ground	 is	what	the	agent	believes,	and	that	(ii)	the	things	that	the	agent	believes	that	are	such	 as	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 are	 not	 restricted	 to	 things	 she	 believes	
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about	herself.	I	also	argued	that	the	Non-Psychologist	stands	in	conflict	with	the	Psychologist	only	if	the	Non-Psychologist	assumes	that	what	the	agent	believes	plays	not	only	the	role	of	a	ground,	but	also	the	role	of	an	explanans.	For	those	that	 hold	 that	 what	 they	 call	 ‘motivating	 reasons’	 are	 the	 agent’s	 believing	something,	 and	 not	what	 she	 believes,	 are	 best	 conceived	 as	making	 a	 claim	about	explanantia,	and	not	as	making	a	claim	about	grounds.	In	the	next	part,	I	will	show	that	at	 least	one	prominent	Non-Psychologist,	 Jonathan	Dancy,	does	indeed	take	it	that	grounds	are	also	explanantia,	and	as	this	leads	to	problems,	at	least	in	error-cases,	it	has	led	some	to	reject	Non-Psychologism	as	such.		 	
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Part	III:	Explanation		According	to	Non-Psychologists,	when	someone	acts	on	a	ground,	her	ground	is	something	she	believes,	and	not	her	believing	something,	or	that	she	believes	it.	Now,	call	cases	in	which	the	relevant	belief	is	false	error-cases.	Error-cases	are	generally	taken	to	pose	a	problem	for	Non-Psychologists	about	Grounds.	For	it	is	 thought	that	 in	error-cases,	 the	Non-Psychologists	must	say	that	 falsehoods	explain.	 In	 this	 part,	 I	will	 show	 that	 error-cases	 only	 pose	 a	 problem	 if	 one	assumes	that	grounds	are	explanantia	(III.1).	I	will	also	show	that,	contrary	to	what	is	usually	assumed,	the	problem	is	not	specifically	a	problem	for	the	Non-Psychologist;	there	is	at	least	one	type	of	Psychologist	with	regard	to	whom	the	self-same	 problem	 arises	 (III.1.2).	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 we	 should	 let	 go	 of	 the	assumption	that	grounds	are	explanantia,	and	conclude	by	giving	an	alternative	account	of	explanantia	(III.4).	Before	I	can	draw	that	conclusion,	however,	I	will	have	to	rule	out	that	there	are	other	ways	out	of	the	conundrum.	I	will	discuss	whether	 it	might	not	be	 so	bad	after	 all	 to	 say	 that	 falsehoods	explain	 (III.2),	and	I	will	discuss	two	ways	in	which	one	might	think	that	giving	error-cases	a	special	treatment	might	do	the	trick	(III.3).	Let	 me	 note	 right	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 ‘explanation’	 is	 throughout	 to	 be	understood	 in	what	 I	 termed	 the	agential	 sense	 (cf.	 II.1.5).	That	 is	 to	 say,	 the	view	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	also	plays	the	role	of	an	explanans	is	the	 view	 that	 when	 S	 Φs	 on	 grounds	 of	 P,	 P	 itself	 is	 what	 renders	 S’s	 Φing	intelligible	(more	on	this	in	III.4).				
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1.	Non-Psychologism	and	the	Problem	Posed	by	Error-Cases		Error-cases	are	generally	taken	to	pose	a	problem	for	Non-Psychologists	about	Grounds.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	clarify	wherein	the	problem	lies.	In	a	first	step,	I	will	 show	 that	 the	 problem	 is	 generated	 by	 adherence	 to	 three	 ideas:	 that	grounds	 are	 what	 one	 believes,	 that	 grounds	 explain	 actions,	 and	 that	 only	truths	can	explain.	With	regard	to	error-cases,	one	cannot	consistently	adhere	to	 all	 those	 three	 claims.	 I	will	 call	 this	 the	Non-Psychologist’s	 Problem.	 In	 a	second	step,	 I	will	show	that	the	Non-Psychologist’s	Problem	is	actually	 just	a	species	 of	 a	 more	 general	 problem:	 what	 I	 will	 call	 the	 Propositionalist’s	Problem.	 It	 is,	 thus,	 a	 mistake	 to	 think	 that	 only	 Non-Psychologists	 about	Grounds	should	worry	about	error-cases.			
1.1	The	Non-Psychologist’s	Problem		Let	us	say	that	a	certain	bridge	collapsed,	and	that	someone	attempts	to	explain	why	 it	 collapsed	by	saying	 that	what	explains	why	 it	 collapsed	 is	 that	a	 truck	drove	 into	 one	 of	 its	 pillars.	 Even	 if	 we	 do	 not	 know	 why	 the	 bridge	 did	collapse,	we	can	know	that	the	given	explanation	cannot	be	correct,	if	we	know	that,	say,	at	that	point	of	time,	there	was	no	truck	on	the	road,	and	that,	thus,	it	cannot	be	true	that	a	truck	drove	into	one	of	the	pillars	of	the	bridge.	Or	let	us	say	 that	 someone	 takes	 out	 an	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out,	 and	 someone	 else	attempts	to	explain	why	that	person	took	out	an	umbrella	by	saying	that	what	explains	why	she	 took	out	an	umbrella	 is	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	Even	 if	we	do	not	know	why	 that	person	did	 take	out	an	umbrella,	we	can	know	 that	 the	given	explanation	cannot	be	correct	if	we	know	that	it	is	not	raining.	And	so	on.	This	
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clearly	seems	to	show	that	we	take	it	that	falsehoods	cannot	explain	anything,	neither	why	some	event	occurred	(like	that	a	certain	bridge	collapsed),	nor	why	someone	performed	some	action	(like	taking	out	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out).	Call	 the	 idea	 that	 a	 condition	 on	 explanantia	 is	 that	 they	 are	 truths	 or	 facts	‘Veridicalism	about	Explanantia’	(with	regard	to	explanations	of	actions,	which	is	our	topic	here,	cf.	for	this	e.g.	Alvarez,	2010;	Hieronymi,	2011;	Hyman,	2015,	chap.	6;	Littlejohn,	2012,	chap.	4.5;	Sandis,	2013).	Jonathan	Dancy	is	one	of	the	main	contemporary	proponents	of	a	Non-Psychologistic	view	about	grounds.	His	view	is	often	criticized	by	pointing	out	that	it	goes	against	common	sense	in	breaching	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia.	Lenman,	for	instance,	writes	that	[t]he	 biggest	 headache	 for	 anti-psychologists	 such	 as	 Dancy	 …	 is	furnished	by	cases	where	 the	agent's	belief	 is	false.	…	 [I]n	cases	where	Angus	punches	his	boss,	believing	mistakenly	 that	he	has	been	 fired,	 it	seems	quite	wrong	to	say	he	so	acts	because	he	has	been	fired.	In	such	a	case	we	surely	must	retreat	to	a	psychologised	explanation	if	we	are	to	have	 a	 credible	 motivating	 reason	 explanation	 at	 all.	 (Lenman,	 2011,	para.	6)	And	Wallace	tells	us	that	Dancy’s	view	leads	to	a	strained	 understanding	 of	 cases	 in	 which	 people	 do	 not	 act	 for	 good	normative	reasons,	because	(for	instance)	things	are	not	in	fact	as	they	take	them	to	be.	If	Peter’s	investment	decision	did	not	turn	out	to	lead	to	an	increase	in	his	pension,	then	it	seems	to	me	strange	and	misleading	to	explain	 his	 action	 [as	 Dancy	 suggests,	 mf.]	 by	 saying:	 “His	 reason	 for	doing	 it	 is	 that	 it	would	 increase	his	pension,	 though	as	 it	happened	 it	failed	to	do	so”.	(Wallace,	2003,	p.	430)	
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Indeed,	 Dancy	 himself	 concedes	 that	 it	 (allegedly)	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 Non-Psychologism	 about	 Grounds	 that	 it	 forces	 one	 to	 deny	 Veridicalism	 about	Explanantia.	As	he	writes:		The	explanations	we	give	when	we	specify	the	agent’s	reasons	for	acting	[...]	 are	 unusual	 in	 being	 non-factive.	 What	 this	 means	 is	 that	 for	 the	explanation	to	be	correct	as	an	explanation,	it	is	not	required	that	what	is	offered	as	explanans	in	fact	be	the	case.	(Dancy,	2004b,	pp.	25–26)		[A]	thing	believed	that	is	not	the	case	can	still	explain	an	action	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	134)	One	 contentious	 aspect	 of	 the	picture	 that	 has	 been	developed	here	 is	that	something	that	is	not	the	case	can	explain	an	action.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	137)		Of	course	it	is	odd	to	suppose	that	on	occasion	a	nothing	(something	that	is	 not	 the	 case)	 can	 explain	 a	 something	 (an	 action	 that	 was	 done).	(Dancy,	2003a,	p.	427)	But	 does	 Non-Psychologism	 about	 Grounds	 really	 commit	 one	 to	 denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia?	 I	argued	above	 that	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	is	the	correct	view.	But	if	it	had	the	consequence	that	Dancy,	Lenman	and	Wallace	seem	to	take	it	to	have,	that	should	give	us	a	pause.	It	should	lead	us	to	reconsider	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	despite	everything	that	was	said	above.	Luckily,	 however,	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	 just	 as	 such,	does	not	 commit	 one	 to	 denying	 Veridicalism	 about	 Explanantia.	 According	 to	 the	Non-Psychologist	about	Grounds,	when	Sam	mistakenly	believes	that,	say,	it	is	raining,	the	false	consideration	that	it	is	raining	can	nevertheless	be	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Even	if	it	is	not	raining,	she	can	still	act	on	grounds	of	the	
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consideration	that	it	is	raining;	she	may,	for	instance,	pick	up	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out,	on	grounds	of	the	(false)	consideration	that	it	is	raining.	Accepting	that	 commits	 one	 to	 implausibly	 holding	 that	what	 explains	 her	 action	 is	 the	falsehood	that	 it	 is	raining	only	if	one	presupposes	that	the	grounds	on	which	we	 act	 are	 what	 explain	 our	 actions.	 We	 saw	 above	 that	 some	 authors	 call	grounds	 ‘reasons’.	 And	 it	 is	 often	 said	 that	 it	 is	 something	 like	 a	 truism	 that	reasons	explain	actions.	But	even	if	 it	 is	a	truism	that	reasons	explain	actions,	on	 some	 interpretation	 of	 ‘reason’,	 it	 is	 far	 from	 clear	 that	 grounds	 explain	actions,	 even	 if	 grounds	 can	 be	 called	 ‘reasons’.	 However,	 it	 is	 precisely	 that	view	–	that	grounds	explain	actions,	or	‘Explanatorism	about	Grounds’,	as	I	will	call	 it	 –	 that	 commits	 a	 Non-Psychologist	 about	 Grounds	 to	 denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia.	Let	 us	 take	 stock.	 Dancy	 sees	 himself	 forced	 to	 give	 up	 Veridicalism	about	 Explanantia	 because	 he	 adheres	 to	 both	 Non-Psychologism	 about	Grounds	 and	Explanatorism	 about	Grounds.	 Lenman	 and	Wallace	 take	 it	 that	giving	up	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	is	quite	untenable,	and	this	appears	to	lead	 them	 to	 question	Non-Psychologism	 about	 Grounds.	 Either	move	makes	sense	 only	 if	 one	 assumes	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds.	 So	 there	 is	 a	 third	option,	besides	biting	the	bullet	of	denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	or	retreating	from	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds.	If	we	give	up	Explanatorism	about	Grounds,	we	can	happily	hold	on	both	to	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	and	to	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds.	According	to	Alvarez,	for	instance,	
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the	reason	that	explains	why	someone	φ-ed	need	not	be	her	reason	for	φ-ing,42	and,	thus,	according	to	her,	it	is	possible	to	 embrace	 a	 non-psychological	 conception	 of	motivating	 reasons	 and	yet	 to	 reject	 the	 view	 that	 a	 true	 explanation	 can	 ever	 have	 a	 false	explanans.	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	177-178)43	We	can	also	put	it	as	follows.	We	are	faced	with	an	inconsistent	triad	of	claims,	namely,	(1) Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	(2) Veridicialism	about	Explanantia	(3) Explanatorism	about	Grounds	and	 the	 question	 is:	which	 of	 those	 three	 claims	 should	we	 give	 up?	 Alvarez	opts	 for	giving	up	(3),	Dancy	opts	 for	giving	up	(2),	and	Lenman	and	Wallace	seem	 to	 opt	 for	 giving	 up	 (1).	 I	 will	 argue	 that	 we	 should	 follow	 Alvarez	 in	giving	 up	 (3).44	I	 will	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 wrong	 to	 say	 that	 grounds	 themselves	explain;	which,	note,	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	grounds	do	not	play	a	role	in	explanations.	I	will	not	discuss	the	option	of	giving	up	(1),	however,	as	I	take	it	that	part	II	has	already	established	that	(1)	is	correct;	there	would,	thus,	be	no	value	in	revisiting	that	claim	again.	I	will,	however,	briefly	discuss	the	option	of	giving	up	(2).	Specifically,	I	will	assess	how	Dancy	seeks	to	make	giving	up	(2)	less	untenable,	and	argue	that	he	does	not	deliver	what	he	promises	to	deliver.																																																									42	We	can	read	‘the	reason	that	explains’	as	‘the	explanans’,	and	‘her	reason	for	φ-ing’	as	‘the	ground	on	which	she	φ’s’.	43	Cf.	 also	 Davis	 (2005);	 Hieronymi	 (2011);	 Hyman	 (2015);	 Sandis	 (2013);	Setiya	(2011).	44	There	are	various	things	that	giving	up	(3)	could	amount	to,	that	is,	various	options	for	alternative	explanantia.	I	will	follow	Alvarez	in	giving	up	(3).	But	I	will	not	follow	her	in	the	alternative	she	opts	for.	Cf.	III.4	below.	
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Note,	however,	that	there	are	of	course	ways	of	tinkering	with	any	one	of	the	three	claims	that	fall	short	of	giving	any	one	of	them	up	outright.	As	we	will	 see,	one	could,	 for	 instance,	hedge	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	and	argue	that	that	view	is	correct	only	under	the	condition	that	the	consideration	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	fact,	and	that	we	need	a	different	account	of	grounds	in	cases	in	which	that	condition	is	not	satisfied	(an	option	discussed	by	Dancy,	2002).	Or	one	could	hold	that	grounds	do	explain,	but	only	 in	cases	 in	which	the	consideration	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	a	 fact,	and	that	 it	 is	only	 in	 other	 cases	 that	 ground	 and	 explanans	 come	 apart	 (cf.	 e.g.	 Alvarez,	2010;	Hyman,	2015).	That	is	to	say,	disjunctive	accounts	of	various	kinds	seem	possible,	and	will	be	considered.	But	first,	I	want	to	show	that	we	can	give	a	more	general	formulation	of	the	 triad.	 Maybe	 somewhat	 surprisingly,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 it	 is	 not	 Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	that	is	at	the	heart	of	the	problem.	Psychologists	about	Grounds,	at	least	of	a	certain	kind,	are	faced	with	the	exact	same	problem.		
1.2	The	Propositionalist’s	Problem		Take	the	example	mentioned	above:	Sam	mistakenly	believes	that	it	is	raining,	and	on	grounds	of	what	she	mistakenly	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining,	she	picks	 up	 an	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out.	 This	 is	 problematic,	 in	 the	 light	 of	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	and	Explanatorism	about	Grounds,	not	because	of	what	Sam	believes,	but	because	her	belief	is	mistaken;	it	is	problematic,	that	is,	not	because	of	the	content	of	Sam’s	belief,	but	because	of	its	truth-value.	And	given	what	 is	 surely	correct,	namely,	 that	we	can	be	mistaken	not	only	about	the	 facts	 around	 us,	 but	 also	 about	 facts	 about	 our	 own	mind,	 we	 would	 be	
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faced	with	 the	 exact	 same	problem,	 even	 if	what	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	were	 only	 always	 considerations	 about	 our	 own	mind	 (cf.	Wiland,	 2003).	 So,	what	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 Veridicalism	 about	 Explanantia	 and	 Explanatorism	about	Grounds	is	not	so	much	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	but	rather,	the	genus	which	Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds	 is	a	 species	of,	namely,	what	 I	called	 Propositionalism	 about	 Grounds.	 Thus,	 a	 more	 general	 formulation	 of	our	triad	is	as	follows:	(1) Propositionalism	about	Grounds	(2) Veridicialism	about	Explanantia	(3) Explanatorism	about	Grounds	Of	course,	if	it	is	correct	what	I	argued	for	in	part	II,	namely,	that	the	only	sane	option	 for	 a	 Propositionalist	 about	 Grounds	 is	 Non-Psychologism	 about	Grounds,	 it	 is	 fine	 to	 put	 things	 as	 I	 put	 them	 above.	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	psychologistic	renderings	of	Propositionalism	about	Grounds	are	faced	with	the	exact	 same	 problem	 shows	 why	 one	 supposed	 way	 out	 of	 the	 Non-Psychologist’s	problem	is	of	no	help.	As	long	as	you	remain	a	Propositionalist,	shedding	commitment	to	Non-Psychologism	and	embracing	Psychologism	will	not	solve	 (or	avoid)	 the	Non-Psychologist’s	problem,	 for	her	problem	 is	but	a	guise	of	a	more	general	problem	that	has	to	do	with	Propositionalism.		
2.	Dancy	on	Denying	Veridicalism	About	Explanantia		One	way	out	of	 the	Non-Psychologist’s	problem	 is	 to	deny	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia.	 But	 few	 people	 are	 tempted	 by	 that,	 and	 for	 understandable	reasons.	 For	 after	 all,	 it	 does	 just	 seem	 like	 a	 truism	 that	 falsehoods	 cannot	explain.	Jonathan	Dancy,	however,	seems	prepared	to	accept,	as	a	consequence	
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of	his	views,	 that	 falsehoods	 (or	non-obtaining	 facts,	 as	he	seems	 to	prefer	 to	put	it)	can	explain	actions.	Above,	I	quoted	him	saying	that		[o]f	 course	 it	 is	odd	 to	 suppose	 that	on	occasion	a	nothing	 (something	that	is	not	the	case)	can	explain	a	something	(an	action	that	was	done).	But	I	cut	off	the	sentence	that	follows,	which	reads:	But	I	maintain	that	we	can	live	with	this	oddity	–	or	rather	that	it	is	not	
as	odd	as	people	make	out.	(Dancy,	2003a,	p.	427;	my	emphasis)	Here,	I	want	to	look	at	what	he	has	to	say	that	is	meant	to	show	us	that	giving	up	 Veridicalism	 about	 Explanantia	 “is	 not	 as	 odd	 as	 people	make	 out”.	 I	will	argue	that	what	he	has	to	say	in	fact	merely	reinforces	Propositionalism	about	Grounds,	but	does	nothing	to	show	that	falsehoods	can	explain.		Above,	I	introduced	a	scenario	in	which	someone	takes	out	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out,	and	someone	else	attempts	to	explain	why	that	person	took	out	an	umbrella	by	saying	that	what	explains	why	she	took	out	an	umbrella	is	that	it	is	raining.	I	said	that	even	if	we	do	not	know	why	that	person	did	take	out	an	umbrella,	we	can	know	that	the	given	explanation	cannot	be	correct	if	we	know	that	 it	 is	not	raining.	And	I	argued	that	 this	clearly	shows	that	we	take	 it	 that	falsehoods	cannot	explain	why	someone	performed	some	action.	Now,	Dancy	concedes	that	(1) what	explains	why	P	is	that	Q	can	only	be	true	if	Q;	or	that	(1)	is	factive,	 like	“S	knows	that	P”,	but	unlike	“S	believes	that	P”.	But	he	argues,	first,	that	there	are	other	ways	of	saying	what	is	said	in	(1)	that	are	non-factive.	He	considers	statements	of	the	forms:	(2) The	ground	on	which	she	Φed	was	that	P.	And	he	tells	us	that	as	his	ears	tell	him,	it	is	not	self-contradictory	to	continue	statements	of	such	a	form	by	denying	the	embedded	proposition	they	state	to	
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be	 the	 ground.	 That	 is,	 to	 present	 his	 example,	 he	 thinks	 that	 the	 following	statement	is	not	self-contradictory:	The	 ground	 on	 which	 he	 acted	 was	 that	 she	 had	 lied	 to	 him,	 though	actually	she	had	done	nothing	of	the	sort.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	132)	Secondly,	he	then	points	out	that	that	is	not	surprising.	As	he	puts	it:	[T]here	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 reason	 why	 there	 should	 not	 be	 a	 way	 of	revealing	the	light	in	which	the	agent	saw	things	as	a	way	of	explaining	why	he	did	what	he	did,	without	asserting	that	he	was	right	to	see	things	that	way.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	133)	That	 seems	 right.	 For	we	 surely	 can	 reveal	 “the	 light	 in	which	 the	 agent	 saw	things”,	and	thereby	explain	why	she	did	what	she	did,	without	asserting	that	she	 “was	 right	 to	 see	 things	 that	way”.	Even	 if	 I	myself	do	not	 think	 that	 it	 is	raining,	or	even	if	I	myself	do	not	think	that	taking	out	an	umbrella	when	it	is	raining	 is	 a	 sensible	 thing	 to	do,	 I	 can	 certainly	explain	why	Sam	 took	out	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	by	way	of	revealing	that,	as	Sam	saw	it,	 it	 is	raining,	and	that,	as	she	saw	it,	doing	so	is	thus	a	sensible	thing	to	do;	by	revealing,	that	is,	“the	light	in	which	the	agent	saw	things”.	After	all,	if	that	were	not	possible,	then	actions	of	agents	for	which,	as	we	(i.e.	those	attempting	to	explain)	see	it,	there	 are	 no	 normative	 reasons	 would	 be	 incomprehensible	 for	 us.	 But	 of	course,	the	mere	fact	that,	as	we	see	it,	there	is	no	normative	reason	for	Sam	to	take	 out	 an	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out	 does	 not	 render	 her	 doing	 so	unintelligible.	But	even	if	what	Dancy	says	is	correct	(and	I	believe	it	is),	all	it	shows	us	is	that	knowing	that,	say,	it	is	not	raining	does	not	suffice	to	rule	out	that	Sam	believed	that	it	is	raining,	and	that	she	took	out	an	umbrella	on	grounds	of	what	she	believed.	It	does	not	render	the	idea	that	what	explains	why	Sam	took	out	
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an	umbrella	need	not	be	a	 truth	any	more	 tenable.	To	put	 it	differently,	what	Dancy	shows	us	 ‘not	to	be	too	odd’	 is	that	we	can	explain	on	grounds	of	what	someone	did	something	even	 if	we	(i.e.	 those	 that	give	 the	explanation)	 think	that	 the	 consideration	 that	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 is	 false.	 We	 already	knew	that	 that	 is	not	particularly	odd,	however.	What	he	does	not	show	us	 is	that	it	is	not	“as	odd	as	people	make	out”	to	hold	that	falsehoods	explain.	That	is,	what	Dancy	says	strengthens	 the	case	 for	Propositionalism	about	Grounds,	but	does	not	 show	 that	denying	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	 is	 tenable,	 or	less	untenable	then	the	consideration	given	at	the	outset	of	this	part	makes	it	out	to	be.		
3.	A	Separate	Account	for	Error-Cases		Let	us	(once	again)	say	that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining,	that	her	belief	is	true,	and	 that	 on	 her	 way	 out,	 she	 picks	 up	 an	 umbrella.45	According	 to	 a	 Non-Psychologist,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 Sam	 acts	 on	 grounds	 of	 what	 she	 believes,	namely,	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	And	holding	 that	 that	 is	possible	 is	compatible	with	joint	 adherence	 to	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds	 and	 Veridicalism	 about	Explanantia.	But	now	consider	a	counterfactual	scenario,	in	which	Sam’s	belief	is	false,	but	in	which	all	else	is	equal.	It	would	seem	that	if	actual-Sam	(as	I	will	call	her)	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining,	then	counterfactual-Sam	(as	I	will	call	her)	does	that	too,	 that	 is,	 that	 she	 too	picks	up	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out	on	grounds	of	what	 she	 believes,	 namely,	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 After	 all,	 the	 only	 difference																																																									
45	Please	apologize	for	all	the	rain.	
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between	the	two	scenarios	is	the	truth-value	of	the	relevant	belief,	and	we	have	already	seen	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	need	not	be	true.	Of	 course,	 if	 the	 counterfactual	 scenario	 under	 consideration	 were	 a	different	one,	then	things	might	be	different.	If,	say,	in	the	actual	scenario,	Sam	values	not	getting	wet,	but	in	the	counterfactual	scenario,	she	positively	enjoys	getting	wet,	then	it	would	not	seem	as	if	we	could	say	that	counterfactual-Sam	acts	on	the	same	ground	as	actual-Sam	acts.	Given,	at	 least,	 that	our	acting	on	the	grounds	on	which	we	act	is	dependent,	in	some	way	or	another,	on	what	we	value,	 there	 would	 be	 no	 basis	 for	 saying	 that	 counterfactual-Sam	 must	 be	acting	on	the	same	grounds	as	actual-Sam	is	acting.	But	we	have	stipulated	that	the	only	difference	between	the	two	scenarios	is	the	truth-value	of	Sam’s	belief	that	it	is	raining.	Someone	 who	 jointly	 adheres	 to	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds	 and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia	cannot	accept	 that	counterfactual-Sam	acts	on	the	same	grounds	as	does	actual-Sam.	For,	for	someone	who	jointly	adheres	to	Explanatorism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	saying	that	counterfactual-Sam	 acts	 on	 grounds	 of	 what	 she	 believes	 (namely,	 that	 it	 is	raining)	is	problematic	in	a	way	that	saying	the	same	thing	about	actual-Sam	is	not.	 For	 such	 a	 theorist,	 the	 truth-value	makes	 a	 difference.	 For	 if	what	 Sam	believes	is	false,	then	what	she	believes	cannot	explain	her	action,	and,	thus,	it	cannot	 be	 her	 ground.	 Now,	 as	 the	 problem	 arises	 only	 in	 error-cases,	 one	might	think	that	we	need	a	special	treatment	for	error-cases,	and	that	what	the	Non-Psychologist	says	about	veridical	cases	is	fine	as	standing.		Such	an	approach	has	precedents	in	the	theory	perception.	Theorists	of	perception	sometimes	argue	 that	 the	mere	 fact	 that	 in	error-cases,	we	cannot	conceive	 of	 her	 who	 is	 in	 a	 perceptual	 state	 as	 standing	 in	 a	 relation	 to	 a	
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worldly	 object	 should	 not	 lead	 us	 to	 think	 that	we	 cannot	 so	 conceive	 of	 the	subject	 in	 veridical	 cases.	 In	 veridical	 cases,	 such	 theorists	 hold,	 being	 in	 a	perceptual	state	amounts	to	standing	in	a	relation	to	a	worldly	object.	It	is	just	that	we	need	a	different	account	for	the	error-case.	In	short,	they	hold	that	we	need	a	disjunctive	account	of	perception,	i.e.	that	we	need	one	kind	of	account	of	being	 in	a	perceptual	state	 for	veridical	cases,	 and	a	different	kind	of	account	for	error-cases.46	In	this	chapter,	I	will	consider	two	options	for	someone	who	thinks	that	error-cases	need	special	treatment.	Here	are	the	two	options	I	will	consider:	(1) Counterfactual-Sam	acts	on	a	different	ground	than	actual-Sam	acts	on	(2) In	contrast	to	actual-Sam,	counterfactual-Sam,	when	she	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out,	is	not	acting	on	a	ground	The	 first	 option	 seems	 attractive,	 at	 least	 on	 first	 glance,	 because	 it	makes	 it	possible	 that	 counterfactual-Sam’s	 ground,	 just	 like	 actual-Sam’s	 ground,	 is	 a	truth,	 and,	 thus,	 that	 the	 noted	 problem	 no	 longer	 arises.	 The	 second	 option	seems	attractive,	at	least	on	first	glance,	because	it	simply	locates	the	allegedly	problematic	case	outside	of	the	parameters	 in	which	the	problem	can	arise:	 if	counterfactual-Sam	 is	not	 acting	on	a	 ground,	 then	 there	 is	no	 falsehood	 that	
must	explain,	insofar	as	it	is	a	ground,	but	that	at	the	same	time,	and	insofar	as	it	is	a	falsehood,	cannot	explain.	In	this	chapter,	I	will	show	that	neither	of	the	two	options	makes	much	sense,	despite	their	prima	facie	attractions.																																																												
46	I	 am	 not	 saying	 that	 Disjunctivism	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 perception	 is	 a	 unified	account.	Cf.	Haddock	&	Macpherson	(2008)	for	an	illuminating	overview	of	the	various	variants	of	disjunctive	theories	of	perception	that	have	been	given.	
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3.1	Disjunctivism	About	Grounds		Dancy	 considers	 whether	 we	 could	 fall	 back	 to	 a	 Psychologistic	 account	 of	grounds	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 error-cases	 in	 a	way	 that	 is	 compatible	with	joint	 adherence	 to	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds	 and	 Veridicalism	 about	Explanantia.	 In	 the	 actual	 case,	 we	 said,	 Sam’s	 ground	 is	what	 she	 believed,	namely,	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 Dancy	 considers	 whether	 we	 could	 say,	 about	counterfactual-Sam,	 that	 her	 ground	 is	 that	 she	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 He	calls	such	an	account	a	disjunctive	theory.	And	as	it	is	grounds	that	a	disjunctive	account	 is	 given	 of,	 we	 can	 term	 it	 ‘Disjunctivism	 about	 Grounds’	 (cf.	 Dancy,	2002,	pp.	138–145,	2003,	p.	427,	2008,	pp.	267–271;	Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	154;	Miller	2008,	p.	230;	Stout	2009,	pp.	58–59).47	Note	 that	 the	 move	 is	 actually	 a	 move	 away	 not	 so	 much	 from	 Non-Psychologism	about	Grounds,	but	 rather,	a	move	away	 from	Propositionalism	
																																																								47	Disjunctive	 views	 are	 of	 the	 form:	 X	 is	 either	 Y	 or	 Z;	 say,	 that	 having	 a	perceptual	appearance	as	of	a	cat	is	either	such	as	to	put	us	in	a	position	to	gain	knowledge	that	there	is	a	cat	in	front	of	us,	or	that	it	is	not	such	as	to	put	us	in	such	a	position,	but	merely	 such	as	 to	not	make	 it	 irrational	 for	us	 to	believe	that	there	is	a	cat	in	front	of	us.	(There	are	many	variants	of	disjunctive	views	about	 perception.	 See	 the	 note	 above.	 Here,	 I	 am	 describing	 McDowell’s	‘epistemological’	variant,	cf.	McDowell,	1982,	1986,	2013)	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	 fits	 the	 ‘X	 is	 either	 Y	 or	 Y’-mold,	 at	 least	 overtly.	 But	 the	 more	interesting	 feature	 of	 disjunctive	 theories	 is	 the	 claim	 they	 make	 about	 the	priority	of	the	‘good’	case,	namely,	that	we	cannot	account	of	Y	in	terms	of	Z	and	some	further	factor;	say,	that	we	cannot	account	for	our	being	in	a	position	to	gain	knowledge	of	the	world	in	terms	of	its	not	being	irrational	for	us	to	form	beliefs	about	 the	world	and	some	 further	 factor	 that	 is	 such	as	 to	secure	 that	rational	beliefs	amount	to	knowledge.	It	is	unclear	whether	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	exhibits	this	further	feature.	That	is,	it	is	unclear	whether	according	to	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds,	non-psychological	ground	are	prior	in	any	sense.	Psychological	and	Non-Psychological	grounds	just	seem	to	be	different.	
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about	 Grounds	 (and	 towards	 Factualism	 about	 Grounds). 48 	For	 what	 is	problematic	 about	 error-cases	 is	 not	 the	 non-psychological	 content	 of	 the	agent’s	 relevant	 beliefs,	 but	 that	 the	 belief	 is	 false.	 It	 is	 just	 that	 in	 cases	 in	which	S	mistakenly	believes	 that	P,	 i.e.	 in	 error-cases,	 the	 fact	 that	 S	believes	that	P	is	a	ready	candidate	for	what	alternatively	might	be	her	ground,	if	(due	to	the	 identification	 of	 grounds	 and	 explanantia,	 and	 the	 requirement	 that	explanantia	are	truths)	one	thinks	that	in	such	a	case,	P	cannot	be	her	ground	(cf.	III.1.2	above).		On	first	glance	at	least,	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	might	seem	helpful.	For	if	counterfactual-Sam’s	ground	is	not	the	falsehood	she	believes,	i.e.	that	it	
is	raining,	 but	 rather,	 the	 truth	 that	she	believes	that	it	 is	raining,	 then	we	can	continue	 to	 maintain	 that	 grounds	 explain	 without	 breaching	 Veridicalism	about	 Explanantia.	 But	 such	 a	 treatment	 of	 error-cases	 is	 highly	 implausible.	For	 if	 Psychologism	 about	 Grounds	 is	 in	 general	 mistaken,	 then	 it	 is	 also	mistaken	if	it	is	limited	to	error-cases.	As	Dancy	writes,	[it	is]	impossible	…	having	argued	against	the	fully	psychologistic	theory,	to	 fall	 back	 on	 the	 disjunctive	 conception	 as	 an	 adequate	 alternative.	(Dancy,	2002,	p.	145)	Recall	 what	 is	 wrong	 about	 Psychologism	 about	 Grounds	 (cf.	 II.1.3).	What	 is	wrong	 about	 Psychologism	 about	 Grounds	 is	 not	 that	 considerations	 about	one’s	own	mind	cannot	be	what	play	the	role	of	a	ground.	What	is	wrong	about	Psychologism	about	Grounds	is	that	considerations	about	one’s	own	mind	play	the	role	of	a	ground	only	in	special	cases.	For	grounds	are	considerations	that	are	taken,	by	her	who	acts	on	them,	to	be	facts	that	are	reasons	to	so	act,	and																																																									
48	For	the	terms,	cf.	II.1.3	and	II.1.4	above.	
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only	in	special	cases	do	we	take	it	that	the	reasons	for	doing	what	we	are	doing	are	facts	about	our	own	mind.	It	is	implausible	that	merely	changing	the	truth-value	 of	 actual-Sam’s	 relevant	 belief	 turns	 her	 case	 into	 a	 special	 case.	 Of	course,	we	can	imagine	a	case	in	which	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	for	Sam	is	 the	consideration	that	she	believes	 that	 it	 is	raining.	 Imagine,	say,	 that	Sam	(call	her	‘psychotic-Sam’)	is	on	anti-psychotic	drugs,	and	that	she	knows	that	an	indication	 of	 them	wearing	 off	 is	 that	 she	 begins	 to	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	Given	all	that,	it	might	be	that	she	takes	a	pill,	and	that	her	ground	for	doing	so	is	that	she	believes	that	it	is	raining.	Note	that	if	we	are	imaginative	enough,	we	can	even	construct	a	case	in	which	psychotic-Sam	does	something	on	grounds	of	the	consideration	that	she	believes	that	it	 is	raining,	and	in	which	what	she	does	is	nothing	other	than	to	pick	up	umbrella	on	her	way	out.	Maybe,	say,	her	doctor	 devised	 some	 special	 therapy	 that	 requires	 taking	 out	 an	 umbrella	always	 when	 she	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 But	 the	 point	 is	 that	 merely	changing	 the	 truth-value	 of	 actual-Sam’s	 belief	 does	 not	 turn	 counterfactual-Sam	into	psychotic-Sam	(or	some	figure	like	her).	There	 is	 also	another	problem	 for	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	 that	 is	sometimes	 noted.	 Littlejohn	 (2012,	 p.	 154)	 and	 Miller	 (2008,	 p.	 230),	 for	instance,	 complain	 that	 such	 an	 account	 implausibly	 portrays	 the	 agent	 as	systematically	mistaken	 about	what	 her	 grounds	 are	 in	 cases	 in	which	 she	 is	mistaken	 about	 how	 the	world	 is.	 For	 if	 we	 ask	 counterfactual-Sam	 on	what	grounds	she	is	taking	out	her	umbrella,	she	will	tell	us	that	her	ground	for	doing	so	 is	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 But	 according	 to	 the	 Disjunctivist	 about	 Grounds,	 her	ground	 is	not	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	but	 rather,	 that	 she	believes	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	And	so,	when	she	tells	us	that	her	ground	for	taking	out	her	umbrella	is	that	it	is	raining,	she	is	mistaken	about	what	her	ground	is.	Note	that	of	course	there	is	a	
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sense	 in	 which	 agents	 like	 counterfactual-Sam	 are	 systematically	 mistaken:	they	 are	 systematically	 mistaken	 about	 the	 status	 of	 their	 grounds.	 For	counterfactual-Sam	takes	her	grounds	to	be	a	fact	that	favors	doing	what	she	is	doing.	But	she	 is	mistaken	 therein,	as	 it	 is	a	mere	consideration.	However,	 the	problematic	systematic	mistake	that	Littlejohn	and	Miller	are	pointing	to	is	not	a	mistake	 about	 the	 status,	 but	 a	mistake	 about	what	has	 the	 relevant	 status.	Maybe	 there	 are	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 agent	 is	 mistaken	 about	 what	 has	 the	relevant	status.	Maybe	someone	can	take	herself	to	be	acting	on	grounds	of	P,	but	 actually,	 she	 is	 acting	 on	 grounds	 of	 Q;	 maybe,	 that	 is,	 self-deception	 is	possible	 in	 cases	 in	 which	 agents	 act	 on	 a	 ground.	 But	 Disjunctivism	 about	Grounds	seems	to	imply	that	cases	in	which	agents	have	false	beliefs	are	always	cases	 of	 self-deception,	 and	 that	 is	 implausible.	 The	 mere	 fact	 that	counterfactual-Sam	is	mistaken	about	the	world	should	not	lead	us	to	think	that	she	is	mistaken	about	what	it	is	that	motivates	her.	Thus,	 I	 conclude	 that	 the	 first	 of	 the	 two	 noted	 options,	 Disjunctivism	about	Grounds,	is	not	a	genuine	option.		
3.2	Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking		I	 now	come	 to	 the	 second	option:	 that	other	 than	actual-Sam,	 counterfactual-Sam	is	not	acting	on	a	ground	when	she	picks	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out.	The	idea	is	that	while	both	actual-Sam	and	counterfactual-Sam	take	themselves	to	be	acting	on	a	ground	in	picking	up	an	umbrella,	only	the	former	is	thereby	acting	on	 a	 ground.	The	 latter	will	merely	be	 taking	herself	 to	be	 acting	on	a	
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ground,	but	what	she	does	will	not	amount	to	acting	on	a	ground49	–	what	she	does	will	not	amount	to	acting	on	a	ground,	but	merely	to	taking	herself	to	be	doing	so,	simply	because	what	she	believes	is	false.	One	might	call	such	a	view	‘Disjunctivism	 about	 Ground-Taking’,	 as	 it	 holds	 that	 when	 someone	 takes	herself	 to	be	acting	on	a	ground,	she	either	acts	on	a	ground,	or	she	does	not,	despite	taking	herself	to	be	doing	so	–	where	one	thing	that	can	make	it	the	case	that	her	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground	does	not	amount	to	her	acting	on	a	ground	is	the	mere	fact	that	what	she	takes	to	play	the	role	of	her	ground	is	a	falsehood.50,	51	Let	me,	 for	 the	 time	being,	 cast	 the	 issue	under	discussion	 in	 terms	of	
motivating	 reasons,	 instead	 of	 in	 terms	 of	 grounds.	 Let	 us	 say,	 that	 is,	 that	actual-Sam	 picks	 up	 an	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out,	 and	 that	 her	 motivating	reason	 for	 doing	 that	 is	 what	 she	 believes,	 namely,	 that	 it	 is	 raining.	 This	 is	compatible	 with	 joint	 adherence	 to	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds	 and	Veridicalism	 about	 Explanantia.	 But	 a	 version	 of	 our	 familiar	 problems	 arise	when	we	 turn	 to	 counterfactual	 Sam,	 as	 counterfactual	 Sam’s	 belief	 that	 it	 is	raining	is	false.	Recently,	 it	has	been	suggested	that	 the	solution	to	this	problem	about	motivating	reasons	and	false	beliefs	is	simple.	All	we	have	to	do,	it	is	said,	is	to																																																									
49	The	former	will	also	be	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground,	but	she	will	not	merely	be	taking	herself	to	be	acting	on	a	ground	–	she	in	fact	will	be	acting	on	a	ground.	50	This	 comes	 close	an	alternative	 to	Disjunctivism	about	Grounds	 that	Dancy	(2002,	p.	145,	2008,	pp.	271)	discusses	and	dismisses.	51	To	make	the	view	disjunctivist	in	a	more	interesting	sense,	one	would	have	to	include	 the	 claim	 that	 acting	 on	 a	 ground	 cannot	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 taking	oneself	 to	 be	 acting	 on	 a	 ground	 plus	 X,	where	 X	 can	 be	 spelled	 out	without	already	presupposing	the	notion	of	acting	on	a	ground.	That	is,	the	idea	would	have	to	be	that	the	‘good’	disjunct	cannot	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	the	‘bad’	disjunct.	Given	my	purposes,	however,	I	will	not	discuss	this.	Cf.	note	47	above.	
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restrict	 the	scope	of	acting	for	a	reason	 to	cases	 in	which	 the	agent’s	 relevant	beliefs	are	true.	So,	the	idea	is	that	it	is	true	that	only	truths	can	explain	actions,	and	 that	motivating	 reasons	 explain	 actions,	 and	 also	 that	when	we	 act	 for	 a	reason,	the	reason	for	which	we	act	is	what	we	believe	–	that	it	is	just	that	when	the	relevant	belief	is	false,	what	we	are	doing	is	not	acting	for	a	reason.	Clayton	Littlejohn,	for	instance,	introduces	the	following	scenario:	Cooper	and	Leo	are	running	down	two	very	similar	hallways	in	two	very	similar	houses.	There	is	a	killer	chasing	Cooper	and	he	knows	it.	Leo	is	Cooper’s	 non-factive	 mental	 duplicate,	 so	 he	 believes	 there	 is	 a	 killer	chasing	him	as	well.	Cooper	 is	 in	 the	epistemically	good	case.	Leo	 is	 in	the	 bad	 case.	 His	 belief	 that	 there	 is	 a	 killer	 after	 him	 is	 mistaken.	 It	seems	natural	to	say	that	Cooper’s	reason	for	running	down	the	hall	was	that	there	was	a	killer	chasing	him.	(Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	146)	Littlejohn	asks:	What	should	we	say	about	Leo?	He	rejects	the	suggestion	that	we	should	say	that	Leo’s	reason	for	running	down	the	hall	was	also	that	there	was	 a	 killer	 chasing	 him.	 As	 he	 sees	 it,	 that	 would	 commit	 us	 to	 saying	 that	falsehoods	can	explain.	(As	he	puts	it:	it	would	commit	us	to	saying	that	‘S	Φ’s	because	 P’	 is	 non-factive,	 i.e.	 does	 not	 imply	 that	 P,	 and	 he	 argues	 that	 the	‘linguistic	 evidence’	 shows	 that	 that	 cannot	 be	 correct.)	 He	 also	 rejects	 the	solution	 of	 saying	 that	 Leo’s	 reason	 for	 running	 down	 the	 hall	 was	 that	 he	
believed	that	a	killer	was	chasing	him.	That	solution	is	the	one	discussed	above,	and	we	saw	why	 it	makes	no	sense.	He	concludes	 that	what	we	should	do,	as	theorists,	 is	“deny	…	that	Leo	acted	for	a	reason	and	that	 this	reason	explains	Leo’s	actions”	(Littlejohn,	2012,	p.	154).	Littlejohn	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 holding	 that	 figures	 like	 Leo	 (who,	 as	 is	stipulated,	is	identical	in	all	relevant	respects	to	Carl,	who	is	acting	for	a	reason,	
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save	that	Leo’s	relevant	belief	is	false,	whereas	Carl’s	relevant	belief	is	true)	are	not	acting	for	reasons.	Similar	claims	(though	not	always	arrived	at	through	the	same	 kinds	 of	 considerations)	 are	 made	 by	 Alvarez	 (2010,	 pp.	 141–147),	Bittner	(2001,	p.	114),	and	Mele	(2007,	p.	104).	Now,	the	view	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for	motivating	reasons	sounds	a	lot	like	the	second	of	the	two	options	distinguished	above:	that	figures	like	 counterfactual-Sam	 are	 not	 acting	 on	 grounds.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 see	why	 the	 view	 that	 figures	 like	 Leo	 are	 not	 acting	 for	 reasons	 is	 not	 just	 an	
elegant-seeming	 solution,	 but	 that	 it	makes	 sense	 as	 a	 solution,	 the	 relevant	understanding	of	‘motivating	reason’	cannot	be	as	ground.	And	so,	as	elegant	as	the	solution	seems	(and	maybe	is),	it	is	of	no	help	for	our	problem.	It	will	seem	like	a	solution	 to	our	problem	only	 for	 those	who	conflate	normative	reasons	that	 motivate	 and	 grounds	 (something	 that	 is	 easily	 done	 if	 one	 uses	 the	ambiguous	 term	 ‘motivating	 reason’).	Why	 can	 the	 relevant	understanding	of	the	term	‘motivating	reason’	not	be	as	ground?	Remember	what	grounds	are.	In	part	II,	I	said	that	something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	just	in	case	it	motivates	an	agent	because	she	takes	it	to	be	a	reason.	And	I	argued	that	propositions	or	considerations	are	what	are	best	 suited	 to	play	 that	 role.	Now,	 the	difference	between	Carl	and	Leo	is	that	in	Carl’s	case,	but	not	in	Leo’s	case,	the	proposition	he	has	in	mind	is	a	truth	or	fact.	But	with	regard	to	the	propositions	they	have	in	mind,	there	is	no	difference	between	Carl	and	Leo.	Such	are	the	stipulations	in	play.	And	so,	 there	 is	no	basis	 for	denying	 that	 if	Carl	 acts	on	a	ground,	 so	does	Leo;	it	must	be	the	case	that	if	Carl	acts	on	grounds	of	P,	so	does	Leo.	That	does	not	mean	that	the	idea	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for	
reasons	does	not	make	any	sense.	To	the	contrary,	I	think	that	that	idea	is	quite	correct	 –	 given,	 however,	 that	motivating	 reasons	 (or	 reasons	 for	 which	 she	
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acted)	are	not	understood	as	grounds,	but,	rather,	as	something	like	normative	reasons	 that	 motivate	 (in	 fact,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 presupposed	 by	 our	 four	authors,	 cf.	 Alvarez,	 2010,	 p.	 144;	 Bittner,	 2001,	 p.	 114;	 Littlejohn,	 2012,	 pp.	144–5;	 Mele,	 2007,	 p.	 117).	 For	 if	 motivating	 reasons	 are	 understood	 as	normative	 reasons	 that	motivate,	 then	 it	 seems	not	much	more	 than	 trivially	true	that	figures	like	Leo	are	not	acting	for	reasons,	that	is,	that	figures	like	Leo	are	 not	 motivated	 to	 do	 what	 they	 do	 by	 normative	 reasons.	 For	 normative	reasons	(as	part	I	argued)	are	facts	that	favor	actions.	But	other	than	Carl,	Leo	does	not	have	a	fact	in	view,	for	his	relevant	belief	is	mistaken.	There	is	no	killer	chasing	him.	So,	whatever	it	is	that	motivates	Leo’s	action	cannot	be	a	fact,	and,	thus,	cannot	be	a	normative	reason.	And	so	he	is	not	motivated	to	do	what	he	does	by	a	normative	reason.	I	said	that	the	view	that	false-believing	Sam	is	not	acting	on	a	ground	has	
prima	 facie-attractiveness,	 in	 that	 it	 locates	 her	 outside	 the	 parameters	 in	which	 the	problem	can	arise.	But	 if	we	 locate	 true-believing	Sam	inside	 those	parameters,	 we	 simply	 cannot	 locate	 false-believing	 Sam	 outside	 them.	 For	what	 puts	 true-believing	 Sam	 inside	 those	 parameters	 is	 the	 mere	 fact	 that	what	she	believes	plays	a	certain	role,	namely,	that	it	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	and	 the	 truth-value	 of	 what	 she	 believes	 is	 simply	 irrelevant	 for	 what	 she	believes	being	able	to	play	that	role.		
4.	Giving	up	Explanatorism	About	Grounds		If	the	considerations	that	motivate	someone	to	do	something	need	not	be	truths	(Propositionalism	 about	 Grounds),	 but	 if	 only	 truths	 can	 explain	 actions	(Veridicalism	 about	 Explanantia),	 then	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds	 –	 the	
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view	that	the	grounds	on	which	we	act	are	what	explain	our	actions	–	cannot	be	true.	 So,	 what	 I	 now	 am	 going	 to	 explore	 is	 the	 possibility	 of	 giving	 up	Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds,	 i.e.	 give	 up	 the	 claim	 that	 grounds	 themselves	are	what	explain	actions.		It	 might	 seem	 odd	 to	 say	 that	 what	 motivates	 is	 not	 what	 explains.	Saying	 that	what	motivates	 is	not	what	explains	might	seem	 like	 failing	 to	do	justice	to	the	relevance	of	the	perspective	of	the	agent	within	explanations.	In	Dancy’s	 terms,	 it	 might	 seem	 like	 “subvert[ing]	 the	 purpose	 of	 explanation,	which	is	to	reveal	the	light	in	which	the	agent	came	to	do	what	he	did.“	(Dancy,	2002,	 p.	 97)	 For	 while	 motivation	 is	 a	 first-personal	 phenomenon,	 and	explaining	a	third-personal	phenomenon,	the	difference	between	the	two	must	not	 be	 overstated.	 As	 has	 often	 been	 observed,	 the	 kind	 of	 third-personal	explanation	 at	 issue	 is	 an	 explanation	 that	 is	 essentially	 tied	 to	 the	 first-personal	perspective,	 in	 that	 it	 displays	 the	 agent	 as	motivated	by	 something	she	takes	to	be	a	reason	(Baier,	1969,	p.	153;	Hieronymi	2011,	422;	Raz,	1975,	pp.	18–19;	Wallace,	2003,	p.	433).	However,	giving	up	 the	claim	that	grounds	themselves	 are	what	 explain	 actions	does	not	 amount	 to	 saying	 that	 grounds	play	 no	 role	 at	 all	 in	 explanations.	 We	 can	 (and	 should)	 concede	 that	 a	satisfactory	explanation	of	S’s	Φing	must	bring	to	light	that	P	motivated	S	to	Φ.	But	saying	that	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	P	itself	must	be	what	explains	her	Φing.	Grounds	can	figure	or	feature	in	explanations,	without	playing	the	role	of	the	explanans.	As	Wayne	Davis	puts	it	at	one	point	(calling	grounds	‘reasons’):	We	need	to	distinguish	the	claim	that	actions	can	be	explained	by	stating	
the	reasons	for	which	they	are	performed	from	the	claim	that	the	reasons	
themselves	are	what	explain	the	action.	…	The	statement	that	my	reason	for	saving	was	that	my	son	will	need	money	for	college	does	explain	why	
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I	saved.	But	it	does	not	follow,	and	is	not	true,	that	my	reason	explains	my	action.	(Davis,	2005,	p.	57)	What	I	want	to	do,	in	this	chapter,	is	to	explore	ways	in	which	one	can	give	up	the	 idea	 that	 grounds	 themselves	 explain	 actions,	 without	 denying	 that	 they	play	some	kind	of	role	in	explanations.	Note	that	grounds	can	play	a	role	in	an	explanation	(‘feature’	or	‘figure’	in	an	explanation)	of	S’s	Φing	only	in	a	case	in	which	her	Φing	is	in	fact	done	on	
some	 ground.	 If	 her	 Φing	 is	 not	 a	 Φing	 that	 is	 done	 on	 some	 ground,	 then	obviously,	there	is	no	ground	on	which	she	Φed,	and,	thus,	there	is	no	ground	(i.e.	no	consideration	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground)	that	could	play	any	role	whatsoever	 in	 an	 explanation	 of	 her	Φing.	 (Though	mistakenly	 taking	 it	 that	her	Φing	was	done	on	some	ground,	we	might	of	course	attempt	an	explanation	in	which	supposed	grounds	figure.)	So,	what	we	are	looking	for	is	what	explains	S’s	Φing	not	 in	any	 case	 in	which	 she	 is	Φing,	 but	only	 in	a	case	 in	which	her	
Φing	is	done	on	some	particular	ground.	Note	 also	 that	 in	 a	 case	 in	 which	 S	 Φ’s	 on	 some	 particular	 ground,	explaining	her	Φing	 in	terms	of	 that	ground	would	seem	to	be	but	one	way	 in	which	we	can	cast	some	kind	of	intelligibility	on	her	Φing.	Given,	that	is,	that	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	 is	compatible	with	her	also,	say,	Φing	with	some	end	 in	view,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 we	 can	 cast	 intelligibility	 on	 her	 Φing	 not	 only	 by	revealing	on	what	grounds	she	is	Φing,	but	also	by	revealing	with	what	end	in	view	she	is	Φing.52	For	instance,	when	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella	on	her	way	out	and	does	so	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	e.g.	that	it	is	raining,	it	might																																																									
52	Teleological	 explanations	 are	 discussed	 (in	 widely	 differing	 ways)	 in	 e.g.	Davis	 (2005),	 Sehon	 (2005),	 Smith	 (2000,	 chap.	 4),	 Thompson	 (2008,	 pt.	 II),	and	Vogler	(2002).	
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also	be	true	of	her	that	she	is	taking	her	umbrella	out	in	order	to	stay	dry.	Thus,	we	can	give	an	explanation	of	why	she	takes	out	her	umbrella	not	only	in	terms	of	her	ground	 for	doing	so;	we	can	also	give	an	explanation	of	her	conduct	 in	terms	of	her	end.	While	I	am	happy	to	accept	such	pluralism	about	explanation,	it	is	not	what	is	at	issue	here.53	Here,	I	am	focusing	exclusively	on	explanations	of	S’s	Φing,	in	cases	in	which	S	is	Φing	on	some	particular	ground,	that	are	such	as	to	render	her	Φing	intelligible	with	the	help	of	that	ground.	(So	when	I	say	that	 such-and-such	 is	what	 renders	 S’s	Φing	 intelligible,	 I	 am	not	 saying	 that	there	 is	nothing	else	 that	renders	her	Φing	 intelligible.	 I	am	 just	putting	aside	ways	of	rendering	intelligible	in	which	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	does	not	figure.)	I	will	start	out	by	introducing	three	answers	one	finds	in	the	literature:	Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia,	 Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia,	 and	Reasonism	about	Explanantia.	 I	will	 then	show	 that	 there	are	 two	complaints	that	can	be	made	against	Psychologism	about	Explanantia:	the	Incompleteness	Complaint	 and	 the	 Insufficiency	 Complaint.	 I	 will	 then	 argue	 that	 while	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	avoids	the	Insufficiency	Complaint,	it	can	be	targeted	 by	 the	 Incompleteness	 Complaint,	 and	 that	 while	 Reasonism	 about	Explanantia	 avoids	 the	 Incompleteness	 Complaint,	 it	 can	 be	 targeted	 by	 the	Insufficiency	Complaint.	Based	on	that,	 I	will	suggest	an	account	–	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 –	 that	 combines	 the	 respective	 virtues	 of	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 and	 Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia,	 while	avoiding	 their	 respective	 vices.	 I	 will	 finish	 by	 considering	 some	 objections	against	that	account.																																																									
53	For	an	illuminating	account	of	such	plurality,	cf.	Sandis	(2012,	chap.	5).	
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4.1	Three	Accounts		In	 the	 literature,	 we	 find	 (at	 least)	 three	 accounts	 of	 action-explanation	 that	deny	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds,	 while	 nevertheless	 allowing	 grounds	 to	play	a	role	in	explanations.		
(a)	 Psychologism	About	 Explanantia.	Dancy,	we	 saw,	maintains	 that	the	grounds	on	which	 someone	acts	 are	what	explain	her	action.	Pace	Dancy,	Hyman	writes:	Stating	his	ground	–	the	thing	believed	–	is	a	way	of	explaining	why	he	did	it,	and	his	ground	need	not	be	a	fact.	But	when	we	explain	an	act	in	this	way,	the	explanans	is	not	the	ground,	the	thing	believed,	but	that	he	
believed	it	–	and	this,	by	hypothesis,	is	a	fact.	(Hyman,	2015,	p.	149)	This	 is	an	expression	of	 the	 first	account	of	explanantia	 I	want	to	 introduce.54	According	to	that	view,	(Psychologism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs,	 in	a	case	in	which	S	Φ’s	on	grounds	of	P,	is	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P.	The	idea	is	that	belief-facts	explain	actions	in	that	they	reveal	the	consideration	that	played	 the	 role	of	 the	ground	on	which	 the	agent	performed	 that	 action.	That	 is,	 according	 to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	 the	 fact	 that	 S	believes	that	 P	 renders	 her	 Φing	 intelligible	 in	 that	 it	 reveals	 what	 consideration	(namely,	P)	played	the	role	of	the	ground	for	which	S	Φed.	As	Raz	put	it	in	one	of	his	early	contributions:																																																									54	Hyman	is	a	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	only	in	that	he	takes	it	that	belief-facts	can	explain	actions.	But,	as	we	will	see	below,	he	also	takes	it	that	reasons	can	 explain	 actions.	 This	 suggests	 a	 disjunctivist	 account	 of	 sorts	 about	explanantia.	For	this,	see	below.	
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Reasons	 are	 those	 facts	 by	which	 behaviour	 should	 be	 guided	 and	we	refer	 to	 the	 agent's	 belief	 in	 reasons	 in	 explaining	 intentional	 action	because	 its	 peculiar	 feature	 is	 that	 it	 is	 an	 attempt,	 successful	 or	otherwise,	to	be	guided	by	reason.	(Raz,	1978,	p.	4)	As	 I	 understand	 him,	 Raz	 says	 here	 that	 belief-facts	 explain	 actions	 because	they	 show	 us	 what	 (maybe	 merely	 supposed)	 reason	 guided,	 i.e.	 rationally	motivated,	the	agent.	Note	 that	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	 not	 Psychologism	 about	Grounds.	 The	 Psychologist	 about	 Explanantia	 is	 someone	 who	 subscribes	 to	Propositionalism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia,	and,	thus,	denies	 Explanatorism	 about	 Grounds.	 But	 if	 one	 denies	 Explanatorism	 about	Grounds,	subscribing	to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	not	tantamount	to	a	subscribing	to	Psychologism	about	Grounds.55	Also,	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	 not	 the	 view	 that	 belief-facts	explain	 actions	 in	 that	 they	 reveal	 the	 action	 to	 be	 a	 causal	 effect	 of	 the	respective	 psychological	 state.56	As	 we	 saw	 above,	 the	 view	 that	 actions	 are	causal	effects	of	psychological	states	is	a	reductive	view	about	what	it	is	to	act	on	a	ground.	But	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	a	view	about	what	explains	a	particular	action	in	a	way	that	reveals	it	to	be	done	on	some	particular	ground.	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	compatible	with	giving	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	but	it	is	not	the	same	view.	Moreover,	also	someone	who	
																																																								55	Dancy	seems	to	take	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	to	fail	because	he	takes	Psychologism	about	Grounds	to	be	false.	That	makes	sense	only	if	he	subscribes	to	Explanatorism	about	Grounds.	56	Though	 it	often	goes	hand-in-hand	with	that	view,	cf.	Smith	(2000).	Cf.	also	the	remarks	I	made	in	II.2.1.	
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denies	 that	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground	 is	 forthcoming	can	be	a	Psychologist	about	Explanantia.	I	 will	 discuss	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 as	 the	 view	 that	 facts	about	 beliefs	 whose	 content	 specifies	 the	 agent’s	 ground	 explain	 actions,	 for	this	 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia.	 Psychologists	 about	Explanantia	can	disagree	among	themselves	about	whether	other	psychological	facts	–	like	facts	about	the	agent’s	desires	or	normative	beliefs	–	are	also	part	of	the	 explanans.	 For	 my	 purposes,	 however,	 I	 can	 ignore	 this	 additional	complication.	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	 in	one	or	another	 form,	 is	adhered	 to	by,	 e.g.,	 Lenman	 (2011),	 Raz	 (1978),	 Smith	 (2000),	Wallace	 (2003).	 I	 do	 not	think	 that	 it	 is	 too	 bold	 to	 say	 that	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	something	like	the	standard	view,	to	the	extent	that	there	is	such	a	thing.	As	I	said	 above	 (II.2.3),	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia,	 together	 with	 the	assumption	 that	motivators	are	explanantia,	generates	 the	Psychologistic	side	of	the	Psychologism-Debate	about	so-called	motivating	reasons.		
(b)	 Motivationalism	 About	 Explanantia.	 Distinct	 from	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	is	the	view	that	(Motivationalism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs,	 in	a	case	in	 which	 S	 Φs	 on	 grounds	 of	 P,	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 P	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	ground	on	which	S	Φs.	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 and	Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 both	hold	that	the	explanans	is	a	fact	about	the	agent.	But	the	former	is	distinct	from	the	 latter,	 in	 that	 it	 holds	 that	 the	 relevant	 agential	 fact	 is	 not	merely	 a	 fact	about	 the	 agent	 having	 the	 relevant	 consideration	 in	mind,	 but	 rather,	 a	 fact	
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about,	as	one	might	put	it,	the	agent’s	motivational	economy,	specifically,	a	fact	about	 the	 relevant	 consideration	 being	 motivationally	 operative;	 hence,	 the	name	I	give	the	view.	Here	 is	 another	 way	 of	 putting	 the	 difference:	 We	 can	 conceive	 of	motivation	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 three-place	 relation	 whose	 relata	 are	 an	 agent,	 a	consideration,	and	an	action.	For	when	an	agent	 is	motivated,	 there	 is	always	something	 that	 she	 is	 motivated	 to	 do	 (an	 action),	 and	 there	 is	 always	something	 that	 motivates	 her	 (a	 consideration).	 Now,	 according	 to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	what	figures	in	the	explanans	are	two	of	those	
relata:	the	agent	and	the	relevant	consideration,	the	latter	as	being	believed	by	the	 former.	 But	 according	 to	 Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia,	 it	 is	 the	
relation	 as	 a	 whole	 that	 comprises	 the	 explanans.	 The	 explanans,	 that	 is,	 is	conceived	 of	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 agent	 is	 motivated	 to	 perform	 a	 particular	action	by	a	particular	consideration.	Some	such	view	can	be	found	in	Hieronymi	(2011),	Sandis	(2012,	2013),	and	–	in	 a	 notable	 shift	 away	 from	 his	 previously-held	 view	 –	 in	 Dancy	 (2014).	 At	least,	this	is	the	view	I	glean	from	the	following	quotations:57	We	 can	 say	 that	 what	 explains	 the	 action	 is	 that	 it	 was	 done	 for	 the	
reason	that	p.	(Dancy,	2014,	p.	90;	my	emphasis)	We	 explain	 actions	 by	 citing	 one	 or	 more	 agential	 reasons	 …	 But	 the	explanation	is	not	done	by	the	reason	cited.	What	is	stated	(implicitly	or	explicitly)	is	not	the	thing	that	the	agent	believed,	rather,	the	purported	fact	that	the	person	acted	upon	that	belief.	…	[W]hat	does	the	explaining																																																									
57	According	to	the	terminological	conventions	introduced	in	part	II,	we	should,	in	 the	 following	 three	 quotations,	 read	 ‘reason’	 as	 ‘ground’.	 For	 when	 our	authors	are	talking	about	‘reasons’,	what	they	are	talking	about	are	grounds.	
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is	 […]	 the	 implied	 truth	 that	 they	 acted	 upon	 the	 belief	 (Sandis	 2012,	107–108).58	I	propose	…	that	we	explain	an	event	that	is	an	action	done	for	reasons	by	 appealing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 agent	 took	 certain	 considerations	 to	settle	the	question	of	whether	to	act	in	some	way,	therein	intended	so	to	act,	and	successfully	executed	that	intention	in	action.	I	suggest	that	this	complex	 fact	 …	 explains	 the	 action	 by	 giving	 the	 agent’s	 reason	 for	acting.	(Hieronymi,	2011,	p.	421)		Note	that	I	neither	seek	to	show	that	those	three	authors	are	defending	one	and	the	same	claim,	nor	that	that	claim	is	nothing	other	than	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia.	 I	 take	 their	 respective	 remarks	 to	 be	 inspirational	 for	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	without	committing	myself	to	the	view	that	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	 a	 completely	accurate	 representation	 of	their	views.		
(c)	 Reasonism	 About	 Explanantia.	 Both	 Motivationalism	 about	Explanantia	 and	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 hold	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 a	ground	 is	 distinct	 from	 the	notion	 of	 the	 explanans.	The	 third	 view	 I	want	 to	consider	agrees.	But	other	than	the	first	two	views,	it	is	the	view	that	while	the	respective	notions	are	distinct,	there	can	be	conditions	under	which	instances	of	the	 former	notion	 can	 be	 identical	with	 instances	 of	 the	 latter	 notion,	 that	 is,	that	there	can	be	conditions	under	which	what	explains	the	action	is	 identical	with	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	Specifically,	it	is	the	view	that	under	the																																																									58	‘Belief’	is	to	be	understood	in	the	object-sense,	not	in	the	state-sense.	That	is,	when	 Sandis	 talks	 about	 someone	 “acting	 upon	 a	 belief”,	 he	 is	 talking	 about	someone	acting	upon	what	she	believes,	and	not	about	someone	acting	upon	her	
so	believing.	
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condition	 that	 in	 Φing	 on	 grounds	 of	 P,	 S	 is	 Φing	 for	 a	 normative	 reason	constituted	by	the	fact	that	P,	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	(which	in	such	a	case	 is	a	normative	reason	constituted	by	 the	 fact	 that	P)	 is	what	explains	S’s	Φing.59	Here	is	Heuer:	[W]hen	an	agent	acts	for	a	(specific)	reason	that	very	reason	is	also	the	explanation	(or	at	least	part	of	the	explanation)	of	why	she	did	what	she	did.	Normative	or	justificatory	reasons	and	explanatory	reasons	are	the	same	 reasons	 in	 such	 a	 case,	 and	 not	 different	 kinds	 of	 reasons	altogether.	(Heuer,	2004,	p.	45)	As	 this	 is	 the	 view	 that	 under	 a	 certain	 condition,	 normative	 reasons	themselves	can	explain,	I	call	it	‘Reasonism	about	Explanantia’:	(Reasonism	about	Explanatia)	In	a	case	in	which	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	consideration	P	constitutes	a	Φing	in	appreciation	of	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	that	very	reason.	Reasonists	 about	 Explanantia	 include	 Alvarez	 (2010),	 Bittner	 (2001),	 Heuer	(2004),	Hyman	(2015),	Raz	(2011d),	Stout	(2009),	Stoutland	(2007).	As	such,	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	 is	much	narrower	 in	scope	than	Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 and	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia.	 The	latter	two	talk	about	all	cases	in	which	S	Φs	on	grounds	of	a	consideration,	the	former	restricts	itself	to	cases	in	which	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	a	consideration	constitutes	a	case	in	which	she	is	Φing	in	appreciation	of	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ.	So,	to	compete	with	the	former	two	views,	the	Reasonist	about	Explanantia	has																																																									59	In	II.1.1,	I	said	that	I	will	have	to	leave	it	open	what	the	conditions	are	under	which	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	counts	as	her	Φing	in	response	to	a	normative	reason	constituted	by	the	fact	that	P.	A	plausible	necessary	condition,	however,	is	that	S	knows	that	P	(cf.	Hornsby,	2008;	Littlejohn,	2012,	chap.	4.5;	McDowell,	2013).	
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to	 be	 able	 to	 say	 something	 about	 the	 other	 kinds	 of	 cases	 too,	 the	 kinds	 of	cases	in	which	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	a	consideration	is	just	that,	and	nothing	more.	 Reasonism	 is,	 thus,	 naturally	 aligned	 with	 a	 disjunctive	 account	 of	explanatia,	 according	 to	 which	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 the	 explanans	 differs,	depending	 on	 the	 truth-value	 of	 the	 relevant	 consideration.	 Specifically,	Reasonism	 about	 Explanatia	 is	 naturally	 aligned	 with	 the	 view	 that	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	 is	 the	 correct	view	 for	 the	 cases	 that	 it	 itself	does	not	cover.60	As	for	instance	Alvarez	puts	it,	there	are,	on	the	one	hand,	explanations	whose	explanantia	are	the	agent’s	reasons	for	acting,61	and,	on	the	other	hand,		explanations	whose	explanantia	are	psychological	facts	about	the	agent	…	which,	to	repeat,	are	not	the	agent’s	reason	for	acting	(Alvarez,	2010,	p.	168;	cf.	also	Hyman,	2015,	chap.	6)	This	gives	us	the	view	that	(Disjunctivism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	why	S	Φs,	 in	a	case	in	which	 S	 Φ’s	 on	 grounds	 of	 P,	 is	 either	 P,	 or	 that	 S	 believes	 that	 P;	depending	 on	whether	 S’s	 Φing	 on	 grounds	 of	 P	 constitutes	 a	 case	 in	which	S	Φs	in	appreciation	of	a	normative	reason	or	not.	
																																																								60	I	merely	say	“naturally	aligned”,	as	not	all	Reasonists	would	agree	that	that	is	the	 correct	 thing	 to	 say.	 Some	 (in	 keeping	 with	 one	 understanding	 of	Disjunctivism)	 would	 simply	 refuse	 to	 say	 anything	 positive	 about	 the	 ‘bad’	cases,	cf.	e.g.	Bittner	(2001,	p.	117).	61	Remember,	for	Alvarez,	someone	acts	for	a	reason	only	if	what	motivates	her	is	a	reason,	 i.e.	a	 fact	that	favors	(see	II.2.1	and	III.3.2).	Often,	I	had	to	ask	the	reader	 to	 read	 ‘reason’	 as	 ‘ground’,	 as	many	use	 the	 term	 ‘reason’	when	 they	talk	 about	 grounds.	 But	 Alvarez	 uses	 the	 term	 ‘reason’	 only	 when	 she	 talks	about	 reasons.	 When	 she	 talks	 about	 grounds,	 she	 calls	 them	 ‘apparent	reasons’,	as	they	are	not	reasons,	but	to	the	agent	appear	to	be	reasons.	
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Note	that	a	Disjunctivist	about	Explanantia	is	not	a	Disjunctivist	about	Grounds.	According	 to	 the	 Disjunctivist	 about	 Explanantia,	 what	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	ground	in	the	good	and	the	bad	case	is	the	same	consideration;	it	is	just	that	in	the	good	case,	but	not	in	the	bad	case,	it	is	the	same	thing	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	and	the	role	of	an	explanans.	In	what	follows,	I	will	focus,	first,	just	on	Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia.	 I	 will	 return	 to	 a	 disjunctive	 conception	 of	explanantia	in	III.4.4.		
4.2	Problems	for	Psychologism	About	Explanantia		Psychologism	about	Explanantia	takes	it	that	psychological	facts	render	actions	intelligible	 as	 done	 on	 a	 ground,	 insofar	 as	 they	 bring	 to	 light	 the	 relevant	consideration,	i.e.	the	consideration	that	motivated	S	to	Φ	because	she	took	it	to	be	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ;	or	the	consideration	that	rationally	motivated	her,	as	I	also	 put	 it.	 However,	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 suffers	 from	 two	problems,	or	shortcomings.	First,	belief-facts	can	indeed	be	such	as	to	bring	to	light	the	relevant	consideration	that	rationally	motivated	S	to	Φ.	But	when	they	do,	they	do	not	bring	the	relevant	consideration	to	light	as	a	rational	motivator,	i.e.	as	the	consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground;	they	merely	bring	it	to	light	as	the	content	of	a	belief.	So,	such	facts	fail	to	be	able	to	display	the	agent	as	acting	 on	 grounds	of	 the	 consideration	 they	bring	 to	 light,	 they	only	 show	that	it	is	possible	that	that	consideration	was	the	one	she	acted	on.	Secondly,	the	idea	of	a	believed	consideration	motivating	an	agent	to	act	is	dependent	on	the	idea	 of	 a	 reason	 motivating	 an	 agent	 to	 act.	 But	 the	 Psychologist	 about	Explanantia	does	not	have	in	view	the	idea	that	reasons	themselves	can	figure	in	
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explanantia.	 I	 will	 discuss	 these	 two	 problems	 for	 Psychologism	 about	Explanantia	in	reverse	order.		
(a)	 The	 Incompleteness	 Complaint.	 According	 to	 the	 Psychologist	about	Explanantia,	when	S	Φ’s	on	grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P.	For	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P	brings	to	light	that	S	had	P	in	mind,	and	P	is	the	consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	So,	according	 to	 the	 Psychologist	 about	 Explanantia	 (and	 pace	 Dancy),	 believed	considerations	 are	 not	 themselves	 explanantia.	 Rather,	 according	 to	 the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia,	believed	considerations	figure	in	explanantia.	Now,	in	part	II,	I	said	that	believed	considerations	can	motivate	an	agent	to	 act	 only	 if,	 and	 because,	 she	 takes	what	 she	 believes	 to	 be	 a	 fact	 that	 is	 a	reason	 for	 her	 to	 so	 act.	 This	 has	 an	 interesting	 consequence:	 For	 if	 believed	considerations	motivate	only	if,	and	because,	they	are	taken	to	be	facts	that	are	reasons,	 it	 follows	 that	whatever	motivational	 power	believed	 considerations	have	 is	 dependent	 on	 the	 motivational	 power	 of	 reasons.	 For	 given	 that	believed	 considerations	 motivate	 only	 if,	 and	 because,	 they	 are	 taken	 to	 be	reasons,	 it	 follows	 that	 if	 reasons	 could	 not	 motivate,	 then	 believed	considerations	taken	to	be	reasons	could	not	motivate	either.	As	Raz	nicely	puts	it:	 [B]eliefs	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 reasons	 can	 …	 motivate	 ….	 But	 the	motivating	power	of	these	beliefs	exists	in	the	shadow	of	the	motivating	power	of	 reasons.	 (Raz,	 2011d,	 pp.	 33–34;	 cf.	 also	Hornsby,	 2008,	 and	McDowell,	2013)	If	believed	considerations	can	motivate	only	 if	 reasons	can	motivate,	 then	the	idea	of	believed	considerations	motivating	agents	is	not	a	self-standing	idea,	but	
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dependent	on	the	idea	of	reasons	motivating	agents.	And,	thus,	 it	seems	that	a	theory	of	explanantia	that	focuses	exclusively	on	believed	considerations	–	like	Psychologism	about	Explanantia	–	misses	out	on	something	it	should	not	miss	out	on.	First,	 if	 reasons	 themselves	can	motivate,	 then	reasons	 themselves	can	figure	 in	explanantia	(Heuer,	2004;	Raz,	2011d;	Williams,	1980).	According	to	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	however,	what	figures	in	explanantia	are	only	ever	believed	considerations.	And	although	believed	considerations,	 if	 they	are	true,	can	be	reasons,	they	do	not	figure	in	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia’s	explanations	as	reasons.	So	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	seems	to	fail	to	have	an	existing	type	of	explanantia	in	view.	Secondly,	 if	believed	considerations	can	motivate	only	because	reasons	can	motivate,	 then	 the	 idea	of	 an	 explanans	 in	which	believed	 considerations	figure	 is	dependent	on	an	understanding	of	 the	 idea	of	an	explanans	 in	which	reasons	 themselves	 figure.	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	however,	 focuses	exclusively	on	the	idea	of	an	explanans	in	which	believed	considerations	figure.	And	so	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia	seems	to	not	only	fail	to	have	a	type	of	explanantia	in	view.	She	seems	to	fail	to	have	the	type	of	explanantia	in	view	on	which	 the	 type	of	 explanantia	 that	 she	does	have	 in	view	 is	dependent	 on.	For	 these	 two	 reasons,	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 seems	 to	 be	 an	incomplete	account	of	explanantia.		
(b)	 The	 Insufficiency	 Complaint.	 According	 to	 Psychologism	 about	Explanantia,	 facts	 about	 the	 agent’s	 beliefs	 explain	 her	 actions,	 in	 that	 those	facts	bring	 to	 light	 the	 consideration	 that	played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 If,	 say,	Peter	kept	to	the	edge	of	the	pond	on	grounds	of	the	consideration	that	the	ice	
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in	 the	 middle	 was	 too	 thin	 to	 support	 his	 weight,	 then	 –	 so	 holds	 the	Psychologist	 about	 Explanantia	 –	 the	 fact	 that	 he	 believes	 that	 the	 ice	 in	 the	middle	 is	 too	 thin	 explains	 his	 keeping	 to	 the	 edge,	 in	 that	 it	 reveals	 the	consideration	that	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	Yet	 do	 belief-facts	 really	 manage	 to	 explain	 actions?	 Consider	 the	following	 situation:	 Sam	 picks	 up	 her	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out.	 You	 are	wondering	why	she	is	doing	that.	And	a	passing	Psychologist	about	Explanantia,	in	 an	 attempt	 to	 explain	 to	 you	why	Sam	picks	up	her	umbrella,	 informs	you	that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining.	It	might	very	well	seem	that	you	now	know	why	 Sam	picked	up	her	 umbrella.	 For	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 people	 to	 pick	 up	their	umbrellas	on	grounds	of	considerations	to	the	effect	that	it	is	raining.	And	so,	you	might	 think,	 that	 is	exactly	why	Sam	is	picking	up	her	umbrella.	Now,	however,	 a	 second	 Psychologist	 about	 Explanantia	 arrives	 on	 the	 scene,	informing	you	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella.	That	should	make	you	hesitate.	For	it	is	true	that	it	is	not	unusual	for	people	to	pick	 up	 their	 umbrellas	 on	 grounds	 of	 considerations	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 it	 is	raining.	But	it	is	also	true	that	it	is	not	unusual	for	people	to	take	those	of	their	belongings	with	them	which	they	fear	would	otherwise	be	stolen.	So,	given	that	Sam	not	 only	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 but	 also	 believes	 that	 Peter	 is	 out	 to	steal	her	precious	umbrella,	 it	might	 just	as	well	be	that	the	ground	on	which	she	 picks	 up	 her	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out	 is	 that	 Peter	 is	 out	 to	 steal	 her	precious	umbrella,	as	it	might	be	that	she	picks	up	her	umbrella	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	raining.	Which	belief-fact	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella?	Is	it	the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	it	is	raining?	Or	the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella?	Let	us	stipulate	that	Sam’s	ground	for	picking	up	her	umbrella	is	(for	once!)	not	that	it	is	raining,	but	rather,	that	
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Peter	 is	 out	 to	 steal	her	precious	umbrella.	Does	 that	make	 the	 fact	 that	 Sam	believes	 that	 Peter	 is	 out	 to	 steal	 her	 precious	 umbrella	 any	 better	 as	explanans?	No,	it	does	not.	For	coming	to	see	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	 steal	 her	 precious	 umbrella	 is	 not	 coming	 to	 see	 that	 Sam’s	 ground	 for	picking	 up	 her	 umbrella	 is	 that	 Peter	 is	 out	 to	 steal	 her	 umbrella.	 It	 is	 only	coming	 to	 see	 that	 that	 could	 be	 Sam’s	 ground	 (a	 similar	 point	 is	 made	 by	Sandis,	2012,	pp.	48–50).62	This	 little	 story,	 I	 believe,	 brings	 out	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 Psychologist	about	 Explanantia.	 But	 wherein	 exactly	 does	 the	 problem	 lie?	 In	 part	 II,	 I	distinguished	between	(i)	the	role	of	a	ground,	and	(ii)	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	It	is	with	the	help	of	that	distinction	that	we	can	pinpoint	the	problem	that	our	little	story	brings	out.	I	stipulated	that	Sam’s	ground	for	picking	up	her	umbrella	 is	 that	Peter	 is	out	 to	 steal	her	precious	umbrella.	Nevertheless,	 the	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	precious	umbrella	does	not	explain	why	Sam	picked	up	her	umbrella.	Why	not?	The	fact	that	Sam	believes	that	Peter	is	out	to	steal	her	umbrella	brings	into	focus	the	consideration	that	in	
fact	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 But	 it	 does	 not	 bring	 it	 into	 view	 as	
consideration	 that	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 Rather,	 it	 brings	 it	 into	 view	merely	as	believed	consideration.	That	is	why,	upon	learning	that	Sam	believes	that	 Peter	 is	 out	 to	 steal	 her	 umbrella,	 you	 merely	 learn	 that	 Sam	 was	 in	 a	
																																																								
62	Above,	 I	 said	 that	 explanations	 are	 such	 as	 to	 render	 actions	 intelligible.	Sandis	however	would	say	 that	belief-facts	do	not	explain	actions,	but	merely	render	 them	 intelligible.	 But	 he	 is	 employing	 a	 different	 sense	 of	 the	 term	‘intelligible’.	To	render	an	action	intelligible,	in	his	usage	of	the	term,	is	to	show	that,	 as	 the	 agent	 saw	 it,	 there	 is	 a	 reason	 to	do	what	 she	does,	 and,	 thus,	 to	show	that	and	why	 it	would	make	sense	 for	 the	agent	 to	perform	that	action,	but	 it	 is	not	 to	 say	 that	 that	 supposed	 reason	was	her	ground,	 i.e.	 it	 is	not	 to	explain	her	action.	
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position	to	act	on	that	consideration,	that	is,	that	she	might	have	acted	upon	that	consideration,	but	not	whether	 that	consideration	was	 the	one	she	did	 in	 fact	act	upon.	Even	 if	 the	 consideration	 that	 the	belief-fact	brings	 into	view	 is	 the	one	that	the	agent	in	fact	acted	on,	as	the	belief-fact	does	not	present	it	as	such,	the	belief-fact	will	only	ever	inform	you	about	what	the	agent’s	ground	could	be,	but	not	about	what	it	is	–	even	if	what	it	informs	you	about	happens	to	be	her	ground.	I	will	call	this	the	Problem	of	Insufficiency,	as	the	problem	is	that	the	fact	that	S	believes	that	P	is	insufficient	for	casting	on	her	Φing	the	intelligibility	of	being	done	on	the	ground	that	P.			
4.3	Moving	Beyond	Psychologism	About	Explanantia		I	 have	 just	 argued	 that	 there	 are	 two	 complaints	 that	 can	 be	 made	 against	Psychologism	about	Explanantia:	what	 I	 called	 the	 Incompleteness	Complaint	and	the	Insufficiency	Complaint.	The	 Incompleteness	 Complaint	 is	 the	 complaint	 that	 the	 Psychologist	about	Explanantia	fails	to	take	into	account	that	facts	that	constitute	normative	reasons	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 action-explanations,	 namely,	 in	 cases	 in	which	 the	action	 is	 done	 in	 appreciation	 of	 a	 normative	 reason	 to	 so	 act.	 Now,	 the	Reasonist	 about	 Explanantia	 holds	 that	 under	 a	 certain	 condition,	 the	considerations	 on	 grounds	 of	 which	 the	 agent	 acts	 are	 suited	 to	 explain	 her	action,	namely,	under	the	condition	that	they	are	facts	that	she	appreciates	as	normative	 reasons.	 Thereby,	 she	 makes	 room	 for	 the	 idea	 that	 facts	 that	constitute	normative	reasons	can	play	a	role	in	action-explanations,	and,	thus,	avoids	 the	 first	 complaint.	However,	 in	 holding	 that	 under	 the	 condition	 that	
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the	 considerations	 on	 grounds	 of	 which	 someone	 acts	 are	 facts	 that	 she	appreciates	as	normative	 reasons,	 those	facts	themselves	 are	what	explain	her	action,	 she	 does	 not	 avoid	 the	 second	 complaint.	 Remember,	 the	 second	complaint	was	 that	 the	 fact	 that	 S	 believes	 that	 P	 is	 not	 suited	 to	 explain	 S’s	Φing	in	a	case	in	which	she	Φ’s	on	grounds	of	P,	because	while	it	specifies	what	consideration	 played	 the	 role	 of	 her	 ground,	 it	 does	 not	 specify	 that	consideration	as	playing	the	role	of	a	ground,	and	thereby	merely	displays	S	as	
being	 in	a	position	 to	 act	 on	 grounds	 of	 P,	 but	 does	 not	 display	 her	 as	 in	 fact	acting	on	grounds	of	P.	The	suggestion	that	under	certain	conditions,	facts	that	constitute	 normative	 reasons	 can	 explain	 actions	 fails	 on	 the	 same	 count.	Merely	 specifying	 a	 reason	 there	 is	 for	 S	 to	 Φ	 shows	 us	 that	 things	 were	normatively	speaking	such	that	S	could	act	for	that	reason,	but	does	not	display	S	as	 in	 fact	acting	 in	response	 to,	or	 in	appreciation	of,	 that	reason.	Even	 in	a	case	in	which	S	Φs	in	response	to	a	normative	reason,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	not	 the	normative	 reason,	 but	 the	 fact	 that	 that	 normative	 reason	played	 the	role	of	a	ground	in	S’s	motivational	economy.	So,	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	avoids	 the	 Incompleteness	 Complaint	 that	 plagues	 Psychologism	 about	Explanantia,	 but	 like	 Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia,	 it	 is	 a	 target	 of	 the	Insufficiency	Complaint.	The	 converse	 is	 true	 of	 Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia.	 The	Motivationalist	 about	 Explanantia	 takes	 seriously	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 facts	 that	explain	are	not	just	facts	that	specify	what	the	relevant	consideration	was,	but	facts	 about	 those	 considerations	 playing	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground.	 But	 like	 the	Psychologist	 about	 Explanantia,	 the	Motivationalist	 about	 Explanantia	 fails	 to	make	room	for	the	idea	that	reasons	themselves	can	figure	in	the	explanantia.	So,	while	 the	Motivationalist	 about	 Explanantia	 avoids	 the	 second	 complaint,	
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the	 first	 complaint	 can	 be	 directed	 against	 her,	 just	 as	 much	 as	 it	 can	 be	directed	against	the	Psychologist	about	Explanantia.	The	 upshot	 is	 that	 while	 both	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 and	Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia	 are	 in	 better	 shape	 than	 Psychologism	 about	Explanantia,	neither	of	them	is	completely	satisfactory.		
4.4	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	About	Explanantia		So,	both	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	and	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	are	in	a	better	shape	than	Psychologism	about	Explanantia,	but	neither	of	them	are	completely	satisfactory.	Luckily,	there	is	a	solution	at	hand:	We	can	modify	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 in	 a	 way	 that	 avoids	 the	 Incompleteness	Complaint;	or,	what	in	the	end	amounts	to	the	same,	we	can	modify	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	in	a	way	that	avoids	the	Insufficiency	Complaint.	Call	 cases	 in	which	 S’s	 Φing	 on	 grounds	 of	 P	 is	 a	 case	 of	 her	Φing	 in	appreciation	of	a	normative	reason	for	her	to	Φ	that	is	constituted	by	the	fact	that	P	‘good	cases’;	and	call	cases	in	which	S’s	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	is	merely	a	case	 of	 her	Φing	 on	 grounds	 of	 the	 consideration	 that	 P,	 ‘bad	 cases’.	We	 can	modify	 Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 in	 a	 way	 that	 avoids	 the	Incompleteness	 Complaint	 by	 going	 Disjunctivist.	 According	 to	 the	Motivationalist	 about	Explanantia,	 good	 cases	 and	bad	 cases	 are	 explained	 in	terms	of	the	same	kind	of	motivation-fact,	namely,	in	terms	of	the	fact	that	what	the	agent	believed,	i.e.	P,	was	what	played	the	role	of	her	ground.	In	saying	that,	the	Motivationalist	about	Explanantia	does	not	make	room	for	the	idea	that	as	the	good	case	differs	 from	the	bad	case,	 in	 that	 in	 the	good	case,	what	played	the	role	of	 the	agent’s	ground	was	a	normative	reason,	 this	normative	reason	
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itself	can	figure	in	the	explanation.	Giving	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	a	disjunctive	 rendering	 amounts	 to	 saying	 that	 there	 is	more	 than	 one	 kind	 of	motivation-fact.	 Specifically,	 it	 amounts	 to	 saying	 that	 we	 should	 distinguish	between	 (a)	 the	motivation-fact	 that	 something	 the	 agent	 believed	 was	 what	played	the	role	of	her	ground	(call	that	an	‘epistemic	motivation-fact’),	and	(b)	the	 motivation-fact	 that	 a	 normative	 reason	 was	 what	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	ground	 (call	 that	a	 ‘normative	motivation-fact’).	Note	 that	 (b)	 implies	 (a),	but	not	 vice	 versa.	 That	 is,	 also	 the	 good	 case	 can	 be	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	 an	epistemic	motivation-fact.	 It	 is	 just	 that	 it	 can	also	be	explained	 in	 terms	of	a	normative	motivation-fact.	By	 introducing	normative	motivation-facts,	we	can	make	room	for	the	idea	that	as	the	good	case	differs	from	the	bad	case,	in	that	in	 the	good	case,	what	played	 the	role	of	 the	agent’s	ground	was	a	normative	reason,	this	normative	reason	itself	can	figure	in	the	explanation.	Now,	 saying	 that	 in	 good	 cases,	 the	 fact	 that	 explains	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 a	certain	 normative	 reason	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 (i.e.	 that	 the	 fact	 that	explains	 is	 a	 normative	 motivation-fact)	 is	 just	 what	 the	 Reasonist	 about	Explanantia	should	say,	 if	 she	 takes	 the	 Insufficiency	Complaint	 seriously	and	revises	 her	 account	 accordingly.	 Remember,	 Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	the	view	that	in	good	cases,	what	explains	actions	are	normative	reasons.	This	view	 is	 problematic,	 I	 said,	 because	 merely	 pointing	 out	 that	 there	 is	 a	normative	 reason	 for	 the	agent	 to	do	what	 she	does	 is	not	 sufficient	 to	 show	that	 in	 acting	 as	 she	 did,	 she	 responded	 to	 that	 reason.	 But	 we	 can	 modify	Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia	 in	 a	 way	 that	 avoids	 the	 second	 complaint	 by	saying	that	what	explains	S’s	Φing,	 in	a	good	case,	 is	not	that	reason	itself,	but	the	 fact	 that	 that	 reason	 played	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 for	 S	 (i.e.	 a	 normative	motivation-fact).	 We	 can	 put	 it	 like	 this:	 the	 truth	 in	 Reasonism	 about	
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Explanantia	 is	 that	 in	 good	 cases,	 normative	 reasons	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	explanations.	 That	 truth	 is	 occluded,	 however,	 if	 one	 understands	 that	 as	meaning	that	reasons	themselves	are	what	explain	the	action.	According	to	the	suggested	revision,	what	explains	the	action,	in	good	cases,	 is	the	fact	that	the	reason	in	appreciation	of	which	the	agent	acts	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	I	will	call	the	variant	of	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	that	respects	the	 truth	 in	 Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia,	 i.e.	 that	 respects	 that	 normative	reasons	 can	 play	 a	 role	 in	 explanations,	 ‘Disjunctive	 Motivationalism	 about	Explanantia’:	(Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia)	what	explains	S’s	Φing,	in	a	case	in	which	she	Φs	on	grounds	of	P,	is	either	(in	both	the	good	and	the	 bad	 case)	 an	 epistemic	 motivation-fact,	 or	 (in	 the	 good	 case)	 a	normative	motivation-fact.	Take	Sam.	On	her	way	out,	she	picks	up	an	umbrella.	What	motivates	her	to	do	so	is	what	she	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining.	Now,	according	to	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	regardless	of	whether	what	she	believes	is	a	fact	that	is	a	reason	for	her	to	pick	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out,	the	fact	that	renders	her	picking	up	an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	 intelligible	 is	the	fact	that	what	 she	 believes,	 namely,	 that	 it	 is	 raining,	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 her	 ground.	However,	if	what	she	relevantly	believes	is	a	fact	that	is	a	reason	for	her	to	pick	up	 an	 umbrella	 on	 her	 way	 out,	 then	 we	 can	 also	 render	 her	 picking	 up	 an	umbrella	on	her	way	out	 intelligible	 in	 terms	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	reason	 there	was	for	her	to	pick	up	an	umbrella	played	the	role	of	her	ground,	and	thereby	portray	her	not	only	as	acting	in	a	way	that	is	rationally	motivated,	but	also	as	rationally	motivated	by	reasons.	
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Disjunctive	 Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 is	 superior	 to	Psychologism	 about	 Explanantia	 in	 that	 it	 avoids	 both	 the	 Incompleteness	Complaint	 and	 Insufficiency	 Complaint.	 It	 is	 superior	 to	 (unrevised)	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia,	 in	 that	 it	 avoids	 the	 Incompleteness	Complaint.	It	is	also	superior	to	Reasonism	about	Explanantia	in	that	it	avoids	the	 Insufficiency	 Complaint.	 Thus,	 I	 suggest	 that	 Disjunctive	 Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	is	the	theory	that	one	should	hold	if	one	wants	to	hold	onto	both	Non-Factivism	about	Grounds	and	Veridicalism	about	Explanantia.		
4.5	Replies	to	Some	Objections		I	want	to	finish	by	discussing	and	dismissing	some	objections	and	worries.	The	first	 three	 worries	 are	 directed	 against	 the	 Motivationalistic	 aspect	 of	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	(a-c).	The	fourth	one	is	directed	against	 the	 Reasonist	 aspect	 (d).	 I	 will	 finish	 by	 considering	 whether	 the	objections	 I	 formulated	 against	 some	 other	 disjunctivist	 theories	 considered	above	can	be	used	against	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	(e).		(a)	 The	 first	 objection	 I	 want	 to	 discuss	 is	 directed	 against	 the	Motivationalist	 aspect	of	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia.	Take	the	case	in	which	Sam	takes	out	an	umbrella	on	grounds	of	what	she	believes,	namely,	that	it	is	raining.	According	to	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia,	what	explains	Sam’s	 taking	out	an	umbrella	 is	 the	motivation-fact	 that	 the	believed	consideration	‘that	it	is	raining’	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	But	saying	that	what	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	an	umbrella	is	that	the	consideration	‘that	it	is	raining’	played	the	role	of	a	ground	seems	to	amount	to	
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saying	 that	what	explains	her	 taking	out	an	umbrella	 is	 that	 she	 takes	out	an	umbrella	on	grounds	of	 the	consideration	 ‘that	 it	 is	 raining’,	or	 schematically,	that	 (1) what	explains	S’s	Φing	is	the	fact	that	S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P.	Here	 is	 a	 first	worry	 about	 (1).	 Above	 (II.1.5),	 I	 said	 that	 that,	 at	 least	 under	certain	conditions,	(2) S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P	is	tantamount	to	(3) S	is	Φing	because	P.	But	surely,	(4) Y	is	what	explains	X	is	also	tantamount	to	(5) X	because	Y.	So,	it	would	seem	that	another	way	of	putting	(1)	is	the	paradoxical-looking:	(6) S	is	Φing	because	(S	is	Φing	because	P)	However,	we	get	this	result	only	if	the	first	‘because’	(the	one	that	also	figures	in	 5)	 and	 the	 second	 ‘because’	 (the	 one	 that	 also	 figures	 in	 3)	 are	 to	 be	interpreted	 in	 the	 same	 way.	 But	 I	 have	 already	 established	 that	 grounds	cannot	be	explanantia.	And	so,	the	propositional	component	in	(2)	specifies	the	ground	 on	 which	 S	 Φ’s,	 or	 what	 it	 is	 that	 motivates	 S	 to	 Φ,	 and	 not	 the	explanans	of	her	Φing.	But	 if	 (3)	 is	 tantamount	to	(2),	 then	 it	 follows	that	 the	‘because’	in	(3)	is	not	to	be	understood	as	a	‘because’	of	explanation	of	the	kind	that	figures	in	(5).	It	is	to	be	understood	as	a	‘because’	of	motivation.	That	is,	(2)	tells	us	that	P	was	what	rationally	motivated	S	to	Φ.	It	does	not	tell	us	that	P	is	what	explains	S’s	Φing.	And	if	(3)	is	tantamount	to	(2),	then	the	‘because’	in	(3)	relates	 S’s	 Φing	 and	 P	 as	what	motivates	 and	what	 is	motivated,	 and	 not	 as	
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explanans	 and	 explanandum.	 Therefore,	 (6)	 is	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 non-paradoxial	(7) S	is	Φing	becauseexplanantion	(S	is	Φing	becausemotivation	P).	Let	 me	 note,	 however,	 that	 (7)	 is	 an	 analysis	 of	 action-explanations.	 For	 of	course,	 in	 everyday	 discourse,	 we	 do	 not	 express	 ourselves	 in	 such	 a	circumspect	manner.	In	everyday	discourse,	we	can	say	things	like	(8) “Sam	is	taking	out	her	umbrella	because	it	is	raining”	in	an	explanatory	spirit.	Of	course,	we	do	not	have	to	say	(9) “Sam	 is	 taking	 out	 her	 umbrella	 becauseexplanantion	 she	 is	 taking	 out	her	umbrella	becausemotivation	it	is	raining”	when	 we	 attempt	 to	 explain	 why	 Sam	 is	 taking	 out	 an	 umbrella.	 But	 the	Motivationalist	 about	 Explanantia	 does	 not	 insist	 otherwise.	 All	 she	 holds	 is	that	(9)	captures	the	underlying	structure	of	(8).		(b)	Despite	this	first	clarification,	there	might	still	be	worries	about	the	view	that	what	explains	S’s	Φing	is	the	fact	that	S	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P,	e.g.	that	(1) what	 explains	 why	 Sam	 buys	 some	 potatoes	 is	 that	 Sam	 buys	 some	potatoes	on	the	ground	that	they	are	on	special	offer.	At	one	point,	for	instance,	Dancy	writes	that	he	considered	“[the]	possibility	…	that	the	explanans	of	his	Φ-ing	is	‘his	reason	for	Φ-ing	was	that	p’.”	(Remember	that	according	to	our	convention,	 ‘reason’	must	here	be	read	as	 ‘ground’.)	But	he	says	that	‘his	reason	for	Φ-ing	was	that	p’	cannot	be	the	explanans,	because	it	contains	the	explanandum,	his	Φ-ing.	After	all,	 ‘his	reason	 for	Φ-ing	was	 that	p’	 is	equivalent	 to	 ‘he	Φ-ed	 for	
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the	reason	that	p’,	which	contains	his	Φ-ing	as	a	part.	(Dancy,	2003b,	pp.	480–1)	The	worry,	 that	 is,	 is	 that	 (1)	 is	 circular,	 in	 that	what	 is	 to	 be	 explained	 also	figures	 in	what	 explains,	 and	 thus	 remains	 unexplained.	 To	 see	 the	 problem,	consider	the	following	putative	explanation:	(2) What	 explains	 why	 Sam	 buys	 some	 potatoes	 is	 that	 she	 buys	 some	potatoes	and	the	moon	is	made	of	cheese.	(2)	is	clearly	problematic.	For	contrary	to	what	it	purports,	(2)	does	not	explain	why	Sam	buys	some	potatoes.	 It	 simply	repeats	 that	 she	buys	some	potatoes.	But	is	(1)	really	like	(2)?	It	is	true	that	in	(1),	just	like	in	(2),	Sam’s	buying	some	potatoes	figures	both	in	the	explanans	and	the	explanandum.	But	the	problem	with	 (2)	does	not	 seem	 to	be	 the	mere	 fact	 that	 Sam’s	buying	 some	potatoes	figures	 both	 in	 the	 explanans	 and	 the	 explanandum.	 The	 problem	 with	 (2)	seems	to	be	that	the	explanans	has	the	form	of	a	conjunction,	that	is,	that	what	additionally	figures	in	the	explanans,	besides	Sam’s	buying	some	potatoes,	is	in	no	way	related	to	Sam’s	buying	some	potatoes.	In	general,	we	cannot	explain	P	by	stating	some	conjunction	in	which	P	figures.	In	(1),	however,	the	explanans	has	 the	 form	 not	 of	 a	 conjunction,	 but	 of	 a	 relation;	 specifically,	 a	 relation	between	action-motivator	and	motivated	action,	or	between	ground	and	action	done	on	 that	ground.	So,	 the	explanans	 is	 such	as	 to	reveal	 the	action	 to	be	a	relata	of	some	determinate	motivation-relation.	And	so,	other	than	(2),	(1)	does	explain	why	 Sam	 buys	 some	 potatoes,	 namely,	 in	 that	 it	 displays	 her	 buying	some	potatoes	as	motivated	by	something	she	believes.		(c)	It	 is	plausible	that	when	someone	does	something	on	a	ground,	she	has	 some	 sort	 of	 knowledge	 or	 awareness	 of	 her	 doing	what	 she	 is	 doing	 on	
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grounds	 of	 whatever	 grounds	 she	 is	 doing	 it	 for,	 at	 least	 in	 normal	 cases.	(Moreover,	 it	 is	plausible	that	that	knowledge	or	awareness	 is,	 in	some	sense,	constitutive	 of	 her	 acting	 on	 grounds	 of	 whatever	 it	 is	 that	 she	 is	 acting	 on	grounds	of.	Cf.	Anscombe,	2000.)	One	might	worry	that	Motivationalism	about	Explananatia	does	not	do	justice	to	this	phenomenon.	For	one	might	worry	that	Motivationalism	 about	 Explananatia	 displays	 the	 agent	 as	 systematically	mistaken	about	why	she	does	what	she	does.	Consider	the	following	objection:	When	S	Φ’s	on	grounds	of	P,	and	you	ask	her	why	she	is	Φing,	she	will	be	able	to	tell	you	that	she	is	Φing	because	P,	at	least	in	normal	cases.	But	if	Motivationalism	 about	 Grounds	 were	 correct,	 she	 would	 not	 be	 Φing	because	P,	but	because	P	plays	 the	role	of	her	ground.	And	 that	would	imply	that	agents	are	systematically	mistaken	about	why	they	do	what	they	do:	when	they	Φ	on	grounds	of	P,	they	think	that	they	Φ	because	P,	but	actually,	they	Φ	because	P	plays	the	role	of	a	ground.	But	it	is	absurd	to	think	that	we	are	systematically	mistaken	about	why	we	do	what	we	do.	Therefore,	Motivationalism	about	Grounds	cannot	be	correct.	This	objection	trades	on	the	ambiguity	of	‘because’	that	was	brought	to	light	in	discussion	of	 the	 first	objection.	When	S	 tells	you	 that	 she	 is	Φing	because	P,	what	she	is	saying	is	that	P	motivated	her	to	Φ,	i.e.	what	she	is	saying	is	of	the	form:	 I	am	Φing	becausemotivation	P.	But	when	the	Motivationalist	about	Grounds	says	that	S	is	Φing	because	P	plays	the	role	of	her	ground,	she	is	saying	that	what	explains	S’s	Φing	is	the	fact	that	P	plays	the	role	of	S’s	ground,	i.e.	what	she	says	is	of	the	form:	S	is	Φing	becauseexplanation	P	plays	the	role	of	S’s	ground.	
	 135	
Thus,	 the	 Motivationalist	 about	 Grounds	 says	 nothing	 that	 challenges	 S’s	knowledge	or	awareness	of	what	motivates	her	to	what	she	does.		(d)	 I	said	above	 that	 the	 truth	 in	Reasonism	is	 the	 idea	 that	normative	reasons	can	play	a	role	 in	explanations.	 I	now	want	to	discuss	and	dismiss	an	objection	that	is	directed	against	that	idea.	For	one	might	think	that	despite	all	that	was	said	above,	reasons	themselves	have	no	place	in	explanantia	after	all.	Consider	the	following	case:	Peter	believes	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	pond	is	too	thin	to	support	his	weight,	and	on	grounds	of	what	he	believes,	he	keeps	to	 the	edge	whilst	skating	on	the	pond.	Now,	as	 I	said,	 this	might	or	might	not	be	a	case	in	which	Peter	is	acting	for	a	normative	reason.	It	might	be	a	case	in	which	Peter	is	acting	for	a	normative	reason	(call	that	the	good	case):	For	 it	 might	 be	 that	 the	 ice	 in	 the	 middle	 of	 the	 pond	 really	 is	 too	 thin	 to	support	his	weight,	that	that	fact	is	a	reason	for	Peter	to	keep	to	the	edge,	and	that	Peter’s	believing	what	he	does,	and	taking	what	he	believes	to	be	a	reason	for	him	to	do	what	he	does,	satisfies	whatever	requirements	must	be	satisfied	for	 his	 acting	 on	 grounds	 of	 what	 he	 believes	 to	 count	 as	 an	 acting	 for	 a	normative	 reason	 (see	 II.1.1).	On	 the	 other	hand,	 it	might	 be	 a	 case	 in	which	Peter’s	acting	on	grounds	of	what	he	believes	is	no	more	than	that	(call	that	the	bad	case):	as,	for	instance,	what	Peter	believes	may	be	false.	Does	it	make	any	difference	whether	Peter’s	 case	 is	 a	 good	 case	or	 a	bad	 case?	Does	he	not	do	exactly	the	same	thing	–	keep	to	the	edge	of	the	pond	–	regardless	of	whether	he	is	in	the	good	case	or	the	bad	case?	And	if	he	does	the	exact	same	thing	in	the	bad	case	and	in	the	good	case,	do	we	not	have	to	conclude	that	the	normative	reason,	which	 is	present	 in	 the	good	case,	but	not	 in	 the	bad	case,	should	not	figure	in	the	explanation	of	what	he	does	in	the	good	case?	As	Dancy	puts	it:	
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[T]hat	the	ice	in	the	middle	was	(in	fact)	thin	does	nothing	to	explain	his	action.	He	would	have	acted	in	the	same	way	had	the	ice	not	been	thin.	So	 that	 the	 ice	was	 thin	 does	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 explanation	 of	 his	action	(Dancy,	2014,	p.	91)	Now,	it	 is	true	that	both	in	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case,	Peter	keeps	to	the	edge	of	the	pond.	So	there	is	a	sense	in	which	he	does	the	exact	same	thing	both	in	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case.	That	alone,	however,	should	not	 lead	us	to	think	that	in	the	good	case,	any	mention	of	the	reason	Peter	is	responding	to	is	explanatorily	speaking	superfluous.	Consider	 the	case	 in	which	Peter	believes	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	is	too	thin,	and	keeps	to	the	edge	of	the	pond,	but	does	not	do	so	on	grounds	of	his	belief	about	the	thinness	of	the	ice.	Let	us	say	that	Peter	also	believes	that	 if	he	keeps	to	the	edge,	Sam	will	see	what	a	good	ice-skater	he	is,	and	that	he	keeps	to	the	edge	on	that	ground.	Here,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	Peter	does	the	exact	same	thing	as	he	does	when	he	keeps	to	the	edge	on	the	ground	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	is	thin.	We	can	even	say	that	had	Peter	not	believed	as	he	believed,	namely,	 that	 if	he	keeps	to	the	edge,	Sam	will	see	what	a	good	ice-skater	he	is,	he	would	nevertheless	have	kept	to	the	edge.	For	then,	surely,	he	would	not	disregard	what	he	also	believes,	namely,	that	the	ice	in	the	middle	of	the	pond	is	too	thin.	Although	there	is	a	sense	in	which	he	does	the	exact	same	thing	in	these	two	cases,	it	obviously	does	not	mean	that	those	two	cases	are	to	be	explained	in	the	same	way.	The	cases	are	different	in	that	Peter’s	 grounds	 are	 different.	 And	 this	 difference	 is	 explanatorily	 speaking	relevant.	That	we	can	construct	the	case	so	that	“[h]e	would	have	acted	in	the	same	way”	is	neither	here	nor	there.	Now,	in	our	original	two	cases	–	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case	–	Peter’s	grounds	are	 the	same.	More	precisely,	 they	are	 the	same	with	regard	 to	 their	
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content.	So	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	can	say	about	the	good	case	that	Peter	“would	have	acted	in	the	same	way	had	the	ice	not	been	thin”.	Had	the	ice	not	been	 thin,	 but	 had	 Peter	 nevertheless	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 thin,	 his	 ground	would	 have	 been	 no	 different.	 But	 in	 the	 good	 case,	 Peter’s	 ground	 is	 a	normative	 reason.	 In	 the	 bad	 case,	 it	 is	 a	 mere	 consideration.	 Consequently,	while	there	is	no	difference	in	content	between	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case,	there	is	a	difference	in	status.	Had	the	ice	not	been	thin,	Peter	would	have	acted	in	 the	same	way.	But	what	he	would	 then	have	done	would	not	have	had	 the	same	status	as	what	he	in	fact	does.	The	absence	of	the	reason	would	not	have	changed	 how	 Peter	 behaved,	 though	 his	 behavior	 would	 have	 counted	 as	
something	else;	it	would	not	have	counted	as	action	for	a	reason,	but	merely	as	action	done	on	a	ground.	From	Reasonism	 about	 Explanantia,	 Disjunctive	Motivationalism	 takes	the	 insistence	that	reasons	are	explanatorily-speaking	relevant.	The	mere	 fact	that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 she	 who	 responds	 to	 a	 reason	 would	 act	 no	differently,	 were	 the	 reason	 she	 responds	 to	 merely	 apparent,	 does	 not	dislodge	the	fact	that	reasons	are	explanatorily-speaking	relevant.		(e)	 Let	 me	 finish	 by	 considering	 whether	 the	 objections	 I	 formulated	against	 some	 other	 disjunctivist	 theories	 considered	 above	 (see	 III.3)	 can	 be	used	against	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia.	 I	 considered	 two	ways	 in	which	one	might	seek	to	deal	with	error-cases	by	way	of	giving	them	special	 treatment.	 I	 considered	 the	 option	 that	 in	 error-cases,	 grounds	 are	considerations	about	one’s	own	mind	 (Disjunctivism	about	Grounds),	 and	 the	option	 that	 in	error-cases,	 agents	do	not	act	on	grounds	 (Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking).	I	also	showed	why	neither	of	those	options	will	do.	Disjunctive	
	 138	
Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	 is	also	a	theory	that	holds	that	error-cases	need	different	treatment	than	veridical	cases.	In	what	respect	is	it	different?	Disjunctivism	 about	 Grounds	 fails	 because	 it	 gives	 an	 implausible	account	of	what	kinds	of	considerations	play	the	role	of	a	ground	in	error-cases.	But	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	is	not	a	disjunctive	theory	of	grounds.	It	does	not	hold	that	we	need	a	special	treatment	of	grounds	in	error-cases.	According	 to	 the	Disjunctive	Motivationalist	 about	Explanantia,	 both	 in	good	cases	and	in	bad	cases	it	is	the	same	thing	that	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	namely,	a	proposition.	Indeed,	with	regard	to	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	the	good	case	and	the	bad	case	are	on	a	par.	The	good	case	and	the	bad	case	are	different,	however,	in	that	in	the	good	case,	but	not	in	the	bad	case,	what	plays	the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 has	 the	 status	 of	 a	 reason,	 and	 accordingly,	 the	 agent’s	acting	 on	 grounds	 of	 whatever	 it	 is	 that	 she	 is	 acting	 on	 grounds	 of	 has	 the	
status	 of	 a	 response	 to	 a	 reason.	 So,	 unlike	 Disjunctivism	 about	 Grounds,	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	about	Explanantia	cannot	be	 faulted	for	giving	an	implausible	account	of	what	kinds	of	considerations	play	the	role	of	a	ground	in	error-cases.	Disjunctivism	 about	 Ground-Taking	 fails	 because	 given	 that	 believed	considerations	 play	 the	 role	 of	 a	 ground	 just	 in	 case,	 and	 because,	 they	 are	taken	to	be	normative	reasons	and	motivate	the	agent	on	that	account,	there	is	simply	 no	 basis	 for	 disallowing	 false	 considerations	 to	 play	 that	 role.	Nevertheless,	as	I	explained,	it	is	true	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	those	that	act	on	grounds	of	false	considerations	are	not	acting	for	reasons;	for	contrary	to	what	they	think,	what	they	are	doing	is	not	a	response	to	a	reason.	Disjunctive	Motivationalism	 about	 Explanantia	 caters	 for	 the	 difference	 between	 those	cases	 in	which	someone’s	acting	on	a	ground	amounts	 to	her	responding	 to	a	
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reason,	and	those	cases	in	which	someone’s	acting	on	a	ground	is	no	more	than	that.	However,	unlike	Disjunctivism	about	Ground-Taking,	 it	does	not	 fall	 into	the	trap	of	conflating	reasons	and	grounds.		
5.	Summary		It	is	widely	agreed	upon	that	error-cases,	i.e.	cases	in	which	the	agent’s	relevant	belief	 is	 false,	 pose	 a	 problem	 for	 the	 Non-Psychologist.	 I	 showed	 that	 such	cases	pose	a	problem	for	the	Non-Psychologist	only	to	the	extent	that	grounds	are	 taken	to	be	explanantia.	Thus,	we	can	avoid	the	problem	by	giving	up	the	presupposition	 that	 grounds	 are	 explanantia.	 If	 grounds	 are	 not	 explanantia,	what	explains	actions	that	are	done	on	grounds?	What	explains	actions	done	on	grounds	 are	 motivation-facts,	 i.e.	 facts	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 action	 was	motivated	 by	whatever	 it	 is	 that	 it	was	motivated	 by,	 or	 done	 on	 grounds	 of	whatever	it	was	done	on	grounds	of.	As	things	that	play	the	role	of	a	ground	can	either	be	normative	reasons	themselves,	or	considerations	merely	taken	to	be	normative	reasons,	it	follows	that	motivation-facts	come	in	two	kinds:	there	are	those	that	include	normative	reasons,	and	there	are	those	that	do	not.	
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Summary		I	started	out	by	asking:	When	someone	does	something	for	a	reason,	what	are	the	reasons	for	which	she	does	what	she	does?	What	is	her	‘motivating	reason’,	as	 it	 is	sometimes	put?	The	simple	answer	is:	 it	depends	on	what	 is	meant	by	‘motivating	 reason’.	Non-Psychologists	hold	 that	motivating	 reasons	are	what	the	 agent	 believes.	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 given	 that	 we	 understand	 ‘motivating	reasons’	as	grounds,	this	is	quite	correct,	as	what	we	believe	is	what	plays	the	role	of	 a	ground.	However,	we	have	 to	be	 careful	not	 to	 confuse	 the	 role	of	 a	ground	and	the	role	of	an	explanans.	For	the	conflation	of	those	two	roles	can	occlude	 the	 truth	 in	 Non-Psychologism.	 What	 the	 Non-Psychologist	 about	Grounds	should	say	is	that	what	plays	the	role	of	an	explanans,	when	someone	acts	on	a	 ground,	 is	 a	motivation-fact.	 She	 should	also	 say	 that	 there	 are	 two	kinds	of	motivation-facts:	those	that	include	normative	reasons	and	those	that	do	not.	Let	me	summarize	how	I	arrived	at	that	result.		What	we	seek	 to	 take	 into	account	 in	deliberation	and	advice	–	what	 I	called	 reasons	 –	 are	 facts	 (which	 I	 said	 we	 should	 understand	 as	 true	propositions)	that	favor	actions.	For	the	most	part,	facts	that	favor	actions	are	not	 facts	 about	one’s	 own	mind,	 e.g.	 about	beliefs	 or	desires	one	has	 (cf.	 I.5).	Rather,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	they	are	ordinary	empirical	facts,	like	the	fact	that	it	is	raining,	or	that	the	house	is	on	fire,	or	that	it	is	your	mother’s	birthday	today	(cf.	I.4).	Notably,	however,	such	ordinary	empirical	facts	are	the	reasons	they	 are	 only	 in	 certain	 circumstances;	 in	 other	 circumstances,	 they	 can	 be	reasons	to	perform	quite	different	actions,	or	no	reasons	at	all	(cf.	I.1).	I	argued	that	 in	 saying	 only	 so	much,	 one	 can	 keep	 an	 open	mind	 about	what	makes	reason-claims	of	the	form	‘P,	 in	C,	 is	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ’	true.	That	is,	one	can	
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keep	on	open	mind	about	whether	such	claims	simply	are	primitive	truths,	or	whether	 they	 are	 true	 because	 of	 primitive	 truths	 about,	 say,	 the	 value	 or	goodness	of	Φing,	or	whether	such	claims	are	true	because	an	idealized	alter-ego	of	S	would	treat	P	as	a	reason	for	her	to	Φ	(cf.	 I.3).	I	also	argued	that	one	can	keep	an	open	mind	about	whether	a	certain	fact’s	being	a	reason	for	S	to	Φ	is	 dependent,	 in	 some	 way	 or	 another,	 on	 S’s	 conative	 and/or	 cognitive	situation.	For	instance,	it	might	be	that	the	fact	that	a	certain	drug	will	cure	the	patient’s	illness	is	a	reason	for	you	to	give	that	patient	said	drug	only	if	there	is	some	way	in	which	you	can	come	to	know	that	it	cures	her	illness,	or	it	might	be	that	 it	 is	 a	 reason	 regardless	of	whether	 there	 is	 some	way	 in	which	you	can	come	 to	know	that	 it	 cures	her	 illness.	And	 it	might	be	 that,	 say,	 the	 fact	 that	your	friend	is	 in	trouble	is	a	reason	for	you	to	help	her	out	only	given	certain	facts	 about	 your	 desires	 or	 interests,	 or	 it	might	 be	 a	 reason	 no	matter	 your	conative	condition.	 I	said	that	one	can	keep	on	open	mind	on	such	 issues.	We	can	do	that,	because	we	can	understand	those	options	as	differing	views	about	what	the	relevant	circumstances	are	in	which	a	certain	fact	is	the	reason	that	it	is	(cf.	I.2).	I	 employed	 this	 account	 of	 normative	 reasons	 in	 an	 argument	 to	 the	effect	 that	 rational	motivators,	 i.e.	 things	 that	 play	what	 I	 called	 the	 role	 of	 a	ground,	 are	 (believed)	 propositions,	 and,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 not	 propositions	about	one’s	own	mind.	Something	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	in	S’s	Φing,	I	said,	just	in	case	(a)	S	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	(b)	S	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ,	where	(a)	and	(b)	are	related	in	that	(c)	S	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ	because	she	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing	(cf.	II.1).	Given	that	what	we	take	to	be	reasons	are	true	propositions	or	facts,	I	argued	that	it	follows	that	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	can	be	a	true	proposition,	but	that	the	truth-value	of	a	proposition	is	
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not	essential	to	its	being	able	to	play	the	role	of	a	ground	(cf.	II.3).	Moreover,	I	argued	that	while	there	are	cases	in	which	we	take	propositions	about	our	own	mind	to	be	reasons,	these	cases	are	rare.	In	normal	cases,	the	propositions	we	take	to	be	reasons	are	propositions	about	the	world	around	us	(cf.	II.4,	I.5).	So,	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	Non-Psychologistic	in	two	senses:	it	is	not	a	psychological	state,	but	a	proposition,	and	the	propositions	that	play	the	role	of	a	ground	are	not	restricted	to	propositions	about	psychological	states.	In	 recent	 time,	 there	 has	 been	 much	 debate	 about	 whether	 so-called	motivating	 reasons	 are	 to	 be	 conceived	 of	 as	 Psychologistically,	 i.e.	 as	psychological	 states,	 or	 propositions	 about	 such	 states,	 or	 Non-Psychologistically,	 i.e.	 as	 propositions	 that	 are	 not	 constrained	 to	 a	psychological	 matter	 (cf.	 II.2).	 But	 contributions	 to	 the	 Psychologism-Debate	(as	 I	 called	 it)	 often	 lack	 proper	 clarification	 of	 the	 notion	 (or	 better:	 the	notions)	 of	 a	 ‘motivating	 reason’.	 I	 argued	 that	 when	 Non-Psychologists	 talk	about	 ‘motivating	 reasons’,	 they	 are	 talking	 either	 about	 (i)	 grounds	(‘motivating	 reason’	 is	 then	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘motivator	 that	 motivates	because	it	is	taken	to	be	a	reason’),	or	about	(ii)	those	grounds	that	are	reasons	(‘motivating	 reason’	 is	 then	 to	 be	 understood	 as	 ‘reason	 that	motivates’).	 As	grounds	are	propositions,	and,	for	the	most	part,	not	propositions	about	one’s	own	 mind,	 Non-Psychologism	 about	 motivating	 reasons	 (where	 motivating	reasons	 are	 understood	 as	 grounds)	 is	 correct.	However,	when	Psychologists	talk	 about	 ‘motivating	 reasons’,	 they	 usually	 are	 neither	 talking	 about	
motivators	 that	 motivate	 because	 they	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 reasons,	 nor	 about	
normative	 reasons	 that	 motivate.	 Rather,	 they	 are	 talking	 about	 (iii)	 what	explains	actions	(i.e.	explanantia),	in	the	sense	of	what	‘makes	sense’	of	actions.	Or	they	are	offering	a	reductive	account	of	acting	on	a	ground,	and	what	they	
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call	 ‘motivating	 reasons’	 are	 (iv)	 psychological	 states	 that,	 according	 to	 their	account,	 play	 some	 role	 in	 the	 production	 of	 behavior	 that	 counts	 as	 action	done	on	a	ground	(cf.	II.2.1,	II.2.2).	Now,	this	clarification	does	not	render	the	Psychologism-Debate	merely	verbal.	 For	 it	 is	 often	 presupposed	 that	 motivating	 reasons,	 understood	 as	grounds,	are	explanantia.	And	if	one’s	view	is	that	something	plays	the	role	of	S’s	motivating	reason	just	in	case	(a)	S	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	(b)	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ,	(c)	is	motivated	by	it	to	Φ	because	she	takes	it	to	speak	in	favor	of	Φing,	and	(d)	it	explains	why	S	Φs,	and	one	holds	that	what	plays	that	role	is	a	non-psychological	proposition,	then	one	has	a	real	issue	with	someone	who	holds	that	what	explains	actions	are	psychological	states	(cf.	II.2.2-3).	However,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 for	 distinguishing	 between	 grounds	and	 explanantia.	 It	 is	 often	 said	 that	 Non-Psychologists	 cannot	 properly	 deal	with	error-cases	(cf.	III.1).	For	the	Non-Psychologist	will	say	things	like	that	in	taking	out	her	umbrella,	Sam	acted	on	grounds	of	what	she	believed,	which	is,	say,	that	 it	 is	raining.	But	if	Sam’s	belief	that	 it	 is	raining	is	false,	 it	 is	thought,	the	Non-Psychologist	will	have	to	implausibly	say	that	the	falsehood	‘that	 it	 is	raining’	is	what	explains	why	Sam	takes	out	her	umbrella.	And	while	that	bullet	has	been	bitten	(cf.	III.2),	doing	so	is	certainly	something	that	we	should	seek	to	avoid.	 As	 I	 put	 it,	 the	 problem	 at	 issue	 can	 be	 conceived	 of	 in	 terms	 of	 the	following	inconsistent	triad	(cf.	III.1.2):	(1) what	plays	 the	 role	of	 a	 ground	are	propositions	 (Propositionalism	about	Grounds)	(2) what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	also	plays	the	role	of	an	explanantia	(Explanatorism	about	Grounds)	(3) falsehoods	cannot	explain	(Veridicalism	about	Explanantia)	
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As	(1)	is	true	(cf.	II.1.3),	and	(3)	is	true	(cf.	III.1,	III.2),	(2)	must	be	false,	that	is,	we	should	hold	grounds	and	explanantia	apart.	However,	if	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	is	not	what	plays	the	role	of	an	 explanantia,	 then	 what	 does	 play	 that	 role?	 I	 argued	 that	 when	 S	 Φs	 on	grounds	of	P,	what	explains	her	Φing	is	the	fact	that	she	is	Φing	on	grounds	of	P.	 To	 put	 it	 differently:	 that	 which	 plays	 the	 role	 of	 the	 explanans	 in	 an	explanation	of	her	Φing	is	not	what	plays	the	role	of	a	ground,	i.e.	P,	but	rather,	a	fact	to	the	effect	that	P	plays	the	role	of	a	ground	(a	motivation-fact,	as	I	put	it).	Furthermore,	the	considerations	that	play	the	role	of	a	ground	can	have	the	status	of	a	reason,	but	they	can	also	have	the	status	of	a	mere	consideration.	So,	while	actions	can	be	explained	in	terms	of	facts	to	the	effect	that	those	actions	were	 done	 on	 grounds	 of	 a	 certain	 consideration,	 quite	 regardless	 of	 what	status	 that	 consideration	has,	 in	 cases	 in	which	 the	 consideration	 that	played	the	role	of	a	ground	has	the	status	of	a	reason,	 the	action	can	be	explained	 in	terms	of	a	fact	to	the	effect	that	that	reason	played	the	role	of	a	ground.	That	is	to	 say,	 motivation-facts	 come	 in	 two	 sorts:	 there	 are	 those	 that	 involve	 and	those	 that	 do	 not	 involve	 reasons,	 and	 those	 two	 kinds	 of	 motivation-facts	differ	in	their	explanatory	power	(cf.	III.4.2,	III.4.4-5).	So,	to	recapitulate,	I	have	argued	that	what	speaks	in	favor	of	someone’s	performing	some	particular	course	of	action	can	be	what	rationally	motivates	her	to	so	act,	but	that	not	all	rational	motivators	are	reasons.	For	something	to	be	a	rational	motivator,	 it	suffices	 that	 it	 is	 taken	to	be	a	normative	reason,	 it	need	 not	 in	 fact	 be	 one.	 Further,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 one	 should	 distinguish	motivation	 and	 explanation:	 motivators	 are	 not	 explanantia.	 Rather,	explanantia	 are	 facts	 about	 motivators.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 this	 amounts	 to	 a	defense	 of	 Non-Psychologism	 about	 motivating	 reasons,	 at	 least	 as	 long	 as	
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motivating	 reasons	 are	 understood	 as	 rational	 motivators,	 i.e.	 grounds.	 For	explanantia	 are	 truths,	 while	 what	 rationally	 motivates	 someone	 can	 be	 a	falsehood.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 it	 transpired	 that	 the	 Psychologism-Debate	 rests	 on	 the	 false	 assumption	 that	 grounds	 are	 explanantia,	 and	 that	Non-Psychologism	 about	 motivating	 reasons	 lacks	 a	 satisfactory	 theory	 of	action-explanation.	I	hope	to	have	shown	what	such	a	theory	must	look	like.		 	
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